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INTRODUCTION
This Article is the first of what is intended to be an annual discussion
of cases decided by American Courts regarding Federal Indian Law. This
collected work was inspired by the work of Symeon Symeonides and the
American Journal of Comparative Law, who have produced a summary of
cases discussing choice of law and conflict of laws for the last thirty years,1
as well as Steve Wise and Stephen Sepinuck’s coauthored survey of
personal property secured transactions published annually by The Business
Lawyer.2
The law changes. To keep current on the law and to avoid the dangers
of malpractice, most states require licensed attorneys to complete
Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses. However, no amount of CLEs
can perfectly capture all of the changes in an area of law in a given year.
Moreover, there is a benefit to everyone involved in the field (scholars,
practitioners, students, judges, and even interested observers) having a
collected compendium of recently decided cases.
To ensure that the project identified all eligible cases, the author has
searched Lexis for all cases containing the words “Indian” or “Tribe”
published between January 1, 2017, and December 31, 2017. Invariably,
this search produced thousands of false-positives: cases involving Indian
Harbor Insurance, the city of Indian Springs, Nevada, and persons from
the country of India, as well as cases citing to noted Harvard law professor
Laurence Tribe. Admittedly, the project misses the hundreds of cases that
may involve aspects of Indian law that are settled and then dismissed, in
which a plea agreement is reached or where the judge decides the relevant
1. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2016: Thirtieth Annual
Survey, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2017).
2. Steve Wise & Stephen L. Sepinuck, Personal Property Secured Transactions, 71 BUS. LAW.
1323 (2016). The author is personally indebted to Stephen Sepinuck, who presented on the importance
to legal scholars of maintaining an active reading list of cases in their given subject area during the
2016 Central States Law School Association annual conference held at the University of North Dakota
in September 2016.
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issue(s) from the bench without a written opinion.3 The project also misses
opinions issued by tribal courts.4 However, this collection is otherwise an
excellent representation of the written opinions by state and federal courts
in 2017 and thus captures the fact patterns and legal reasoning that have
precedential value. While there is admittedly a risk of missing a relevant
case that does not use either “Indian” or “Tribe” anywhere in the opinion,
the risk is acceptably small.
Such a broad search contains many cases that apply existing law to a
very similar set of facts and therefore do not add anything to the current
canons of Indian law. It also includes many unpublished opinions. These
cases were selectively included based on the author’s understanding of
how helpful their inclusion might be to an annual collection of the law.
Invariably, such search terms also yield court orders, summary dismissals,
interlocutory rulings, and other court decisions that may not be opinions
on the merits but, if given sufficient discussion, speak to important aspects
of federal Indian law. These were included based on the author’s judgment
of their usefulness to the intended audience.
The end result is a comprehensive review of Indian law for 2017 that
necessarily makes some judgment calls about the inclusion of material. It
does not include a citation to every case related to Indian law issued by the
courts but tries to incorporate the majority of opinions into its catalog to
provide a robust discussion of the changes in Indian law over the course
of 2017. The discussion here is provided as objectively as possible. It is
intended to be a faithful summary of the relevant cases without judgment
on whether the court got the law right or whether the case is consistent
with previous authority.
Part I of this Article provides some general statistics about Indian
law in 2017. Part II focuses on activity at the U.S. Supreme Court, which
is the most watched forum for Indian law cases for obvious reasons. Part
III groups cases by subject area and arranges those subject areas
alphabetically. The goal of such an organization is to provide easier access
to new, relevant materials for readers who may be specifically interested
in a certain area of Indian law. Part IV covers some other developments
3. Capturing these cases is literally impossible. When a judge rules from the bench or a settlement
agreement is shared only between the parties, the decisions are not written and therefore cannot be
captured through any method of case collection.
4. There are also cases published by tribal courts, which are certainly relevant to Indian law but
are not collected and indexed by Lexis. These cases are not included in this survey given the difficulty
of obtaining and organizing all of their important insights. This would be an excellent project for future
scholars but is outside the scope of this undertaking. The Indian Law Reporter does publish some
decisions from tribal courts—but not all. Other tribes have their own reporters (for example, the
Navajo Nation and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation). However, no effort to read and report all of these
cases has been made here.
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often touched on by just one or two cases the entire year, but they are
included in this Article for purposes of completeness. Finally, the
Conclusion provides just a few short concluding remarks. Given that this
is the first year the author has collected and published a list of cases, the
author encourages and welcomes feedback from every reader with
suggestions for how future iterations of this catalog could be edited to be
more useful.
I.

SOME STATISTICS

A thorough search of the literature shows there has been almost no
attention paid to an annualized survey of Indian law cases—the two
notable exceptions being Nell Jessup Newton’s One Year in the Life of
Twenty Tribal Courts, in which Professor (now Dean) Newton provides
her insights from reading the eighty-five tribal court opinions published in
the Indian Law Reporter in 1996,5 and Professor Kathryn Fort’s The
Cherokee Conundrum: California Courts and the Indian Child Welfare
Act, in which Professor Fort uses Westlaw to survey the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) opinions decided by courts between January 1, 2007,
and February 29, 2008.6
Having carefully searched and read all of the cases in Lexis using the
terms “Indian” or “Tribe,” I can provide some interesting statistics about
the landscape of Indian law in 2017. There were 646 written opinions in
cases that substantively addressed Indian law issues. This omits many
cases in which an Indian was a party to the proceedings but the case did
not involve questions of Indian law. Among the most common omitted
scenarios were criminal appeals where Indians were convicted and then
appealed for ineffective assistance of counsel, where individuals claimed
employment discrimination on the basis of their Indian status, or
procedural cases against the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Indian Health
Service that raised purely administrative or procedural questions but did
not require the interpretation of Indian law.
Of the 646 opinions, 252 of them involved the ICWA, and 176 of
those came out of California. This is in keeping with Professor Fort’s
analysis on ICWA from 2007, both in terms of the large number of cases
and California’s disproportionate share of those cases.7 Of the 646
opinions, 74 of them were issued by federal appellate courts, and only two
5. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts,
22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 290 (1998).
6. Kathryn E. Fort, The Cherokee Conundrum: California Courts and the Indian Child Welfare
Act 18 (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 0707, 2009), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/ssrn-id13922931.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2Y7N-V7TB].
7. Id. at 18–19.
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were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.8 The following charts provide a
catalog of the number of Indian law opinions decided by each federal
appellate court and the ten federal district courts that decided seven or
more substantive Indian law opinions. Generally the charts provide few
surprises, with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits having the busiest Indian law
caseloads from an appellate perspective and federal district courts in
California, Washington, South Dakota, New Mexico, and Arizona, which
all have large Indian populations,9 carrying the largest Indian law
caseloads among district courts in the country.
Federal Circuit Ct.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Federal

# Cases
2
1
0
1
0
0
1
4
36
22
0
2
5

Federal District Ct.
E.D. Cal.
W.D. Wash.
D.S.D.
D.N.M.
D. Ariz.
D.D.C.
N.D. Cal.
S.D. Cal.
D. Mont.
Fed. Cl.

# Cases
32
27
22
21
18
16
8
7
7
7

The number of Indian law cases decided in state courts is skewed
substantially by the large number of ICWA cases. In addition to
8. Infra Part II. The Supreme Court issued one full length opinion on an Indian law question in
2017: Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (discussing the ability of a tribal employee to raise
sovereign immunity as a defense to a suit brought against him in his personal capacity). The other
opinion is actually a denial from certiorari: Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d
372 (2017). Justice Thomas wrote a dissent from the denial of certiorari on the basis that the Indian
Commerce Clause should not be read to give Interior the broad power to take land into trust. His
dissent was not joined by any other Justice.
9. See TINA NORRIS, PAULA L. VINES & ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at 7 (Jan. 2012), https://www.census.
gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/876D-M3DU] (noting the total and
comparatively large relative numbers of American Indians in states like California, Washington, South
Dakota, New Mexico, and Arizona). While states like New York and Texas also have large Indian
populations, they do not have as many reservations and so their native populations are much less likely
to get involved in questions of Indian law, which are inherently tied to tribal governments and
reservation or allotted lands.
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California’s 176 decisions, state courts in Alaska issued 11 ICWA
opinions, Arizona issued 8, Michigan issued 6, and Washington, Kansas,
and Colorado all issued 5. While most of Indian law raises federal
questions due to the unique and complicated nature of the relationship
between tribes, the several states, and the federal government, state courts
also decided a number of tax cases, jurisdictional questions in Public Law
280 cases, and cases where the tribe invoked sovereign immunity as a
defense to litigation.
The statistics presented here are offered only to present an overview
of Indian law in the year 2017. The following Parts provide more detailed
discussion on the evolution of the various Indian law doctrines across state
and federal courts during the calendar year.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT

Since 1953, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard an average of between
two and three Indian law cases a year.10 However, during the 2016–2017
term the Supreme Court decided a single Indian law case, Lewis v. Clarke,
in the spring of 2017.11 The 2017–2018 term has proved more fruitful. As
of December 31, 2017, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in two
Indian law cases,12 and Justice Thomas had issued a lone dissent from
denial of certiorari in a third.13
A.

The 2016–2017 Term

The sole Indian law case decided by the Supreme Court in 2017 was
an appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court that raised the question of
when a tribal employee can assert sovereign immunity to avoid liability in
civil litigation. In Lewis v. Clarke, non-Indian petitioners were driving on
a Connecticut highway when they were struck from behind by a vehicle
driven by the respondent, an employee of the Mohegan Sun Casino, while
he was transporting casino patrons.14 Petitioners brought a negligence
action in Connecticut state court against the respondent in his personal
10. Grant Christensen, Judging Indian Law: What Factors Influence Individual Justice’s Votes
on Indian Law in the Modern Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 267, 290 n.121 (2012). Professor Matthew
Fletcher has an excellent piece discussing the Supreme Court’s behavior concerning accepting cases
for review. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier
to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009).
11. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 1285.
12. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe,
187 Wn.2d 857, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017). On January 12, 2018, just after the first draft of this
Article was submitted, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a third case to be decided during the
2017–2018 term: United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct.
735 (2018). For a discussion of this case, see infra Part III.S.
13. Upstate Citizens for Equal., 199 L. Ed. 2d 372.
14. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1286.
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capacity.15 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the defendant could
assert sovereign immunity because he was acting within the scope of his
employment when the accident occurred.16 Moreover, the petitioners had
an available forum in tribal court where the tribe had waived immunity
from suit.17
Justice Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion, which reversed the
decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court and limited the scope of tribal
sovereign immunity by focusing on the real party in interest.18 The Court
clarified that in tort cases where plaintiffs seek liability not from the tribe
but against the tribal employee in their personal capacity, sovereign
immunity is not designed to shield that defendant for liability for what is,
essentially, their own personal negligence.19
However, the Court cautioned that not all cases that name the
individual employee as the defendant are necessarily cases that are seeking
to recover against the employee in their personal capacity. The Court
reasoned that a proper inquiry needs to be made into who is the real party
in interest.20 The Court explained that while sovereign immunity is a
defense in official capacity suits, it is not available when a defendant is
sued in their personal capacity.21 Applying those principles to this case,
Justice Sotomayor reasoned that here, a claim was made against the driver
in his personal capacity for his personal negligence while operating an

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1290–91 (“The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding that tribal sovereign
immunity did bar the suit. 320 Conn. 706, 135 A. 3d 677 (2016). The court agreed with Clarke that
‘because he was acting within the scope of his employment for the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority
and the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority is an arm of the Mohegan Tribe, tribal sovereign immunity
bars the plaintiffs’ claims against him.’”).
17. See id. at 1290 (“Of particular relevance here, Mohegan law sets out sovereign immunity and
indemnification policies applicable to disputes arising from gaming activities. The Gaming Authority
has waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in the Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court.
Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, § 1; Mohegan Tribe Code § 3-250(b).”)
18. Id. at 1288–94 (“We hold that, in a suit brought against a tribal employee in his individual
capacity, the employee, not the tribe, is the real party in interest and the tribe’s sovereign immunity is
not implicated. That an employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time the tort
was committed is not, on its own, sufficient to bar a suit against that employee on the basis of tribal
sovereign immunity.”).
19. Id. at 1292 (“This is a negligence action arising from a tort committed by Clarke on an
interstate highway within the State of Connecticut. The suit is brought against a tribal employee
operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment but on state lands, and the judgment will not
operate against the Tribe. This is not a suit against Clarke in his official capacity. It is simply a suit
against Clarke to recover for his personal actions . . . .”).
20. Id. at 1291–93 (“In an official-capacity claim, the relief sought is only nominally against the
official and in fact is against the official’s office and thus the sovereign itself. . . . Personal-capacity
suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken
under color of state law. . . . [A]nd the real party in interest is the individual, not the sovereign.”).
21. Id. at 1292.
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automobile, and therefore, he was the real party in interest.22 Accordingly,
the Court found that the defendant was not able to avail himself of the
tribe’s sovereign immunity.23
The Court further held that, although tribal law required the tribe to
indemnify the defendant, indemnification does not change either the real
party in interest or the ability of the driver to claim sovereign immunity.24
Essentially, the court suggested that when determining who is the real
party in interest, the question is not who ultimately pays but rather whose
liability the plaintiff is seeking to recover under. When the plaintiff
assumes the liability regardless of any pre-arranged indemnification, the
plaintiff—not the tribe—is the real party in interest. While the tribe may
indemnify Clarke for any negligence that occurred as a result of his driving
a vehicle on Connecticut roads as a part of his employment, that
indemnification does not convert a claim against him in his personal
capacity to an official capacity case.
Justices Thomas and Ginsburg each contributed a short concurrence
expressing their views that tribal sovereign immunity should be more
narrowly construed than the Court’s current jurisprudence allows, but
because they agreed with the outcome as applied to an employee of a tribal
enterprise, they each concurred in the judgment. Justice Thomas wrote to
express his view that “tribal immunity does not extend ‘to suits arising out
of a tribe’s commercial activities conducted beyond its territory.’”25
Justice Ginsburg added that “tribes, interacting with nontribal members
outside reservation boundaries, should be subject to nondiscriminatory
state laws of general application.”26 Despite the separate concurrences, the
ultimate decision was an 8–0 victory for the appellant.27
Application of Lewis v. Clarke in 2017
Although it was only decided on April 25, 2017, the Lewis v. Clarke
opinion has already been cited in written opinions by many lower courts.28
22. Id. at 1291–93 (“[H]ere, that immunity is simply not in play. Clarke, not the Gaming
Authority, is the real party in interest.”).
23. Id. at 1295.
24. Id. at 1293–94 (“The Tribe’s indemnification provision does not somehow convert the suit
against Clarke into a suit against the sovereign; when Clarke is sued in his individual capacity, he is
held responsible only for his individual wrongdoing.”).
25. Id. at 1294.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1287–88. The case was argued on January 9, 2017, and so Justice Gorsuch had not yet
been nominated, let alone confirmed, to his seat on the Supreme Court. In accordance with Supreme
Court practice, because he did not participate in the argument, he did not vote on the final issued
opinion.
28. See Pennachietti v. Mansfield, No. 17-02582, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203005 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
11, 2017); Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, No. CIV. 16-5105-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149120
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In Pennachietti v. Mansfield, the plaintiff, who had borrowed money from
a payday lender owned by the Lac Vieu Desert Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians, brought suit against the manager of the lender in his
personal capacity for a series of tortious claims under state and federal
law.29 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited to Lewis v. Clarke as part
of its refusal to grant the defendant summary judgment on the basis of
sovereign immunity.30
The federal court in South Dakota applied Lewis v. Clarke to a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by an Indian against several officers of the
Oglala Sioux Tribe, including a former tribal judge, related to his detention
after he was arrested pursuant to two different tribal warrants issued for
failing to appear in tribal court to address speeding tickets.31 In Stanko v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, the federal court dismissed claims against the
individuals acting in their official capacity because “[t]he Tribe’s
immunity extends to its officers acting in their official capacities.”32 To
justify its conclusion the court cited directly to Lewis v. Clarke:
“‘Defendants in an official-capacity action may assert sovereign
immunity.’”33 The court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim
against the tribal officers in their individual capacity because the alleged
violations of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the individual
defendants were not conducted under color of “state” law as required in a
§ 1983 action but instead under “tribal” law.34 One week later the court
dismissed a nearly identical set of claims against employees of the Kyle
jail and tribal employees in the criminal justice system.35
(D.S.D. Sept. 14, 2017); Alexander v. New York, No. 6:17-CV-725 (GTS/ATB), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108745 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017); Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 851 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 2017); Harrison v. PCI Gaming Authority,
No. 1130168, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 98 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017).
29. Pennachietti, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203005, at *1–3.
30. Id. at *4–11. The defendant argued that he was acting within the scope of his employment
and therefore this is really a suit against him in his official capacity, but the district court disagreed:
This is a personal capacity suit to recover money damages solely from Mansfield for his
personal actions, and extending tribal sovereign immunity to him simply because he was
acting within the scope of his employment would extend that immunity beyond what
common-law sovereign immunity principles would recognize for government employees.
Id. at *8.
31. Stanko, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149120, at *1–3.
32. Id. at *8.
33. Id. (citing Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017)).
34. Id. at *12 (“There is no allegation in the complaint that the Individual Tribal Defendants
were acting under color of state law. It is also improper for the court to infer from the complaint that
the Individual Tribal Defendants were acting under color of state law. Section 1983 does not provide
jurisdiction for plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Tribal Defendants.”).
35. See Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, No. CIV. 17-5008-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152933
(D.S.D. Sept. 20, 2017).

2018]

The Year in Indian Law 2017

815

The effects of Lewis v. Clarke are already prolonging litigation. In
Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, the Utah
Supreme Court partially reversed a state appellate court opinion that had
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against tribal officials related to
interference with contract and extortion. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the tribe on the basis of
sovereign immunity but remanded the claims against the tribal officials in
their individual capacities.36 It cited Lewis v. Clarke: “We do not hold that
Harvey has valid claims against the tribal officials in their individual
capacities, merely that they do not enjoy sovereign immunity at this stage
of the litigation.”37
Similarly, in Alexander v. New York, the Northern District of New
York dismissed claims against the Oneida Indian Nation, its police
department, and its officers in their official capacity but allowed the claims
against the officers in their individual capacity to continue.38 The court
reasoned:
The Supreme Court has recently held that sovereign immunity
does not apply to individual capacity suits. . . . In Lewis, the Court
used the general principles of sovereign immunity, taken from
lawsuits against state and federal employees or entities. . . . Thus,
a suit against the individual officers in this case would not be
barred by tribal immunity.39
The federal district court affirmed the decision of the magistrate and
ordered that summonses be sent to the tribal officers for claims alleged
against them in their individual capacities.40
Finally, the Alabama Supreme Court has used Lewis v. Clarke and
other recent Supreme Court cases on sovereign immunity to conclude that
tribal sovereign immunity does not exist at all in cases of tort where the
defendant did not have an opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of that
immunity.41

36. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 851 Utah Adv.
Rep. 19 (Utah 2017).
37. Id. ¶ 33.
38. Alexander v. New York, 6:17-CV-725 (GTS/ATB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108745, at *11–
14 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017).
39. Id. at *13.
40. Id. at *17.
41. See Harrison v. PCI Gaming Authority, No. 130168, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 98 (Ala. Sept. 29,
2017). For a more complete discussion on a series of three Alabama Supreme Court cases all decided
after Lewis v. Clarke and each questioning the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, see infra Part
III.Q.4.
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The 2017–2018 Term

By December 31, 2017, the Court was halfway through its 2017–
2018 term and had granted certiorari in two more Indian law cases:
Patchak v. Zinke42 and Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren.43 On
January 12, 2018, the Court added one additional Indian law case to its
2017–2018 docket, United States v. Washington.44 In addition, in
November 2017 Justice Thomas issued a lone dissent from denial of
certiorari of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Upstate Citizens for Equality
v. United States.45
1.

Cases Docketed for the 2017–2018 Term

Patchak v. Zinke was decided in 2016 by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals46 and argued in front of the Supreme Court on November 7,
2017.47 It is actually the second time petitioner Patchak has been heard by
the Supreme Court. In 2012, Patchak prevailed in Match-E-Be-Nash-SheWish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, when the Supreme Court
recognized48 his ability as a local resident to challenge the decision by the
Department of the Interior (Interior) to take land into trust for the Band.49
After the Supreme Court’s decision, in 2014, Congress enacted the Gun
Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, which removed the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear challenges to the decision of Interior to take land into
trust for the Band and ordered any pending litigation dismissed.50 Patchak
challenged the ability of Congress to order his suit dismissed and the D.C.
Circuit unanimously affirmed Congress’s power to alter the jurisdiction of
42. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The respondent was replaced with the
change in administrations. Sally Jewell, the Secretary of Interior, was replaced with Ryan Zinke, and
the parties were appropriately substituted in accordance with Court rules.
43. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017).
44. United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2017). This opinion was a denial of
rehearing en banc with a strong dissent against granting the rehearing; for a discussion, see infra Part
III.S.
45. Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2017).
46. See Patchak, 828 F.3d 995.
47. For a thorough discussion of the argument, see Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices
Struggle to Find the “Beef” in Challenge to Congressional Authority to Resolve Pending Litigation,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2017, 8:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/argument-analysisjustices-struggle-find-beef-challenge-congressional-authority-resolve-pending-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/64L6-6XE6].
48. The decision was 8–1 with Justice Sotomayor dissenting on the basis that the United States
did not waive immunity to suit to challenge the land-to-trust decision under the Quiet Title Act. MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 228–38 (2012).
49. Id. at 228 (“The QTA’s reservation of sovereign immunity does not bar Patchak’s suit.
Neither does the doctrine of prudential standing. We therefore affirm the judgment of the D.C. Circuit,
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
50. See Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014).
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the federal courts.51 The Supreme Court agreed to review the case with a
decision expected by June 2018.52
Unlike Patchak, the second Indian law case the Court has docketed
in 2017 is making its first appearance before the bench and, like Lewis v.
Clarke, is an appeal from a state supreme court. In Lundgren v. Upper
Skagit Indian Tribe, the tribe purchased title to real property.53 During a
survey preparatory to taking the land into trust, the tribe learned of a fence
on the property that the adjoining landowner had long treated as the
boundary line between their property and the property purchased by the
tribe.54 The tribe contested the fence as the boundary line, asserting rights
to the full property it purchased as established by the survey.55 The
adjoining landowner filed suit to assert a right in the disputed property by
adverse possession.56 The tribe asked the court to dismiss the case on the
basis of sovereign immunity, either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
or for failure to join an indispensable party.57
The majority of the Washington Supreme Court (5–4) affirmed
the lower court’s conclusion that sovereign immunity is irrelevant when
the court has jurisdiction over the property in rem. It cited the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Nation, for the proposition that the county had
jurisdiction to impose an ad valorem tax over Indian lands “on the basis of
alienability of the allotted lands, and not on the basis of jurisdiction over
tribal owners.”58 Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court concluded
that state courts “have subject matter jurisdiction over in rem proceedings
in certain situations where claims of sovereign immunity are asserted.”59
Additionally, the majority reasoned that because the adverse possession
51. Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1003 (“In passing the Gun Lake Act, Congress exercised its ‘broad
general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that [the Supreme Court] ha[s]
consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’’ United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.
Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d. 420 (2004). Accordingly, we ought to defer to the policy judgment reflected
therein. Such is our role. Indeed, ‘[a]pplying laws implementing Congress’ policy judgments, with
fidelity to those judgments, is commonplace for the Judiciary.’”).
52. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 1, 2017. Patchak v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 2091
(Mem) (2017).
53. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 187 Wn.2d 857, 861–62, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017).
54. Id. at 862.
55. Id. (“In September 2014, the Tribe notified the Lundgrens in a letter that the fence did not
represent the boundary and that they were asserting ownership rights to the entire property deeded to
them in 2013. The Lundgrens initiated this lawsuit in March 2015. They asked the court to quiet title
in the disputed property to them and sought injunctive relief.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 862–63.
58. Id. at 866 (internal citations omitted) (citing Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)).
59. Id. at 868.
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occurred long before the tribe took title to the property, the tribe was not a
necessary party, and so the lawsuit could not be dismissed for failure to
join an indispensable party under Washington’s Rule of Civil Procedure
19.60
Four members of the court dissented: “While the existence of in rem
jurisdiction gives a court authority to quiet title to real property without
obtaining personal jurisdiction over affected parties, Civil Rule (CR)
19 counsels against exercising this authority in the face of a valid assertion
of sovereign immunity.”61 The dissent reasoned that since the tribe claims
to own a recorded interest in the property, it has a legally protected
property interest in the quiet title action decided after it purchased the
disputed property.62 The dissent would have held that in a proceeding to
quiet title to land over which the court admittedly has personal jurisdiction,
the claim should not have been able to survive a Rule 19 motion because
the tribe’s property interest makes it a necessary party, and it has not
waived its sovereign immunity.63 On December 8, 2017, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted the tribe’s petition for certiorari.64
2.

Dissent from Denial of Certiorari

In addition to the two cases docketed by the Court, there was one
notable lone dissent from denial of certiorari in an Indian law case in 2017.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Upstate Citizens for
Equality v. United States in 2016.65 The case involved a challenge by the
petitioner to a decision by Interior to take 13,000 acres of land into trust
for the Oneida Nation of New York.66 The Second Circuit had upheld the
power of Interior under the Indian Reorganization Act.67
Appellants, a group of towns and residents in the area near the trust
acquisition, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court refused to grant
their petition for an appeal but Justice Thomas issued a lone dissent from
the denial of certiorari.68 Justice Thomas would have granted certiorari as
an opportunity to revisit the ability of the United States to take land into

60. Id. at 871–73.
61. Id. at 874.
62. Id. at 880.
63. Id. at 880–81.
64. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 543 (2017).
65. See Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States , 841 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2016).
66. Id. at 560.
67. Id. at 577 (“[W]e conclude that the federal government’s plenary power over Indian affairs
extends to taking historic reservation land into trust for a tribe. That the entrustment deprives state
government of certain aspects of jurisdiction over that land does not run afoul of general principles of
state sovereignty, the Indian Commerce Clause, or the specific guarantees of the Enclave Clause.”).
68. Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2017).
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trust.69 His dissent argues that such power may be outside the power
imposed by the Indian Commerce Clause because the acquisition of land
by Interior of land already owned by the tribe cannot properly be
understood as “commerce” within the meaning of the Indian Commerce
Clause.70
Justice Thomas further argued that such an interpretation would have
been against the intent of the founders when they wrote the Indian
Commerce Clause.71 The Justice looked at the broad language of the
Indian Reorganization Act’s authorization, holding “[u]nder our
precedents, Congress has thus obtained the power to take any state land
and strip the State of almost all sovereign power over it ‘for the purpose
of providing land for Indians.’”72 Justice Thomas expressed concern at the
breadth of this language.
This means Congress could reduce a State to near nonexistence by
taking all land within its borders and declaring it sovereign Indian
territory. It is highly implausible that the Founders understood the Indian
Commerce Clause, which was virtually unopposed at the founding, as
giving Congress the power to destroy the States’ territorial integrity.73
Accordingly, Justice Thomas would have granted certiorari to
reconsider the ability of Interior to take land into trust.
III.

IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017

While the Supreme Court’s developments in Indian law are likely to
be those that capture the largest headlines and that students, practitioners,
and scholars are certainly the most familiar with, there are more than 600
unrelated cases decided in 2017 that are slowly changing the landscape of
Indian law. This third and longest Part of the annual year in review
attempts to capture some of the most important and most interesting
developments in Indian law during 2017.

69. Id. at 373–74.
70. Id. at 373 (“Understood this way, the Indian Commerce Clause does not appear to give
Congress the power to authorize the taking of land into trust under the IRA. Even assuming that land
transactions are ‘Commerce’ within the scope of the Clause . . . many applications of the IRA do not
involve trade of any kind. . . . [I]n cases like these, where the tribe already owns the land, neither
money nor property changes hands. Instead, title is slightly modified by adding ‘the United States in
trust for’ in front of the name of ‘the Indian tribe or individual Indian’ who owns the land. . . . In short,
because no exchange takes place, these trust arrangements do not resemble ‘trade with Indians.’”).
71. Id. at 373–74 (“Applying our precedents, the Second Circuit concluded that the Indian
Commerce Clause empowered the Federal Government to take into trust the land at issue here. In so
doing, it showed how far our precedents interpreting the Indian Commerce Clause have strayed from
the original understanding, and how much Congress’ power has grown as a result.”).
72. Id. at 373 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012)).
73. Id.
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Among the more interesting observations, 2017 saw Leonard Peltier
return to the federal courts.74 A powerful opinion on choice of law and
tribal exhaustion was issued from the Honorable Diane Humetewa, the
first Native American woman appointed to the federal bench.75 The year
included continuing challenges to the allocation of the $99 million in
attorney’s fees under the Cobell settlement related to the mismanagement
of Individual Indian Money Accounts,76 and yet another reaffirmation that
prosecution by a tribe and by the United States does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.77
The remainder of this Part is divided up around constituent themes,
attempting to provide a concise discussion and thorough set of citations to
the Indian law developments of 2017.

74. See Peltier v. Sacks, No. C17-5209-RBL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116434 (W.D. Wash. July
25, 2017). Leonard Peltier, an American Indian actively involved in the American Indian Movement
and convicted of the murder of two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975, brought suit
against the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, which had removed some of his
artwork from a display commemorating Native American Heritage month after objections from the
public. In addition to the Department of Labor, Peltier sued two former FBI agents who had written
letters expressing their concerns that Peltier’s artwork was prominently displayed for defamation. The
FBI agents asked the court to dismiss, arguing that their letters were protected speech under the
Washington anti-SLAPP statute. The court agreed:
The letters Woods and Langberg wrote to Saks and Inslee regarded a matter of public
concern to the State and to the L&I department specifically. Each communicated his
displeasure with L&I’s public display of Peltier’s artwork, as it seemed to condone his
murderous past. How the public receives a state-sanctioned public display is a matter
reasonably of concern to the State and to its agency housing the display. . . . Under the antiSLAPP statute, Woods and Langberg are immune from suit for these communications,
which regarded L&I’s public display of Peltier’s paintings.
Id. at *8. The Court dismissed the claims against the individual FBI agents.
75. See Progressive Advanced Ins. Co. v. Worker, No. CV-16-08107-PCT-DJH, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19283 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2017).
76. See Cobell v. Jewell, 234 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that withdrawal of
counsel before the litigation ends in settlement does not prevent that counsel from being compensated
for the time actually spent on the litigation—counsel in the case was awarded $2,878,612.52); Cobell
v. Jewell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that the same counsel was entitled to an additional
six percent in prejudgment interest to fully compensate him for waiting more than four years to be
paid for his work); Lannan Foundation v. Gingold, No. 13-01090 (TFH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
176671 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2017) (refusing to grant summary judgment and ordering supplemental
pleadings where the plaintiff sought recovery on several reimbursable grants it had extended to Eloise
Cobell to cover costs during the litigation).
77. See United States v. Bearcomesout, 696 F. App’x 241 (9th Cir. 2017). Defendant argued that
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution prevented the United States from prosecuting her for
involuntary manslaughter after she had been previously prosecuted by the Northern Cheyenne Tribe
for the same offense. The Ninth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a
prosecution by different sovereigns and dismissed her appeal.
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Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers: Developments in Montana
and Its Progeny

The question of a tribal court’s jurisdiction has long occupied federal
courts. The Supreme Court decided a pair of cases in 1981 and 1982 that
established the modern tests for tribal authority. In 1981, the Supreme
Court announced a presumptive rule that a tribe lacked authority over
nonmembers when the activity occurred within the outer boundary of the
reservation but on land held in fee by the state or by nonmembers.78
However, the Court also announced a pair of exceptions permitting tribal
jurisdiction when there existed a “consensual relationship” between the
tribe and the nonmember, or when the conduct would have a “direct effect”
on the tribe’s political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.79
The following year, in 1982, the Court clarified that when the activity
occurred on tribal land, even when the offending party was non-Indian, the
tribe retained inherent authority to regulate the conduct of the nonmember
unless Congress were to explicitly divest the tribe from its jurisdiction.80
Thus, for years the status of the land seemed to control which of two
Supreme Court cases controlled the outcome of a challenge to the tribe’s
jurisdiction. But in 2001 the Supreme Court decided Nevada v. Hicks,
which prohibited tribal jurisdiction over a state police officer who entered
the reservation pursuant to a tribal warrant to investigate a crime that had
occurred outside the reservation.81 The Court questioned the previously
presumptive role of the status of land.82 Hicks was very unusual in that it
was both unanimous and sharply divided. The vote was 9–0 that the tribe
lacked jurisdiction but with five separate written opinions.83 Ever since,
78. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“[E]xercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”).
79. Id. at 565–66 (“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. . . . A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”).
80. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1982) (“[T]he . . . authority that a
tribe may exercise over nonmembers does not arise until the nonmember enters the tribal jurisdiction.
We do not question that there is a significant territorial component to tribal power: a tribe has no
authority over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal lands or conducts business with the
tribe.”).
81. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
82. Id. at 358–60 (“The ownership status of land, in other words, is only one factor to consider
in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations.’ It may sometimes be a dispositive factor.”).
83. Id. at 375–404. Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, O’Connor, and Stevens all wrote separate
opinions.
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lower federal courts have struggled to reconcile how Hicks effects the
framework first established by Montana/Merrion.
1.

Montana and Its Exceptions

In 2017, a number of courts continued to try to reconcile these
conflicting opinions, with a consensus emerging that Hicks is generally
intended to be limited to its facts. In Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of
N. Paiute Indians, the Eastern District of California, citing a prior Ninth
Circuit case, held that “Montana’s exceptions ‘do[ ] not apply to
jurisdictional questions’ over nonmembers for claims arising on tribal land
within a reservation, except ‘where a state has a competing interest in
executing a warrant for an off-reservation crime.’”84 Instead, the district
court otherwise affirmed the importance of the status of the land,
concluding that the tribe had jurisdiction over nonmembers for activity
that occurred on tribal land without needing to reference the Montana
exceptions.85 The court reasoned that the tribe has regulatory authority
over nonmembers for events that occur on tribal land whenever the
nonmembers’ conduct might “intrude on the internal relations of the tribe
or threaten tribal self-rule.”86 The petitioner admitted that the tribe had
regulatory authority over tribal employees and that her alleged conduct
“directly interfered” with the tribe’s power to control internal relations or
protect its members.87
In the context of exhaustion, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the
principle that the status of the land gives tribes at least “plausible” or
“colorable” jurisdiction over nonmembers and, in so doing, also rejected
the broader suggestion that Hicks has changed the jurisdictional analysis.88
In Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves, the Ninth Circuit
suggested that Hicks should be read narrowly and “is limited to the

84. Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of N. Paiute Indians, 234 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1051 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 15, 2017) (citing Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813
(9th Cir. 2011)).
85. Id. at 1053 (“This record demonstrates that Knighton’s activities in question did not occur
on non-Indian fee lands within the Tribe’s reservation, and thus under Water Wheel, the Montana
exceptions do not apply.”).
86. Id. at 1054 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
335 (2008)).
87. Id. at 1055.
88. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Because
the claims arise from conduct on tribal land and implicate no state criminal law enforcement interests,
we conclude that tribal jurisdiction is colorable or plausible under our court’s interpretation of Nevada
v. Hicks.”(internal citation omitted)).
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question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state
law.”89
The Tenth Circuit similarly limited the Hicks exception. In Norton v.
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, state law
enforcement officers argued that even if tribal jurisdiction was plausible
on the tribe’s trespass claim, exhaustion should not be required because
they are law enforcement officers like in Hicks.90 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed, and like the Ninth Circuit above, limited Hicks to cases where
state law enforcement investigated off-reservation conduct or were crossdeputized.91
The District of Idaho had occasion to articulate different standards
for the appropriate award of damages in a review of the application of
Montana’s two exceptions. In FMC Corporation v. Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes, the plaintiff objected to the enforcement of a tribal appellate court
judgment imposing a $1.5 million annual permit fee on the plaintiff.92 The
plaintiff had operated a phosphorous production plant on land owned in
fee mostly located within the Shoshone-Bannock Reservation.93 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declared the site a superfund
cleanup site.94 To avoid extensive litigation, the plaintiff sought a Consent
Decree with the EPA.95 As a condition of the Consent Decree, the EPA
required the plaintiff to obtain permits from the tribe for the work done on
the reservation.96 The tribe demanded $100 million for the permits or,
alternatively, $1.5 million a year and a consent to tribal jurisdiction.97 The
plaintiff consented to jurisdiction and then challenged the $1.5 million fee
in tribal court, arguing that the waste was contained and posed no health
89. Id. at 902. For a more thorough discussion of Reeves, see infra Part III.B.2 dealing with tribal
exhaustion.
90. Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 862 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir.
2017). For a more thorough discussion of Norton, see infra Part III.B.2 dealing with tribal exhaustion.
91. Id. at 1248–49 (“Given that the chief concern driving the Court in Hicks was the state’s
paramount interest in investigating off-reservation crimes, we cannot say that a similar state interest
is implicated when state officers pursue a tribal member on tribal land for an on-reservation offense
over which they lack authority.”).
92. FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, No. 4:14-CV-489-BLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161387, at *2–3 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2017).
93. Id. at *2 (“FMC’s operations produced 22 million tons of waste products stored on the
Reservation in 23 ponds. This waste is radioactive, carcinogenic, and poisonous. It will persist for
decades, generations even, and is so toxic that there is no safe method to move it off-site.”).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *2–3 (“As a condition of agreeing to that Consent Decree, the EPA insisted that FMC
obtain Tribal permits for work FMC would do under the Consent Decree on the Reservation. The
Tribes, however, were demanding $100 million for those permits, although they would drop the fee to
$1.5 million a year if FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction. To get the lower permit fee, and to satisfy
the EPA’s condition that they obtain Tribal permits, FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction.”).
97. Id.
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problems to the tribe.98 The tribal appellate court affirmed the $1.5 million
annual fee given the highly dangerous nature of the waste and the inability
of the waste to be moved.99 The plaintiff challenged the tribal appellate
court’s decision in federal court.
The federal court looked first at whether the tribal court had
jurisdiction over the plaintiff when it imposed the $1.5 million annual fee.
The court recognized that for activity located on privately owned fee land
on the Reservation, the tribe lacks jurisdiction except for the two Montana
exceptions.100 The plaintiff argued that the agreement it entered into with
the tribe was the product of duress, but the court disagreed.101 It held that
the consensual relationship entered into between the plaintiff and the tribe
confers jurisdiction upon the tribe and was simply the price of settlement
and not the product of duress.102
While the first Montana exception provided sufficient jurisdiction
for the tribal court, the federal court continued to discuss the second
exception: whether the conduct of non-Indians would have some direct
effect on the political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of
the tribe. Here, while the EPA had taken steps to contain the waste, the
EPA itself concluded that the toxic waste “may constitute an imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the
environment.”103 The court concluded that the waste poses a direct effect
on the tribe of exactly the kind that falls within Montana’s second
exception.104
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *4.
100. Id. at *28 (“The first exception provides that ‘a tribe may regulate through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter into consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.’”).
101. Id. at *30.
102. Id. (“FMC complains that this agreement was a product of duress, but the Tribes only took
advantage of their bargaining leverage, a long-standing practice in the sharp-elbowed corporate world
in which FMC does business every day. FMC had a strong desire to obtain a Consent Decree from the
EPA, but the EPA was insisting that FMC obtain Tribal permits. The Tribes, recognizing their superior
bargaining position, used that leverage to extract a high price for the permits. FMC paid the price
because the Tribal permit was a key component to obtaining the Consent Decree, which in turn was
worth the price of the Tribal permit. This was a simple business deal, not the product of illegal duress
or coercion. FMC cites no case law holding that Montana’s exception does not apply when the
consensual relationship is formed begrudgingly or by one party taking advantage of bargaining
leverage.”).
103. Id. at *32.
104. Id. at *34–37 (“[T]hese sites are generating lethal gases that accumulate under pressure
beneath the pond covers. In other words, they pose a constant and deadly threat to the Tribes, a real
risk of catastrophic consequences should containment fail. And despite the best efforts of the EPA,
there have been releases of these lethal gases. . . . the record shows conclusively that a failure by the
EPA to contain the massive amount of highly toxic FMC waste would be catastrophic for the health
and welfare of the Tribes. This is the type of threat that falls within Montana’s second exception.”).
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The court then proceeded to discuss how the source of the
jurisdiction relates to the possible award that a tribal court may
legitimately impose. The court reasoned that when jurisdiction is premised
on consent, the amount agreed between the parties must be fair because it
was the result of the consensual relationship.105 However, the court warned
that if the jurisdiction of the tribal court is premised on the second
exception, then the damages awarded must have some relation to the
amount of risk or effect that the tribe will experience.106 “The scope of the
Tribes jurisdiction depends on its source. If the source is the second
Montana exception, the permit fee must have some relationship to the
Tribe’s obligation to protect the health and safety of Tribal members.”107
Because the tribes have never explained how the $1.5 million is related to
tribal action to supplement efforts by the EPA to keep the tribe safe, the
$1.5 million figure would be improper under the direct effects
exception.108 However, because the tribe can also assert jurisdiction under
the consensual relationship exception, and the parties have agreed to a $1.5
million annual fee, the district court held that the tribal court had
jurisdiction to impose such a fee.109
2.

Forum Selection Clauses

In 2017, a couple courts had to remind parties that the jurisdiction of
tribal courts is subject to forum selection clauses or other agreements
between the parties that may make an otherwise proper assertion of
jurisdiction unlawful. In Enerplus Resources (U.S.) v. Wilkinson, the
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed that the exhaustion requirement, and tribal
jurisdiction in general, may be waived through a forum selection clause.110
“It is well-established in the Eighth Circuit that parties may waive tribal
court jurisdiction and compliance with the tribal exhaustion doctrine
through a forum selection agreement. . . . The tribal exhaustion doctrine
105. Id. at *39–41 (“The scope of the Tribes jurisdiction depends on its source. . . . Under
Montana’s first exception, Tribal jurisdiction is based on the consensual relationship between FMC
and the Tribes. FMC agreed to obtain a use permit under the Amendments to Chapter V of the Fort
Hall Land Use Operative Policy Guidelines, and pay a $1.5 million annual fee for that
permit. . . . Thus, FMC agreed to pay the annual permit fee for as long as it stored the waste on the
site.”).
106. Id. at *39–40.
107. Id. at *39.
108. Id. at *40 (“There may be legitimate reasons justifying the Judgment amount, but they have
never been explained, and FMC has never had an opportunity to address them. Under Marchington’s
comity analysis, it would be unfairly prejudicial to enforce the permit fee imposed by the Tribal
Appellate Court under the second Montana exception.”).
109. Id. at *43.
110. Enerplus Res. (U.S.) Corp. v. Wilkinson, No. 1:16-cv-103, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181579,
at *9-11 (D.N.D. Nov. 2, 2017).
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does not apply when the contracting parties have included a forum
selection clause in their agreement.”111 In Amerind Risk Management
Corporation v. Blackfeet Housing, the District of New Mexico held that
when the parties agreed in a contract to litigate any disputes in New
Mexico, the assertion of jurisdiction by the Blackfeet Tribal Court was
improper.112
3.

State Interference with Tribal Jurisdiction

Finally, there were several cases where the state was alleged to have
interfered with the jurisdiction of the tribe. In Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo
County, the tribe brought a complaint against Inyo County, alleging that
the county’s threat to criminally prosecute tribal police who are enforcing
tribal ordinances and protection orders interferes with the tribe’s inherent
right to operate a police department on its reservation, and it sought an
order clarifying that the tribe has an inherent right to enforce its laws. 113
The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction,114 and the tribe appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. “The Tribe alleges that federal common
law grants the Tribe the authority to ‘investigate violations of tribal, state,
and federal law, detain, and transport or deliver a non-Indian violator to
the proper authorities.’”115 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the tribe’s
request raises a federal question because it alleges that the state has
violated federal common law.116 The Ninth Circuit further confirmed that
the case was ripe for judicial review and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings on the merits of the tribe’s claim.117
In Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Lawrence,
a nonmember former contractor with the tribe brought suit in state court

111. Id. at *10–11.
112. Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. v. Blackfeet Hous., No. 16 CV 1093 JAP/KK, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 172764, at *12–21 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2017). “When consent to be sued is given, the terms of
the consent establish the bounds of a court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at *13.
113. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., 863 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017).
114. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15-CV-00367-GEB-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90684 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2015).
115. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 863 F.3d at 1152.
116. Id. (“Because the Tribe has alleged violations of federal common law, the Tribe has
adequately pleaded a federal question that provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”).
117. Id. at 1153–54 (“The Tribe has already seen one of its officers arrested and prosecuted based
on Defendants’ interpretation of the Tribe’s lawful authority. Since the Tribe covers the legal costs of
defending its Tribal PD officers from prosecution, this dispute has cost the Tribe money. And
Defendants’ interference with the Tribe’s alleged inherent authority has, according to Tribe, interfered
with the Tribe’s ability to maintain peace and security on the reservation.”).
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to enforce the contractual terms of their agreement.118 The tribe responded
by filing suit in federal court seeking a determination that the state has no
jurisdiction over the tribe.119 The federal district court held that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the tribe’s challenge to the jurisdiction of
the state court.120 The Tenth Circuit reversed.121 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that the Supreme Court has long held that states have only limited
jurisdiction over Indians.122 The Court relied on National Farmers123 as
definitive evidence that whether a tribal court may assert jurisdiction over
a nonmember of the tribe is a question that “arises under” federal law for
the purposes of § 1331124 and remanded the case for further proceedings.
B.

Civil Jurisdiction: Exhaustion and Its Exceptions

In a pair of U.S. Supreme Court cases decided during the 1980s,125
the Court articulated a common law rule that requires parties contesting
the jurisdiction of the tribal court to first exhaust their tribal remedies.126
The court reasoned that such a policy will encourage tribal court
development and provide a record for federal courts to review.127
118. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Lawrence, 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir.
2017).
119. Id. at 540.
120. Id.
121. Id. (“We hold that the Tribe’s claim—that federal law precludes state-court jurisdiction over
a claim against Indians arising on the reservation—presents a federal question that sustains federal
jurisdiction.”).
122. Id. at 542–44 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
made clear that state adjudicative authority over Indians for on-reservation conduct is greatly limited
by federal law. . . . If a suit to enjoin a tribe from exercising jurisdiction contrary to federal law is an
action ‘arising under’ federal law, then so is a suit to enjoin a State from exercising jurisdiction
contrary to federal law.”).
123. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
124. Ute Indian Tribe, 875 F.3d at 543–48 (“Because petitioners contend that federal law has
divested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is federal law on which they rely as a basis for the
asserted right of freedom from Tribal Court interference. They have, therefore, filed an action ‘arising
under’ federal law within the meaning of § 1331. . . . Here, the Tribe likewise relies on federal law ‘as
a basis for the asserted right of freedom from [state-court] interference.’”).
125. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. 845.
126. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19 (“Although petitioner must exhaust available tribal
remedies before instituting suit in federal court, the Blackfeet Tribal Courts’ determination of tribal
jurisdiction is ultimately subject to review. If the Tribal Appeals Court upholds the lower court’s
determination that the tribal courts have jurisdiction, petitioner may challenge that ruling in the District
Court.”).
127. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 (“We believe that examination should be conducted in the
first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to
a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will
provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual
and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the orderly administration of justice in the federal court
will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or
any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed.”).
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In a textbook example of why exhaustion of tribal remedies is
important, in Board of Education for the Gallup-Mckinley County School
v. Henderson, the Tenth Circuit heard a case where terminated employees
of a school district located on the Navajo Reservation brought suit in
Navajo tribal court alleging a violation of the Navajo Preference in
Employment Act.128 The Navajo Supreme Court had dismissed the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the school district appealed
anyway, seeking a declaratory judgment from the federal courts that as a
matter of law, the Navajo court system lacked jurisdiction over the school
board.129 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal; because the school
district won, there was no reason to consider the Navajo Supreme Court’s
conclusion that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant school
district.130 Henderson illustrates that tribal courts are not always protective
of the tribal parties that appear before them, to the detriment of
nonmembers, but instead are thoughtful about the constraints on their own
jurisdiction. By exhausting its tribal remedies, the Gallup-McKinley
County School District won the outcome that it was seeking, the dismissal
of claims against it, without needing to resort to federal courts.
1.

Cases Dismissed Based on Comity

Judge Diane Humetewa decided another well-reasoned Indian law
case on the basis of exhaustion. In Progressive Advanced Insurance Co. v.
Worker, an insurance company filed for a declaratory judgment that
having paid the policy’s maximum limit, it owed no further money to the
defendant. 131 The defendant, a Navajo tribal member with cars garaged on
the reservation, argued that he was entitled to stack the underinsured
motorist coverage on three other vehicles covered under the policy and
recover additional funds.132 The contract says disputes will be governed
by Arizona law, which the plaintiff argued is a forum selection clause and
the defendant argued is a choice of law clause.133 The defendant moved to
have the case dismissed because the plaintiff had not exhausted its tribal

128. Bd. of Educ. for the Gallup-McKinley Cty. Sch. v. Henderson, 696 F. App’x 355 (10th Cir.
June 19, 2017).
129. Id. at 357.
130. Id. at 359 (“[T]here is no ‘substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality’
to warrant a court issuing a declaratory judgment. The school district will suffer no legal or financial
penalty from the dismissal of its suit. Its legal victory will stand, and it will be where it was before
Henderson sought recourse in the Navajo legal system. And if the school district thinks it is improperly
subjected to Navajo jurisdiction in the future, it can pursue its legal remedies then.”).
131. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co. v. Worker, No. CV-16-08107-PCT-DJH, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19283 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2017).
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id. at *2–3.
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remedies.134 The plaintiff argued no exhaustion was required because
under Nevada v. Hicks, there is an exception to the exhaustion doctrine if
a proceeding in federal court would serve no purpose other than delay.135
Judge Humetewa’s opinion recognized that generally a tribal court
has no civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant but that there are two
exceptions created by Montana that may give the tribe jurisdiction: (1)
whether there is a consensual relationship between the plaintiff and the
tribe or its members, or (2) whether there is a direct effect on the health or
welfare of the tribe.136 Judge Humetewa cited LaPlante for the proposition
that legal and factual questions relating to jurisdiction should be decided
in the first instance by the tribal court.137 “[T]he parties in this case entered
into a contractual agreement. Whether this contract created a consensual
relationship between Plaintiff and a member of the tribe such that tribal
courts have jurisdiction under Montana’s consensual relationship
exception is not clear.”138 Because the court could not conclude that the
tribal court plainly lacked jurisdiction, comity required the plaintiff’s
action be dismissed until it has exhausted Navajo tribal court remedies.139

2.

Exceptions to Exhaustion

In National Farmers, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that there are
several exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine: when jurisdiction is
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, where
jurisdiction is patently violative of express jurisdictional provisions, or
where jurisdiction would be futile.140 The Supreme Court has subsequently
added a fourth exception: where nonmember activity occurred on land not
controlled by the tribe and under Montana, neither exception could apply
such that exhaustion would serve no purpose other than delay.141 In 2017,

134. Id. at *1.
135. Id. at *9 (“The question for this Court is whether jurisdiction is plainly lacking in the tribal
court such that exhaustion ‘would serve no purpose other than delay.’”).
136. Id. at *4.
137. Id.
Progressive issued an insurance policy that listed a tribal member as a named insured and
covered vehicles that were kept on tribal lands. . . . however, Progressive never mailed
anything to an address on tribal lands. To the extent that factor is dispositive, it may be that
the tribal court lacks jurisdiction. But this is a question that must be answered first by the
tribal courts of the Navajo Nation.
Id. at *9.
138. Id. at *10.
139. Id.
140. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985).
141. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (“[I]t is plain that no federal grant provides for
tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana’s main rule, so the exhaustion
requirement ‘would serve no purpose other than delay.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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a number of cases were decided on the basis of whether the exceptions to
exhaustion applied.
a.

Bad Faith

In Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria, the tribe brought suit in tribal court
against the plaintiff for breach of contract.142 The tribal judge failed to
disclose that he had an attorney–client relationship with the tribe, and so
the plaintiff filed in federal court seeking a declaration that the tribe was
acting in bad faith, and therefore an exhaustion of his tribal remedies was
not required.143 Subsequently, the tribal judge recused himself and named
a retired California appellate judge with no previous ties to the tribe to hear
the case.144 The court noted that “no court has ever found that the bad faith
exception applies”145 and recognized that the tribe took “real effort” to
address the plaintiff’s concern by appointing an outside judge with no
tribal connection and not one of the other tribal judges.146 It held that the
actions of the tribe cured any errors related to its bad faith and accordingly
dismissed the case with instructions for the plaintiff to exhaust his tribal
remedies.147 The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision.148
b.

Futility

In Rabang v. Kelly, a group of allegedly disenrolled members of the
Nooksack Nation brought suit against the acting tribal council, contesting
their disenrollment.149 Interior had made three separate determinations that
the actions of the tribal council after March 24, 2016 were not to be
recognized by the United States because tribal elections had been canceled
and the remnant council lacked a quorum.150 The remnant council had
attempted to appoint itself as a new Nooksack Supreme Court to overturn
decisions of the tribe’s existing appellate court.151 The federal district court
recognized that ordinarily tribal plaintiffs are required to exhaust their
tribal court remedies, but that in some cases “exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge the [tribal] court’s
142. Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria, No. 16-cv-05391-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26447
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017).
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id. at *4.
145. Id. at *7.
146. Id. at *9.
147. Id. at *8–9.
148. Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria, 692 F. App’x 894 (9th Cir. 2017).
149. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63515 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26,
2017).
150. Id. at *6–7.
151. Id. at *14–15.
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jurisdiction.”152 The court gave great deference to the decision of Interior
not to recognize the tribal council.153 It held that where Interior does not
recognize the tribal council’s ability to create a new tribal court, there is
no adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction, and so the
federal court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.154
c.

Serve No Purpose Other than Delay

In Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves, the Ninth Circuit
was asked whether it was “colorable” or “plausible” that the tribe would
have jurisdiction over employment-related claims against two public
school districts who operate schools on land leased from the tribe.155 A
group of current and former employees of the Window Rock and Pinon
Unified School District had filed claims with the Navajo Labor
Commission.156 The school districts filed in federal court, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over their
employment decisions at schools located on the reservation.157 The district
court held that jurisdiction was so plainly lacking that no exhaustion was
required.158
The Ninth Circuit, in a divided opinion, reversed. It reasoned that
jurisdiction was “colorable” or “plausible” because the schools were
operated on lands leased from the tribe: “Tribal jurisdiction is plausible in
this case because (a) the schools operated by the Districts are located on
tribal land over which the Navajo Nation maintains the right to exclude,
and (b) state criminal law enforcement interests are not present here.”159
The majority opinion started with the proposition that the status of the land
controls questions of tribal jurisdiction because if the activity occurs on
tribal land, the tribe retains the absolute right to exclude even nonmembers
from their land.160 The school district asked the Court to read Hicks
broadly as not requiring exhaustion when nonmember activity occurs on
tribal land, but the court expressly refused to do so. It held that Hicks
should be read narrowly and “is limited to the question of tribal-court
152. Id. at *13.
153. Id. at *16–17 (“Although the sovereign nature of American Indian tribes cautions the
Secretary of the Interior not to exercise freestanding authority to interfere with a tribe’s internal
governance, the Secretary has the power to manage ‘all Indian affairs and [ ] all matters arising out
of Indian relations.’”).
154. Id. at *18–19.
155. Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017).
156. Id. at 896.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 897.
159. Id. at 904.
160. Id. at 899 (“We begin with the general principle that a tribe’s right to exclude non-tribal
members from its land imparts regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction over conduct on that land.”).
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jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. Because ‘the specific
concerns at issue in that case,’ are not present here, it is at least plausible
that tribal jurisdiction exists. Exhaustion is therefore required.”161
In dissent, Judge Christen would have affirmed the district court. She
would have read Hicks to say that the general presumption is that tribal
jurisdiction does not extend to nonmembers even if their activity occurs
on tribal land.162 Essentially, Judge Christen reasoned that absent the
Montana exceptions, there is no tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.163
Her opinion emphasized the status of the parties (nonmembers of the tribe)
and not the status of the land (tribally controlled) as the relevant lens
through which to view the question of jurisdiction.164 Her opinion also
ignored the alternate source of plausible/colorable jurisdiction provided by
the right to exclude in Merrion, arguing that the Navajo Nation ceded its
right to exclude nonmembers from its territory in the Treaty of 1868.165
Because she would conclude that there is no plausible tribal jurisdiction
under either of the Montana exceptions, the dissent would not require
exhaustion but instead would affirm the district court and grant a
declaratory judgment that the Navajo Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction
over the school districts.166
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion on a very different
set of facts. In Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, the Ute Tribe, the estate of a deceased member, and his
parents, brought suit in tribal court against state police officers involved
in a police chase that started just outside the reservation, continued for
almost twenty miles into the reservation, and ended with the passenger
being fatally shot.167 The passenger died of a bullet to the head.168 The
161. Id. at 906.
162. Id. at 910 (“Supreme Court precedent and our own case law makes clear that at least where
there are competing state interests, tribes generally lack jurisdiction over the conduct of non-tribal
members within the boundaries of a reservation, regardless of the status of the land on which
nonmember conduct occurs.”).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 910–14.
165. Id. at 916 (“[T]he Navajo Nation has ceded the right to exclude the school districts from the
Navajo Reservation by: (1) expressly agreeing that the federal government must enter to provide a
system of compulsory education for Navajo children; and (2) consenting to state enforcement of
compulsory education on the Navajo Reservation.”).
166. Id. at 919–21.
167. Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 862 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th
Cir. 2017) (“After finding Murray, Norton ordered him to the ground but Murray did not obey. Norton
fired two shots toward Murray. Murray died from a gunshot wound to the head. The parties disagree
whether Murray shot himself or was shot by officers. Raymond Wissiup, a Ute tribal member and
certified law enforcement officer, arrived shortly thereafter, but the officers prevented him from
accessing the scene.”).
168. Id.
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parties dispute whether police fired that bullet or whether the tribal
member shot himself.169 The tribe asserted that the officers prevented a
tribal law enforcement officer from accessing the scene of the shooting or
providing medical assistance.170 The tribal court claims included (1)
trespass and (2) other torts related to the conduct including false arrest,
wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and conspiracy.171 The officers
then filed in federal court seeking a preliminary injunction to halt the tribal
court action claiming that because they were state law enforcement
officers the tribal court had no jurisdiction over their conduct.172 The
federal district court enjoined the tribal court action on the basis that
Nevada v. Hicks bars tribal civil jurisdiction, making exhaustion
unnecessary.173
The Tenth Circuit reversed in part. On the trespass claim, it held that
tribal court exhaustion was required unless it was automatically foreclosed
by a federal statute or a decision of the Supreme Court.174 As long as tribal
jurisdiction is “colorable” or “plausible,” the federal court should require
exhaustion.175 The Tenth Circuit reiterated that tribes have long had the
right to exclude non-Indians from their land.176 The court cited Montana
and its second exception, noting that the tribe’s jurisdiction needs to
implicate its political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare, but
found it “colorable” that the state’s action in this case did so through
allegations of trespass and interference with a tribal law enforcement
officer on the reservation.177 The court thus required tribal court
exhaustion of the trespass claim.178
The state law enforcement officers also argued that exhaustion in
tribal court was unnecessary due to either the “bad faith” or “intent to
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (“[T]he officers’ motion for a preliminary injunction was granted by the district court.
It concluded that the Tribal Court clearly lacked civil jurisdiction over the officers, and thus exhaustion
of tribal court remedies was not required.”).
174. Id. at 1243.
175. Id. (“Exceptions typically will not apply so long as tribal courts can ‘make a colorable claim
that they have jurisdiction.’”).
176. Id. at 1245 (“In light of these repeated confirmations of tribes’ right to exclude nonmembers
from tribal lands, we think it plausible that the Tribal Court possesses jurisdiction over the trespass
claim. . . . ‘[W]here tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction
over disputes arising out of such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.’”).
177. Id. at 1246 (“[The tribe] asserts that the officers prevented Wissiup, a tribal member and
certified law enforcement officer, from accessing the site of the shooting or attending to Murray as he
bled to death. Thus, in addition to impinging upon a ‘hallmark of Indian sovereignty’ by trespassing,
the officers colorably threatened the ‘political integrity’ of the tribe, by improperly asserting their own
authority as superior to that of a tribal official on tribal lands.”).
178. Id.
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harass” exceptions.179 The Tenth Circuit disagreed. It explained that the
bad faith exception applies to the actions of a tribal court’s misconduct,
not to the actions of any party in tribal court proceedings, and since the
defendants had not alleged that the tribal court had acted improperly, the
bad faith exception was inapplicable.180 The court also rejected the
harassment claim, suggesting that the defendant’s claim substantially
amounted to an “attack” on the general premise that tribal courts can hear
claims involving non-Indians, which was contrary to Tenth Circuit
precedent.181
On the other claims, the Tenth Circuit held that the alleged injuries
occurred to a single tribal member and did not arise to a level that would
threaten the tribe itself, as required by Montana’s section exception.182 The
Tenth Circuit therefore did not require exhaustion of the other claims.
Like both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits this year, district courts also
refused to find that non-Indian plaintiffs were excused from exhausting
their tribal remedies on the basis of the Montana exceptions. In Rincon
Mushroom Corporation of America v. Mazzetti, plaintiff corporation
RMCA sued tribal officials to stop them from asserting tribal
environmental regulation over non-Indian-owned fee lands located on the
reservation of the Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians.183 After the
tribal court determined that it had jurisdiction, RMCA appealed to the
federal district court.184 The district court concluded that the tribe had not
exhausted its tribal remedies because exhaustion includes proceedings at
the appellate level.185
179. Id. at 1249.
180. Id. (“[W]e agree with the Ninth Circuit that ‘the interpretation most faithful to National
Farmers is that it must be the tribal court that acts in bad faith to exempt the party from exhausting
available tribal court remedies.’”).
181. Id. (“We also reject the officers’ arguments that they will suffer undue bias and a lack of
due process if subjected to tribal jurisdiction. The officers offer little support for their allegations,
which boil down to baseless ‘attacks’ on the competence and fairness of the Ute Tribal Court. . . . The
Court has also ‘repeatedly’ recognized tribal courts ‘as appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and nonIndians.’”).
182. Id. at 1246–47 (“[W]e are bound by our prior precedent holding that Montana governs both
Indian and non-Indian lands. . . . [W]hen a tribal member hales a nonmember into tribal court as a
defendant, a tribe’s interest in self-government is less direct because the suit concerns nonmember
conduct.”).
183. Rincon Mushroom Corp. of Am. v. Mazzetti, No. 09cv2330-WQH-JLB, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117179 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2017).
184. See id. at *13.
185. Id. at *17–18 (“While the tribal court has made an initial determination on jurisdiction
following the first portion of the bifurcated trial, exhaustion of tribal remedies includes tribal appellate
review on the issue of jurisdiction. . . . While RMCA contends that these rulings are interlocutory and
therefore not appealable, RMCA fails to establish that the tribal court’s decision on jurisdiction would
not be subject to tribal appellate review at a later point during tribal court proceedings.”).
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The district court then proceeded to ask whether any exception might
excuse RMCA from exhausting its remedies.186 It asked whether the tribal
court plainly lacked jurisdiction under Montana, such that exhaustion
would serve no purpose but delay, but concluded that jurisdiction was
plausible under the second Montana exception.187 Development of the land
could affect ground water, and Ninth Circuit precedent suggests that
threats to water could meet Montana’s second exception of affecting the
health or welfare of the tribe.188 Since RMCA failed to exhaust its tribal
remedies, and none of the exceptions to exhaustion were present, the court
denied the motion to reopen the proceedings in federal court.
C.

Criminal Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court long ago announced a presumptive rule that
Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian persons.189 Such a
bright-line rule seems easy to learn for many law students, but its
ramifications result in a steady stream of criminal cases involving Indian
law issues arriving in front of state and federal courts. The year 2017 saw
a couple noteworthy cases address the questions of who is an Indian, and
how does the government prove the defendant is an Indian when Indian
status is a required element of the offense. Other issues included the role
of tribal police in protecting the rights of the accused and how states and
tribes handle questions of extradition from one sovereign to the other.
1.

Who Is an Indian

The last time the U.S. Supreme Court answered the question of who
is an Indian was in 1846;190 however, state and federal courts have
continued to try to refine the doctrine, and new cases are decided every
year. From Rogers there has emerged a two-part test for determining who
is an Indian: (1) the individual must have some degree of Indian blood,
and (2) the individual must be recognized as an Indian by their tribe and/or
the United States.191 Four cases were decided in 2017 involving Indian
186. Id. at *18–19.
187. Id. at *19–22 (“‘[T]hreats to water rights may invoke inherent tribal authority over nonIndians’ pursuant to Montana’s second exception. . . .’ ‘Defendants have shown that conduct on
Plaintiff’s property plausibly could threaten the Tribe’s groundwater resources and could contribute
to the spread of wildfires on the reservation.’”).
188. Id. at *20–22.
189. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
190. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846) (suggesting that to be an “Indian” required
some degree of Indian blood and that the individual was recognized as an Indian by their tribe or the
federal government).
191. For a discussion of the emergence of this two-part test from Rogers, see Daniel Donovan &
John Rhodes, To Be or Not to Be: Who is an ‘Indian Person,’ 73 MONT. L. REV. 61, 66 (2012).
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status, but this summary will touch on the two most notable. The first
concerned a dismissal of state criminal charges, and the second concerned
the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of federal criminal charges.192
In Idaho v. George, the defendant was initially arrested by Coeur
d’Alene tribal police on the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation for
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia
with intent to use, both misdemeanors under tribal law.193 Upon learning
that the defendant was not an enrolled member of the tribe, she was
transferred to the State of Idaho, where the state brought three felony
charges against her.194 The defendant contested the jurisdiction of the state
court, arguing that although she was not enrolled, she met the legal
definition of an Indian under Rogers and, therefore, the state had no
criminal jurisdiction over her on-reservation activity.195 The Idaho state
trial court agreed.
The state court recognized that Ms. George was at least twenty-two
percent Indian by blood and descended from a Coeur d’Alene tribal
member.196 The court further acknowledged that this status confers upon
her all of the benefits of membership except for sharing in the proceeds of
the tribe’s casino.197 Her children are enrolled members because their
fathers are enrolled, and she is the adoptive daughter of another tribal
member.198 Therefore, the court reasoned the defendant met the first part
of the test from Rogers—that she have some degree of Indian blood.199
The court went on to reason that while Ms. George was not eligible for
enrollment based on her known blood quantum, she is eligible for tribal
adoption given her adoptive parent’s enrollment and her own blood
quantum.200 The court concluded and that the defendant otherwise has a
192. For reference, the other two are Martin v. United States, Nos. 12-206(1) (DWF/LIB), 153310 (DWF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25508 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2017) (defendant stipulated to his
Indian status even though he may not have been enrolled), and United States v. Tsosie, No. 12-10624,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18513 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2017) (holding that even though there was an
unauthenticated certificate of Indian blood, any error was harmless because countless other evidence
demonstrated the defendant was an Indian, including testimony about his blood quantum from his
wife, his participation in Navajo ceremonies, and his use of a Navajo language interpreter throughout
the proceedings).
193. Idaho v. George, No. CR-16-21089, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 230 (First Judicial Dist. Court of
Idaho, Kootenai Cty. May 9, 2017).
194. Id. at *2.
195. See id. at *19.
196. Id. at *4.
197. Id. at *5–7.
198. Id. at *4–6.
199. Id. at *28 (“It is undisputed that Ms. George has 22% Indian blood. There is some question
whether she has a greater percentage of Indian blood based both on her biological father’s ancestry
and any errors in her maternal Family Ancestry chart. . . . [But] the first prong requires only ‘some’
Indian blood.”).
200. Id. at *39.
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“significant” or “substantial” amount of Indian blood for purposes of the
first prong of the analysis determining her Indian status.201
The court began its analysis of the second prong by recognizing that
“[t]ribal enrollment is ‘the common evidentiary means of
establishing Indian status, but it is not the only means nor is it necessarily
determinative.’”202 Accordingly, the court looked to the Coeur d’Alene
tribe’s recognition of Ms. George as an Indian and its provision of tribal
services to her in order to determine that she did indeed meet the second
prong of the test; the tribe had recognized her as an Indian.203 Because the
court concluded Ms. George was an Indian, it dismissed the state criminal
charges against her for lack of jurisdiction.
In United States v. Seymour, the defendant appealed from his
conviction under the Major Crimes Act involving the sexual abuse of three
minor children on the White Mountain Apache Reservation.204 Even
though he was an enrolled member of the White Mountain Apache Tribe,
the defendant argued that the United States failed to prove that he was an
Indian because it presented no evidence that he had any Indian blood.205
The Ninth Circuit agreed and remanded the case with instructions to enter
an acquittal.206 The government relied upon the testimony of the tribal
enrollment officer who stated the defendant was a member, but it made no
representation about any Indian blood.207 The court held that the
government had failed to prove the first element of being an Indian: “But
without any evidence regarding the basis for Seymour’s enrollment in
the tribe or about Seymour’s ancestry, even construing the facts in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say that any rational trier of
fact could find that Seymour has ‘some quantum of Indian blood.’”208
201. Id.
202. Id. at *42.
203. Id. at 45–46 (“[I]t is apparent to the Court that the Tribe recognizes her as an Indian. She
has lived virtually her whole life on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation as an Indian. She is the adopted
daughter of an enrolled member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and an enrolled member of the
Flathead Tribe. Throughout her life she has received benefits from the Tribe or through
the Tribe reserved for Indians and these benefits include health care, substance abuse treatment,
housing assistance, job assistance, education, social benefits . . . and food assistance. She has worked
on the reservation. Throughout her life she has participated in Tribal social and cultural events. Thus,
while case law indicates that tribal enrollment is an important consideration, and if it exists, is
determinative of the second element of the status test, it is not an absolute requirement for recognition
as an Indian.”).
204. United States v. Seymour, 684 F. App’x 662 (9th Cir. 2017).
205. Id. at 663.
206. Id.
207. Id. (“The government now contends that the Tribal Affidavit, along with other
circumstantial evidence, proves Seymour’s blood quantum when considered in light of the White
Mountain Apache Tribe’s constitution, which establishes criteria for tribal membership.”).
208. Id.
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Tribal Police

Although numerous cases raised questions of the appropriate powers
of tribal police, this annual review has selected two of them to provide an
overview of the kinds of issues that were litigated this year. Both cases
raise issues of the admissibility of evidence obtained by tribal police. For
purposes of variety, I’ve selected one case where the evidence was
excluded and one case where it was admitted.209
Voluntary statements made to tribal law enforcement, even by nonIndians, are admissible in federal court. In United States v. Peters, a nonIndian was detained by a tribal law enforcement officer and placed in
handcuffs while on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.210 Eventually
a federal officer completed a probable cause arrest.211 During the five and
a half hours he was detained by tribal police, which included a trip to the
hospital and to Pierre, the defendant made comments that were recorded
on both a lapel and a dashboard camera.212 At trial the defendant filed a
motion to suppress the statements he made to officers on the grounds that
he was unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or that
he made statements without being given his Miranda warnings in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.213 A federal magistrate recommended the motion
be denied.214 The magistrate reasoned that even if the tribe lacks
jurisdiction, tribal law enforcement can arrest and detain an offender until
he can be turned over to the proper authorities.215 It further recommended
that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because there had been no
“interrogation”—the statements were made either voluntarily or in
response to questions tribal law enforcement asked to clarify what had
already been said.216 A month later the district court adopted the
magistrate’s recommendation.217
209. For an honorable mention, see United States v. Tepiew, 859 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2017)
(upholding evidence obtained by tribal law enforcement when they entered a home without a warrant
on the basis of the emergency in aid doctrine). The case provides an excellent discussion of the
difficulty in obtaining a tribal court warrant on some reservations.
210. United States v. Peters, No. 3:16-CR-30150-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56754 (D.S.D.
Mar. 15, 2017).
211. Id. at *4.
212. Id. at *5.
213. See id. at *1.
214. Id. at *10–11.
215. Id. at *6–7 (“[T]ribal police officers have the authority to arrest an offender within Indian
country and to detain him until he can be turned over to the proper authorities, even if the tribe itself
lacks jurisdiction. Federal and state courts (including the Eighth Circuit) have likewise regularly
upheld tribal police actions, including stopping, investigating and detaining non-Indians suspected of
criminal conduct.”).
216. Id. at *9.
217. United States v. Peters, No. 3:16-CR-30150-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56488 (D.S.D.
Apr. 13, 2017).
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Evidence obtained by tribal police regarding a non-Indian is not
always deemed admissible. In United States v. Cooley, a tribal law
enforcement official stopped to offer assistance to a vehicle stopped along
the side of a state highway running through the Crow Reservation.218 The
officer quickly identified that the driver was not an Indian but continued
to ask for identification.219 During the course of the conversation, the tribal
officer observed firearms and methamphetamines.220 The tribal officer
detained the driver and notified state police, who then confiscated the
drugs and weapons.221 The driver moved to suppress the evidence on the
basis that the tribal officer had no jurisdiction over him, a non-Indian, and
therefore had no authority to prolong the police stop after the officer had
ascertained that the driver was not an Indian.222 The federal district court
agreed that the tribal police officer had conducted an unlawful search and
excluded the evidence.223
3.

Extradition

As a general rule, state law enforcement does not have the right to
enter a reservation and remove individuals accused of violating state law
without following tribal rules for extradition.224 Whether the state acted
appropriately in removing an individual from a reservation was at the heart
of a pair of 2017 cases.
Federal courts are less likely to get involved in extradition
proceedings when the extradition from tribal to state custody was subject
to a tribal court order. In Henry v. McMahon, a California state police
officer engaged the assistance of CRIT (tribal) police to assist in taking a
tribal member into custody.225 Tribal police arrested the tribal member and
later, subject to an order from the tribal court, the member was turned over
to California state police and charged with multiple felonies.226 The
petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was
218. United States v. Cooley, No. CR 16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17276 (D. Mont.
Feb. 7, 2017).
219. Id. at *2–4.
220. Id. at *3–6.
221. Id. at *6.
222. Id. at *8–9.
223. Id. at *11–12. “The remedy for evidence obtained by a tribal officer acting outside the scope
of his authority is suppression. ‘No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government’ shall ‘violate
the right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable search and seizures . . . .’” Id. at 8.
224. For a discussion of the complicated area of tribal–state relations in the context of extradition,
see Kerstin G. LeMaire & Mark D. Tallan, Issues Involving Extradition and Their Impact on Tribal
Sovereignty, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 803 (1999).
225. Henry v. McMahon, No. EDCV 15-02384-CAS (DTB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56153
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017).
226. Id. at *2–3.
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not extradited in accordance with tribal law and seeking release from his
pre-trial detention by the state of California.227 The federal court refused
to consider the writ because it was reluctant to interfere with state criminal
proceedings and the habeas claim failed to raise any immediate
constitutional concerns.228 Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that
the petitioner’s writ be denied, and the district court adopted the findings
and dismissed the petition.229
Extradition agreements between states and tribes require close
examination as to the scope of the extradition procedures. In State v.
Carpio, the defendant was charged with unlawful flight after a city police
officer signaled for him to stop.230 A chase ensued, in which the defendant,
a member of the Gila River Indian Community, drove from the city of
Chandler, Arizona, and onto the reservation.231 The defendant alleged that
the city police officer arrested and removed him from the reservation
without complying with the extradition requirements of the Community.232
The state replied that the officer was in hot pursuit of the defendant for a
crime that was committed in the state of Arizona and therefore extradition
was not necessary.233 The court agreed with the state.234 The court
concluded that an agreement between the City and the Community that
required extradition of member defendants only applied when the offense
was committed on the reservation.235 Here, the offense was committed off
the reservation, so the state had properly obtained jurisdiction over the
defendant.236

227. Id. at *3.
228. Id. at *7–8 (“Such a claim does not fall within the established exceptions [violation of
speedy trial or double jeopardy], nor otherwise constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ such that
immediate intrusion into state criminal proceedings by a federal habeas court would be warranted.
Framed another way, the harm petitioner alleges does not embody a right that is necessarily forfeited
by delaying review until after petitioner’s trial . . . . Indeed, the Constitution does not prohibit
petitioner’s prosecution as, ‘an illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to
subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction.’”).
229. Henry v. McMahon, No. EDCV 15-02384-CAS (DTB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56151
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2017).
230. State v. Carpio, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0635, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 817 (Ariz. Ct. App.
June 22, 2017).
231. Id. at *2.
232. Id. at *1.
233. See id. at *1.
234. Id. at *6 (“[T]he State has a particularly strong policy interest in not allowing suspects to
narrowly escape arrest and avoid this State’s jurisdiction over offenses committed within this State by
fleeing across the border to another jurisdiction.”).
235. Id. at *6–8.
236. Id. at *8–10 (“Carpio’s arrest therefore did not interfere with tribal sovereignty, and the
superior court properly exercised jurisdiction over Carpio with respect to the unlawful flight
offense.”).
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Public Law 280

Public Law 83-280 (PL-280) was enacted by Congress in 1953 to
expressly permit states to assert some authority on the reservation.237
While the law applied to five (later six) states in full,238 it allowed other
states to “opt in” to assert jurisdiction over some or all of the Indian
country land within their jurisdiction.
In 2017, there was one notable case about criminal jurisdiction from
Washington State that extended criminal jurisdiction under PL-280 over
Indian allotments located outside the reservation. In State v. Comenout,
members of federally recognized Indian tribes appealed from their
criminal convictions in state court related to the possession and illegal sale
of cigarettes without a license from their store on a trust allotment but not
within any Indian reservation.239 The defendants argued that as Indians in
Indian country, the state had no criminal jurisdiction over them.240
The Washington appellate court disagreed and upheld their criminal
convictions.241 The appellate court recognized that the property was
“Indian country” for purposes of federal jurisdiction.242 However, because
the allotment at issue was not within the borders of a reservation, the court
reasoned that Washington’s assumption of jurisdiction under PL-280 in
1963 conferred jurisdiction on the state.243 The appellate court noted that
the Washington Supreme Court has had several occasions to interpret
Washington’s assumption of jurisdiction over Indian persons on
allotments not within a reservation, including in a case involving the exact
store at issue here, and had regularly upheld jurisdiction.244 Because the
237. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012)
and 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012)) (commonly referred to in Indian law circles in its abbreviated form as
PL-280).
238. Id. The mandatory states are California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
Alaska was subsequently added when it entered the Union in 1959.
239. State v. Comenout, Nos. 48990-2-II, 48994-5-II, 49000-5-II, 49004-8-II, 2017 Wash. App.
LEXIS 2945 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017).
240. Id. at *1.
241. Id.
242. Id. at *5 (“Allotment property held in trust by the United States, such as the property at
issue here, constitutes ‘Indian country.’”).
243. See id. at *7. The relevant Washington statute reads:
The state of Washington hereby obligates and binds itself to assume criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within this
state in accordance with [federal legislation] . . . but such assumption of jurisdiction shall
not apply to Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an established Indian
reservation and held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States.
WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2016).
244. Id.
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allotment fell within Washington’s expansion of PL-280, the Washington
appellate court concluded that the state had criminal jurisdiction over the
defendant’s activity.245
D.

Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL)

Perhaps the Indian law issue that caught the greatest amount of
attention in the national media during 2017 was the conflict over the
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) between the Standing
Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes on one side, and Energy Transfer
Partners and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the other.246 The Sioux
tribes fought vehemently against the decision by the Army Corps to permit
an oil pipeline to pass under Lake Oahe.247 The tribes collectively raised
environmental, social justice, and even religious arguments against the
construction, and they won a limited reprieve at the end of 2016 when the
Obama Administration agreed to further study the environmental
impacts.248 However, with the inauguration of President Trump, the
administration reversed course and the pipeline was eventually
completed.249
While DAPL litigation predated 2017, the first challenge decided
that year involved the tribes’ claim that the routing of the pipeline was a
violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).250 In
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the
tribes argued that the mere presence of the DAPL under Lake Oahe would
cause irreparable harm to the religious exercise of their members. 251
Specifically, the tribes referenced a traditional Lakota belief:
The Lakota people believe that the mere existence of a crude oil
pipeline under the waters of Lake Oahe will desecrate those waters
and render them unsuitable for use in their religious
sacraments. . . . The Lakota people believe that the pipeline
correlates with a terrible Black Snake prophesied to come into the
Lakota homeland and cause destruction. . . . The Lakota believe
that the very existence of the Black Snake under their sacred
waters in Lake Oahe will unbalance and desecrate the water and

245. Id.
246. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C.
2017).
247. Id. at 80.
248. Id. at 80–82.
249. Id. at 82.
250. Id. at 83.
251. Id. at 82.
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render it impossible for the Lakota to use that water in their Inipi
ceremony.252
The tribes sought an injunction from the district court, which was denied
based upon both laches and the unlikelihood that the tribe would prevail
on the merits.253
Laches is a defense available when a party has inexcusably or
unreasonably delayed filing their claim.254 The court noted that while the
tribe was made aware of the pipeline’s proposed route in October 2014, it
waited until February 2017 to raise its RFRA objection.255 Because the
tribes had both notice of the route and an opportunity to voice their
concerns, including concerns about contamination from a potential oil
spill, the court held that the tribes had no excuse for delaying their claim.256
The court also held that the tribes were unlikely to prevail on the
merits. To prevail, the tribes would have to show that the government’s
action implicated the tribe’s religious exercise, that their religious belief is
sincere, and that the government’s action presented a substantial burden
on their religious practice.257 While the court concluded that the tribes
would likely be able to demonstrate that their religious belief is sincere, it
concluded that it is unlikely the tribes would be able to show that their
religious practice would be substantially burdened.258 For authority the
court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng: “[T]he incidental effect
on religious exercise of a government action undertaken in furtherance of
the management and use of government land, even if extreme, is not alone
enough to give rise to a Free Exercise claim.”259 Because of both the
inexcusable delay and the unlikelihood that the tribes will prevail on the
merits, the court denied their request for a preliminary injunction.260 One
252. Id.
253. Id. at 80.
254. See id. at 84.
255. Id. at 85–87.
256. Id. at 86–87. As proof the tribe was aware of the dangers earlier but did not object to the
mere presence of the pipeline under the river, the court cited the tribal chairmen:
When the pipeline leaks, the Missouri river—the source of our drinking water, where we
fish, swim, and conduct ceremonies—will be contaminated. Our Sundance, a spiritual
ceremony sacred to us, is performed on the banks of the river. The source of life, as well
as spiritual continuity, would be damaged.
Id. at 88 (internal citation omitted).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 89–92. The Court reasoned that the pipeline “does not impose a sanction on the Tribe’s
members for exercising their religious beliefs, nor does it pressure them to choose between religious
exercise and the receipt of government benefits.” Id. at 91.
259. Id. at 91–92.
260. Id. at 100.
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week later the tribes filed a notice of appeal, and the court denied the
tribes’ request for an injunction pending appeal for the same reasons.261
Even after the pipeline was completed, the parties continued to argue
in court over a variety of ongoing issues. In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Dakota Access LLC sought a protection
order to prevent public disclosure of eleven documents in the record on
the grounds that “terrorists” or others could use the information to inflict
environmental injury.262 The court agreed to protect only those redactions
in five spill reports suggested by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration that corresponded to the information that it would
redact subject to a FOIA request.263 The court refused to redact the names
of waterways expected to be impacted by a spill or the location of
containment booms. 264
The tribes also saw limited success from a challenge to the
Environmental Assessment (EA). In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, the D.C. District Court heard the third
major challenge to the pipeline brought by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.265 The court began by placing these
new claims within the context of the larger litigation266 and concluded that
while the tribes’ previous two challenges had failed, this third attack held
some merit.267 The Army Corps completed an EA, in which it determined
that the pipeline presented no significant impact on the environment and,
therefore, a much more detailed Environment Impact Statement (EIS) was
not prepared.268 The D.C. District Court concluded that while the Army
261. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 93908 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2017).
262. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 517–18
(D.D.C. 2017).
263. Id. at 522–23.
264. Id. at 523–24.
265. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C.
2017).
266. Id. at 111–12 (“The Tribes have since mounted two substantial legal challenges to DAPL,
neither of which yielded success. The first contended that the grading and clearing of land for the
pipeline threatened sites of cultural and historical significance, and that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers had flouted its duty to engage in tribal consultations pursuant to the National Historic
Preservation Act. The second maintained that the presence of oil in the pipeline under Lake Oahe
would desecrate sacred waters and make it impossible for the Tribes to freely exercise their religious
beliefs, thus violating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. . . . Now that the Court has rejected
these two lines of attack, Standing Rock and Cheyenne River here take their third shot, this time
zeroing in DAPL’s environmental impact.”) (internal citations omitted).
267. Id. at 112.
268. Id. at 116 (“Given those measures and its evaluation of DAPL’s ‘anticipated environmental,
economic, cultural, . . . social[, and] . . . cumulative effects,’ the Corps concluded that the crossing at
Lake Oahe would not ‘significantly affect the quality of the human environment,’ and preparation of
an EIS was therefore not required.”).
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Corps complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in
many areas, it failed to account for the potential effects a spill could have
on fishing rights, hunting rights, and environmental justice when it issued
its EA and, therefore, the EA in certain respects was inadequate.269
The court remanded the case back to the Army Corps to reconsider
the EA in light of the court’s discussion of the failures in the original
analysis.270 Whether the pipeline must cease its operation during the
reevaluation on remand was not decided by the court but was assigned to
the parties for further briefing.271
In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
court decided that the pipeline did not need to cease its operation while the
Army Corps reevaluated the EA.272 The district court ultimately decided
that revoking the easement was not an appropriate remedy because the
deficiencies of the agency’s action were not sufficiently serious and the
agency had a high probability of being able to cure them and justify its
prior determinations on remand.273 However, the court cautioned that its
conclusion to continue to allow oil to flow does not reduce the burden on
the Army Corps from complying with the NEPA errors that were
previously identified.274
269. Id. at 132–34. The Court recognized that the Tribe had raised the issue of hunting and
fishing rights before the Corps had made its final determination in the Environmental Assessment
(EA):
Standing Rock, though, had alerted the Corps to its fishing–and hunting–related concerns
after the agency published the Draft EA. . . . The Director of Standing Rock’s Department
of Game, Fish, and Wildlife Conservation, moreover, explained that many of the Tribe’s
members rely on fishing as ‘an important supplemental source of food and
nutrition’ . . . . An oil spill, he said, could ‘cause extensive fish kills.’ He also spelled out
the ways in which an oil spill could seriously affect game along the Oahe shoreline,
including by poisoning animals that ingest, inhale, or are otherwise externally exposed to
oil and preventing those birds and mammals whose feathers or fur are coated with oil from
maintaining their body temperatures.
Id. at 134 (internal citations omitted).
270. Id. at 112.
271. Id. at 160–61.
272. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 167569 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2017).
273. Id. at *13 (“Defendants argue that the three inadequacies identified by the Court—namely,
the Corps’ failure to adequately address the degree to which the project’s effects are likely to be highly
controversial, the impacts of a spill on fish or game, and the environmental-justice impacts of a spill—
are not significant deficiencies in the agency’s prior analysis.”).
274. Id. at *45 (“In light of the ‘serious possibility’ that the Corps will be able to substantiate its
prior conclusions, the Court finds that vacatur is not the appropriate remedy in this case. That
determination does not, however, excuse Defendants from giving serious consideration to the errors
identified in this Court’s prior Opinion. Compliance with NEPA cannot be reduced to a bureaucratic
formality, and the Court expects the Corps not to treat remand as an exercise in filling out the proper
paperwork post hoc. After the agency’s further work on remand, the parties may well disagree over
the sufficiency of its conclusion. If and when such a dispute arises, they will again have the opportunity
to address whether Defendants have in fact fulfilled their statutory obligations.”).
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Despite the fact that the court refused to stop active use of the
pipeline, it recognized that the threat of a spill would have a serious effect
on tribal communities and ordered enhanced public reporting of the
pipeline’s status.275 In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, the tribe asked the court to impose a series of reporting and
monitoring measures to ensure ongoing compliance.276 The federal court
approved all of the measures requested by the tribe.277 The court
recognized the need for ongoing monitoring measures and rejected the
Army Corps’ suggestion that such monitoring was unwarranted.278 The
reporting requires that Dakota Access file bi-monthly reports on the status
of the pipeline beginning at the end of December 2017 and specifically
include any repairs and incidents involving the portion of the pipeline
crossing Lake Oahe.279
E.

Effect of a Tribal Court Judgment

The U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Bryant in 2016,
which held that a tribal court conviction for domestic violence, even if
uncounseled, could qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of federal
criminal prosecution.280 Several courts in 2017 have applied Bryant’s
principles to build a canon of law on the effect of a tribal court judgment
outside of the tribal courts.
1.

Application of Tribal Court Conviction as a Predicate Offense

Conviction for an improper sexual offense in tribal court, even if
uncounseled, is a sufficient offense to require the convicted party to
register as a sex offender with the state.281 In State v. Lopez, the defendant
was convicted of “child molesting” in Tohono O’odham tribal court and

275. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 198603 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017).
276. Id.
277. Id. at *11 (“Plaintiffs request three specific conditions during the remand period: (1) the
finalization and implementation of oil-spill response plans at Lake Oahe; (2) completion of a thirdparty compliance audit; and (3) public reporting of information regarding pipeline operations. The
Court agrees that each of these measures is appropriately tailored to monitoring the status of the
pipeline during remand.”) (internal citations omitted).
278. Id. at *9–11 (“Recent events have made clear, moreover, that there is a pressing need for
such ongoing monitoring. Earlier this month, the Keystone Pipeline leaked 210,000 gallons of oil in
Marshall County, South Dakota. The spill occurred near the boundaries of the Lake Traverse
Reservation, home of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe, thus highlighting the potential impact of
pipeline incidents on tribal lands.”) (internal citations omitted).
279. Id. at *12–14.
280. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
281. State v. Lopez, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2016-0076, 2 CA-CR 2016-0122, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 27, 2017).
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sentenced to 360 days in a proceeding in which he was uncounseled.282 He
subsequently pled guilty in state court for failure to register as a sex
offender.283 Three years later he was again charged with failure to register,
and this time he contested the charge, arguing that his tribal court
conviction was unconstitutional because it was uncounseled and,
therefore, he had no duty to register as a sex offender.284 The state court
agreed and threw out the conviction.285
The U.S. Supreme Court then decided Bryant, which held that
uncounseled convictions in tribal court could still be used in state or
federal court without violating constitutional rights.286 Accordingly, the
state in Lopez appealed the dismissal.287 Applying Bryant, the Arizona
appellate court reversed: “[Bryant] makes clear that an otherwise valid but
uncounseled tribal court conviction, where a defendant is sentenced to a
term of less than one year, comports with both the Constitution and
ICRA.”288
The defendant in Lopez argued that his conviction in tribal court
should still be construed as unlawful because his guilty plea was
involuntarily extracted.289 However, the court concluded that because this
issue was raised for the first time on appeal, it was improper for the
appellate court to review it here, and so it remanded the issue to the trial
court.290
In United States v. Long, the defendant was charged with, among
other things, being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.291 The
predicate offense upon which his status as a prohibited person was based
was a tribal court conviction for domestic violence where the defendant
was represented by someone approved as a lay advocate but not licensed

282. Id. at *2.
283. Id.
284. Id. at *2–3.
285. Id. at *3.
286. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016).
287. Lopez, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1097, at *3 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s
reversal in Bryant, the state requests that we vacate the trial court’s dismissal order.”).
288. Id. at *6.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *7–8 (“Accordingly, we decline Lopez’s request to entertain his alternate basis for
upholding the dismissal order, vacate that order, and remand to the trial court with instructions to
reinstate the indictment.”).
291. United States v. Long, 870 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), it
is unlawful for any person ‘who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence’ to possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce . . . . Section 921(a)(33)(B), however,
provides: (B)(i) A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for
purposes of this chapter, unless— (I) the person was represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly
and intelligently waived the right to counsel in the case.”).
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as an attorney in tribal court.292 A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled
that the tribal court conviction was sufficient to trigger the federal
statute.293 The court reasoned that the statute’s requirement that the
defendant be represented by counsel “in the case” meant he only needed
to be represented by someone recognized to appear before the court
prosecuting the criminal case.294
Judge Colloton dissented. He argued that a lay advocate should not
qualify as counsel for purposes of the federal statute.295 The dissent would
have reversed the conviction of the prohibited person in possession of a
firearm claim because the defendant was not represented by counsel when
he was convicted of domestic violence.296
2.

How to Treat a Tribal Court Conviction

Because tribes do not always use the same labels as state and federal
courts, it can be difficult to determine how to treat a tribal court conviction
when in a different court system. In State v. Horselooking, the defendant
appealed his sentence after being convicted of DUI and aggravated
battery.297 The district court assigned him a criminal history score of B
based on his prior conviction by the Kickapoo Nation Tribal Court for
residential burglary, treating it like a felony conviction.298 The tribal code
does not classify residential burglary as either a felony or a
misdemeanor.299 The sole issue on appeal was whether it was proper to
treat the tribal court conviction as a felony for criminal history purposes.300
A divided Kansas appellate court determined that it was improper.301
The court began by noting that criminal convictions by a tribal court
in Kansas are treated as out-of-state convictions.302 Under Kansas law, if
292. Id. at 745.
293. Id. at 747.
294. Id. at 746–47 (“Long has presented no evidence that his counsel at the tribal-court
proceeding was not admitted to practice as lay counsel in the tribal court, arguing only that Ms. White
Pipe is not a licensed attorney. Because lay counsel are admitted to practice before the tribal court, we
conclude that Long was represented by counsel in the tribal-court proceeding within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B) . . . .”).
295. Id. at 749–50 (“The ordinary meaning of ‘counsel’ in the legal context conveyed by the
phrase ‘represented by counsel’ is a lawyer. . . . When Long was convicted of a misdemeanor in the
tribal court, he was not represented by a lawyer in the case. Therefore, he was not ‘represented by
counsel in the case’ within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(I), and he ‘shall not be considered to
have been convicted’ of a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ for purposes of § 922(g)(9).”).
296. Id. at 750.
297. State v. Horselooking, 400 P.3d 189 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
298. Id. at 191.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Id. at 192.
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the out-of-state jurisdiction treats a crime as a felony, that crime will be
treated as a felony in Kansas, but the tribal code does not use the terms
“misdemeanor” or “felony.”303 Because the legislative sentencing scheme
is silent in situations like the defendant’s, the majority applied the rule of
lenity and determined that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
accused.304
The dissent looked at the possible consequences the tribal court could
impose for the offense. It noted that felonies are “serious” or “major”
crimes while misdemeanors are “less serious.”305 In order to determine
whether a tribal court conviction is equivalent to a felony or misdemeanor,
the dissent suggested looking to the punishment the tribe may impose.306
Because the punishment for residential burglary in the tribal code could
include banishment, the dissent would have concluded that the lower court
correctly accounted for the defendant’s criminal history.307
3.

The Recognition of a Tribal Court Judgment in State Court

No federal law or constitutional provision has been held to require
state courts to enforce tribal court judgments. The issue of how and when
to enforce tribal court judgments comes up often in the interplay between
the powers of competing sovereigns. One particularly notable case
discussed the issue in 2017. In Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe brought suit in tribal court against non-Indians who owned
land in fee within the outer boundary of their reservation. 308 The tribe
enforced a tribal ordinance that requires a tribal permit before a landowner
can install a dock on the portion of the St. Joe River running through the
reservation.309 The Johnsons were served with notice but failed to
appear.310 The tribal court issued a default judgment for $17,400 and
declared that the tribe was entitled to remove the dock and pilings.311 The
tribe then sought to enforce the judgment in state court.312
303. Id. (“The complicating issue here is that the Kickapoo Nation Tribal Code does not
differentiate between felonies and misdemeanors. . . . [And] there is no explicit language in the KSGA
explaining how a court is to classify an out-of-state conviction as either a felony or a misdemeanor
when the convicting jurisdiction does not distinguish between the two.”).
304. Id. at 196.
305. Id. at 198.
306. Id. (“[T]he types of punishment that may be imposed for various wrongs under the Kickapoo
Nation criminal code create an obvious line of demarcation between those considered serious crimes
and those considered to be lesser offenses. The serious crimes include banishment from the tribe for a
term of years or for life as a potential punishment. Other offenses do not permit banishment.”).
307. Id. at 201.
308. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13 (Idaho 2017).
309. Id. at 15.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See id.
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The state trial court upheld the enforcement of the civil judgment.313
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified that Idaho would no longer
give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments but would instead apply
the principles of comity.314
The Idaho Supreme Court provided guidance going forward for when
Idaho state courts should extend comity to tribal court opinions: “[A]s a
general principle, ‘courts should recognize and enforce tribal judgments.’
However . . . a tribal judgment is not entitled to enforcement if the tribal
court did not have both personal and subject matter jurisdiction or the
defendant was not afforded due process of law.”315 The court briefly
mentioned four additional instances in which a court may decline to
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of equitability.316
After reversing its prior guidance that tribal court judgments are
entitled to full faith and credit, the court considered whether the Coeur
d’Alene Tribal Court’s judgment should be entitled to comity under this
new analysis. The court identified that the tribal court had jurisdiction over
the dock because the U.S. Supreme Court, in Idaho v. United States, 533
U.S. 262 (2001), held that the riverbed was held in trust for the tribe.317
The court reasoned that the petitioners had failed to meet their burden to
show that the tribe lacked jurisdiction over the dock and held that the due
process rights of the petitioners were not violated because they had
received notice of the claims against them and were afforded an
opportunity to appear in tribal court.318 However, the Idaho Supreme Court
still refused to extend comity to the $17,400 civil fine because the penalty
313. Id.
314. Id. at 17 (“Although we value good relations with the tribal courts within Idaho, we are
unable to continue to apply the strained construction of 28 U.S.C. section 1738 that we adopted in
Sheppard in order to advance that important objective. Therefore, we overrule the holding in Sheppard
that tribal judgments are entitled to full faith and credit and adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
in Wilson and hold that tribal court judgments are entitled to recognition and enforcement under
principles of comity. We do not overrule Sheppard in its entirety. We will continue to apply its
requirement that a party attacking the validity of a tribal court’s judgment bears the burden of proving
its invalidity.”).
315. Id. at 17–18 (internal citations omitted).
316. Id. at 18 (“[There are] four equitable grounds upon which a court may decide not to
recognize a tribal judgment. Those grounds are: ‘(1) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (2) the
judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; (3) the judgment is
inconsistent with the parties’ contractual choice of forum; or (4) recognition of the judgment, or the
cause of action upon which it is based, is against the public policy of the United States or the forum
state in which recognition of the judgment is sought.’”) (internal citations omitted).
317. Id. at 19–20 (“In this case, the ownership of the land is dispositive. Unlike the situation in
Hicks, the State here does not have any interests that would weigh against the Tribal Court exercising
jurisdiction. This case is similar to Water Wheel in that there are no competing State interests. We hold
that the Johnsons have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the Tribal Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.”).
318. Id.
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was penal in nature.319 Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower court awarding the monetary penalty but affirmed
the lower court’s recognition of the declaratory relief—that the tribe may
remove the Johnsons’ dock and pilings from the river.320
F.

Enrollment

Federal law gives great deference to tribal courts to determine for
themselves who is and who is not a member. Despite this deference,
federal courts often hear cases when a tribal member has been disenrolled
by their tribe. Many of these cases were brought in 2017, but this Section
will focus on the Nooksack disenrollments and the Cherokee Freedmen.321
The right to membership in an Indian tribe cannot be entirely
controlled by the tribe when a treaty with the United States establishes
some criteria for membership. In Cherokee Nation v. Nash, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia addressed the disenrollment by
the Cherokee Nation of the “Freedmen”—members who had traced their
ancestry back to slaves owned by Cherokee citizens and then freed by
treaty.322 In 2007, the Cherokee voted to limit citizenship to only those
persons who were Cherokee, Shawnee, or Delaware by blood.323 The
Cherokee Nation argued that it was only the Cherokee Nation Constitution
that had guaranteed citizenship to the Freedmen and that the Constitution
could be changed in accordance with its amendment provisions.324 The
Cherokee Freedmen brought suit alleging that their attempted
disenrollment violated the Treaty with the Cherokee in 1866 and that their
Cherokee citizenship is instead conferred by the Treaty, which has never
been abrogated.325
319. Id. at 22 (“The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies
not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the
state for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its
revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties.”).
320. Id. (“In this case the judgment comprises two parts. The first part is a civil penalty of
$17,400. The second part is a declaration that the Tribe has the right to remove the offending
encroachment. The civil penalty is not enforceable under principles of comity. However, the penal law
rule does not prevent courts from recognizing declaratory judgments of foreign courts.”).
321. Other interesting cases presenting issues of enrollment include a dispute among members
of the San Pasqual Band. See Alegre v. United States, No. 17-CV-0938-AJB-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76136 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2017) (granting a temporary restraining order to enjoin changes to
the Tribe’s membership ordinance); Alegre v. Jewell, No. 16-CV-2442-AJB-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130918 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017) (lifting that injunction); see also Collins v. Salinan Heritage
Pres. Ass’n, No. B267301, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5325 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2017) (a
defamation action against the Salinan Heritage Preservation Association for publically claiming the
plaintiff was not an Indian).
322. Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017).
323. Id. at 111.
324. Id. at 114.
325. See id. at 112.
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The 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee contained a provision that
discussed the enrollment of the Cherokees’ freed slaves as members of the
Cherokee Nation.326 The court was called upon to resolve whether the
1866 Treaty guarantees a continuing right to Cherokee Nation citizenship
for descendants of Freedmen listed on the Final Roll of Cherokee
Freedmen as compiled by the Dawes Commission.327
The court reasoned that the 1866 Treaty’s guarantee of “all the rights
of Native Cherokee” included the right of citizenship.328 It also concluded
that the language “and are now residents therein, or who may return within
six months, and their descendants” included the current class of Freedmen
petitioning the court.329 Therefore, the court held that the 2007 amendment
to the Cherokee Constitution violated the Treaty and was therefore
unlawful.330
The court explicitly rejected the Cherokee Nation’s argument that
citizenship in the nation is conferred solely by the Cherokee Constitution
and is therefore subject to amendment.331 Instead, it held that the Cherokee
have the right to determine their own membership and to change their
membership criteria, but any changes must accord the rights conferred to
the Freedmen by the 1866 Treaty.332
Unlike the definitive answer Nash provided to the Cherokee
Freedmen, the Western District of Washington had to issue repeated
326. Id. at 90 (“[T]he Cherokee Nation promised that ‘never here-after shall either slavery or
involuntary servitude exist in their nation’ and ‘all freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act
of their former owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who were in the country at the
commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may return within six months,
and their descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees . . . .’”).
327. Id. at 89.
328. Id. at 123 (“The Cherokee Nation Constitution defines native Cherokees’ right to citizenship
in the Nation. Accordingly, by virtue of Article 9 of the 1866 Treaty, qualifying freedmen have a right
to citizenship as defined by the Cherokee Nation Constitution to the same extent that native Cherokees
have that right. Thus, the 1866 Treaty grants qualifying freedmen the right to citizenship but the
Cherokee Nation Constitution actually makes them citizens. The history, negotiations, and practical
construction of the 1866 Treaty do not suggest that the parties believed otherwise.”).
329. Id. at 129.
330. Id. at 140.
331. Id. at 127 (“The Cherokee Nation is mistaken to treat freedmen’s right to citizenship as
being tethered to the Cherokee Nation Constitution when, in fact, that right is tethered to the rights of
native Cherokees. Furthermore, the freedmen’s right to citizenship does not exist solely under the
Cherokee Nation Constitution and therefore cannot be extinguished solely by amending that
Constitution.”).
332. Id. at 140 (“The Cherokee Nation’s sovereign right to determine its membership is no less
now, as a result of this decision, than it was after the Nation executed the 1866 Treaty. The Cherokee
Nation concedes that its power to determine tribal membership can be limited by treaty. The Cherokee
Nation can continue to define itself as it sees fit but must do so equally and evenhandedly with respect
to native Cherokees and the descendants of Cherokee freedmen. By interposition of Article 9 of the
1866 Treaty, neither has rights either superior or, importantly, inferior to the other. Their fates under
the Cherokee Nation Constitution rise and fall equally and in tandem.”) (internal citations omitted).
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opinions related to the alleged disenrollment of 306 Nooksack tribal
members. On March 24, 2016, the Nooksack Tribal Council lost a quorum
of recognized members, and since then Interior has refused to recognize
the Council’s actions, including the attempt to disenroll the 306 tribal
members.333 Litigation has proceeded, raising several different causes of
action.
In Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, the remnant Council sued Interior,
seeking an order to restore federal funding for tribal programs under its
638 contracts.334 The disenrolled tribal members moved to intervene in the
proceedings, and the court granted the intervention.335 In Nooksack Indian
Tribe v. Zinke, the court reached the merits of the tribe’s claim,
determining that federal courts should not interpret tribal law.336 Instead,
courts take their signal from the federal government, and “no Nooksack
tribal leadership group is currently federally recognized.”337 Therefore, the
court reasoned that the acting Council lacks the ability to bring its claims
in federal court.338
In November 2017, the Nooksack Indian Tribe filed for
reconsideration.339 The federal court denied the motion for
reconsideration.340 The tribe asserted the federal court committed manifest
error when it refused to defer to tribal law that a holdover group of the
Tribal Council could bring suit on behalf of the tribe.341 The court rejected
the tribe’s argument, again deferring to Interior.342

333. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63515, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 26, 2017).
334. Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, 321 F.R.D. 377 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
335. Id. at 383 (“[T]he Court sees no reason why intervention would be inappropriate. The
intervention will not cause undue delay and Intervenors have a very probable relation to the merits of
the case. Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that American Indian tribes’ ‘participation in
litigation critical to their welfare should not be discouraged.’”).
336. Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, No. C17-0219-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72364 (W.D.
Wash. May 11, 2017).
337. Id. at 13.
338. Id. at 17 (“[T]he Court concludes deference is owed to the DOI decisions and the holdover
Council does not have authority to bring this case against the federal government in the interim period
where the tribal leadership is considered inadequate by the DOI.”).
339. See Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, No. C17-0219-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188398,
at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2017).
340. Id. at *7.
341. Id. at *4.
342. Id. at *4–6 (“[T]he Court believes that it is appropriate to defer to DOI’s refusal to recognize
Nooksack Tribal leadership and find that the holdover Council lacked authority to bring this lawsuit
on behalf of the Tribe. As the Court described in its prior order, there was sufficient evidence in the
record for the Court to determine that DOI’s recognition decision was reasonable. Nothing has
changed since the Court made its ruling that would warrant a different outcome. Therefore, the Court
does not find that its holding represented manifest error.”).
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In Rabang v. Kelly, the 306 tribal members that the holdover Tribal
Council attempted to disenroll bought suit against the members of the
council and the tribal judge that had overseen the disenrollment
proceedings.343 The district court dismissed the tribal judge in charge of
the disenrollment procedures on the basis of judicial immunity because
“when a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of
clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction,
judicial immunity is lost.”344 The evidence presented by the parties in this
case did not definitively show that the judge knew that Interior had refused
to recognize all actions of the Tribal Council after March 24, 2016.345 On
May 3, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging additional
facts against the tribal judge.346 The judge filed for summary judgment,
and the plaintiffs asked for time to complete discovery related to when the
judge had subjective knowledge that he lacked authority to act.347 The
court granted the plaintiffs additional time to complete discovery.348
By October 2017, the federal district court held out hope for a
settlement of the issues that remained between the parties. In Rabang v.
Kelly, the federal district court took notice of an August 28, 2017
agreement between Interior and Kelly, which recognized Kelly as
Chairman of the Nooksack Tribal Council, and the Council as the
governing body of the Nooksack Indian Tribe contingent upon Kelly
organizing an election within 120 days in which all the purportedly
disenrolled members were eligible to vote, run for tribal office, and receive
benefits from the tribe on an equal basis with all other members.349 In light
of that agreement, the federal court stayed the proceedings, suggesting that
Interior’s decision to recognize the Tribal Council could be an event of
“jurisdictional significance.”350 In December 2017, the remnant Council
won an election that was marred with allegations of fraud.351 Chairman
343. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66798 (W.D. Wash. May 2,
2017).
344. Id. at *2.
345. Id. at *3.
346. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101182 (W.D. Wash. June
29, 2017).
347. Id. at *2.
348. Id. at *3.
349. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177176, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 25, 2017).
350. Id. at *12–13 (“The DOI’s action will likely have substantial relevance to—or even
control—the Court’s subsequent rulings on this litigation. Given that the pending tribal election could
affect the Court’s continued jurisdiction over this case, a stay of proceedings could conserve both the
Court’s and parties’ resources.”).
351. Nina Shapiro, Nooksack Chairmen Vows to Continue Disenrollments in Wake of Contested
Election, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/
nooksack-chairman-vows-to-continue-disenrollments-in-wake-of-contested-election/.
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Kelly vowed to reinstate the disenrollment procedures,352 which almost
certainly means this litigation will continue into 2018.
G.

Gaming

The Supreme Court decided in 1987 that California could not impose
its state civil regulations on a bingo operation run by the Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians.353 The following year Congress enacted the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to create federal requirements to oversee
tribal gaming activity.354 Since then Indian gaming has become a $30
billion operation, providing economic development for many tribes.355
With the potential profitability of Indian casinos, the stakes have
increased litigation on all sides. States, local communities, and non-Indian
property owners object to the construction of casinos; even other tribes,
sensing competition, have attempted to use the law and the courts to limit
casino development. There are too many cases involving gaming to
summarize them all. I have tried to provide an overview of the important
decisions taken by state and federal courts in 2017.
1.

IGRA

Among the most notable cases of 2017 was a decision permitting a
degree of state regulation into Indian gaming as long as those regulations
were directed at off-reservation activity. In Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New
Mexico, the Pueblo of Pojoaque sued New Mexico for failing to conduct
gaming compact negotiations in good faith as required under IGRA.356 The
Pueblo also alleged that New Mexico deprived it and its members from
their right to be free from state jurisdiction over activities that occur on its
lands when the state gaming board denied vendor licenses for businesses
doing work with the Pueblo.357 The district court dismissed the Pueblo’s
claims, holding that IGRA does not preempt state regulatory authority over
non-Indian state licensee vendors.358
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.359 It concluded that traditional
preemption analysis is appropriate for conduct that occurs outside Indian
country (and is thus indirect) even if it has a substantial effect on the
352. Id.
353. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
354. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
355. Grant Christensen et al., Tribal Court Litigation, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS
AND CORPORATE LITIGATION 436 (2017). In 2015, tribal gaming had grown to a $29.9 billion industry
and had posted 5% annual growth.
356. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico, 863 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2017).
357. Id. at 1229–30.
358. See id. at 1229.
359. Id. at 1228.
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tribe.360 It then held that IGRA does not explicitly preempt state regulatory
action occurring outside Indian country, only activity on Indian lands.361
The Tenth Circuit concluded that under traditional preemption analysis,
there must be a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme in order to
preempt regulation, but the IGRA has no such scheme that governs the
state regulation of vendors doing business with Indian gaming enterprises;
it is in fact “silent” as to the regulation of licensing gaming vendors.362
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, IGRA does not implicitly
preempt state authority based on field preemption because it explicitly
allows state regulation of licensing, regulation, and prohibition of vendors
with conduct based outside of Indian country in the area of gaming.363
Conflict preemption also does not apply because it is possible to comply
with IGRA and state rules on vendor licensing.364
Judge Bacharach issued a dissenting opinion. He argued that
Bracker’s interest balancing approach should be applied instead of
traditional preemption because the underlying dispute involved an Indian
tribe.365 The dissent cited Ramah Navajo School Board, 458 U.S. 832
(1982), to conclude that Bracker is appropriate even when the effect on
the tribe is indirect and the activity to be regulated is outside of Indian
country.366 The dissent would have found that IGRA preempts state
regulation regardless of whether the effect on the Pueblo was direct or
indirect.367
In a related challenge, the Tenth Circuit also held that IGRA’s grant
of power to the Secretary to issue gaming regulations when a state refused
to negotiate a compact was an unlawful exercise of the Secretary’s powers.
368
In New Mexico v. United State Department of Interior, the state
360. Id. at 1232–35.
361. Id.at 1235 (“[T]he pertinent question is not from where the State is regulating, but whether
the State is regulating Indian gaming on tribal lands. If New Mexico is regulating gaming on tribal
land, then the Bracker balancing test applies. If not, then the traditional preemption analysis applies.”).
362. Id. (“Indeed, ‘[e]verything—literally everything—in IGRA affords tools (for either state or
federal officials) to regulate gaming on Indian lands, and nowhere else.’”) (quoting Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (2014)).
363. Id. at 1236.
364. Id. (“But here it is not impossible to comply with both federal and state law, because there
are no conflicting obligations for state licensees. Moreover, the licensees can continue doing business
with the Pueblo (as no license is required), and the absence of a compact demonstrates that the State
is without authority to take enforcement action to prohibit or penalize such transactions.”).
365. Id. at 1237 (“In determining whether to apply Bracker, neither the Supreme Court nor our
court has ever drawn a rigid distinction based on the directness of the effect on a tribe. To the contrary,
the Supreme Court’s opinions on Indian taxation establish that Bracker may be triggered even when
the burden on the tribe is indirect.”).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1239–40.
368. New Mexico v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2017).
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challenged the authority of Interior to issue regulations (25 C.F.R. § 291
et. seq.) allowing the Secretary to approve gaming operations when the
state itself did not enter into a gaming compact with the tribe.369 The state
argued that Interior lacks this authority where a tribe’s IGRA suit against
the state for failing to negotiate a compact in good faith is dismissed due
to the state’s sovereign immunity.370 In this case, the Pueblo of Pojoaque
sued New Mexico for failure to negotiate a compact in good faith as
permitted under IGRA, but New Mexico had that case dismissed on the
basis of sovereign immunity.371 The Pueblo then asked Interior to
promulgate gaming regulations as permitted by 25 C.F.R. § 291 when a
state does not negotiate in good faith.372 Before Interior could do so, New
Mexico challenged its authority.373 The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court’s holding that the case was justiciable and affirmed the state’s
summary judgment motion blocking the Secretary from approving tribal
gaming under Section 291 because the creation of the regulation was an
invalid exercise of the Secretary’s power.374
The court concluded that New Mexico had standing.375 The Tenth
Circuit then applied Chevron deference to the powers granted to the
Secretary.376 The Tenth Circuit held that Congress spoke directly to the
question of when the Secretary could issue regulations to permit gaming
without a compact, and the text of IGRA requires a finding by a federal
court that the state has acted in bad faith.377 The Tenth Circuit reasoned
that Section 291 was therefore an attempt by the Secretary to rewrite
IGRA.378 It rejected Interior’s argument that when Congress wrote IGRA
it “drew a map in which all roads lead to some kind of gaming
procedures.”379 The Tenth Circuit instead concluded that Congress
369. Id. at 1211.
370. See id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1214.
375. Id. at 1215–18. New Mexico has suffered both a procedural and an injury in fact: “[T]he Part
291 regulations injure New Mexico by forcing it to choose between participating in a process it
considers unlawful and forgoing any benefit from that allegedly unlawful process . . . .” Id. at 1218.
376. Id. at 1221 (“‘If Congress has spoken directly to the issue, that is the end of the matter; the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent.’
However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the precise question at issue, a court must determine
whether to afford the agency’s interpretation Chevron deference. Such deference is appropriate if
‘‘Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law’ and
the agency’s interpretation of the statute was issued pursuant to that authority.’”) (internal citations
omitted).
377. Id. at 1217–18.
378. Id. at 1225 (“At bottom, the Secretary is attempting to rewrite IGRA.”).
379. Id. at 1227.
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intended to create a system that balances the equal sovereign interests of
states and tribes.380
Interior argued that the decision in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), altered what might have been an unambiguous statute into an
ambiguous one by declaring Congress’s chosen enforcement mechanism
(a lawsuit by the tribe against the state) violated the Eleventh
Amendment.381 However, the Tenth Circuit rejoined: “The Supreme Court
has never held that, in crafting a partially unconstitutional regulatory
regime, Congress has necessarily delegated to the relevant administrative
agency the power to fundamentally revise that regime in order to work
around an area that had been declared unconstitutional.”382 Instead, it cited
now Justice Gorsuch (then a member of the Tenth Circuit): “[W]hen the
political branches disagree with a judicial interpretation of existing law,
the Constitution prescribes the appropriate remedial process. It’s called
legislation.”383
In Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), the
tribe moved to establish gaming pursuant to IGRA on lands gained subject
to a 1987 settlement that made the land subject to the laws of the
commonwealth.384 The settlement specifically contemplated bingo or any
other game of chance and took effect six months after Cabazon but before
the enactment of IGRA.385 The district court concluded that the tribe failed
to exercise sufficient “government power” over the lands and that even if
it had such power, IGRA did not impliedly repeal the settlement
agreement’s grant of commonwealth authority over gaming on the tribal
lands.386
The First Circuit reversed.387 It recognized that IGRA requires the
tribe to have jurisdiction over the land in order for IGRA to apply but
concluded the settlement agreement recognized that jurisdiction.388 The
court explained that those government powers utilized by the tribe include:
a housing program that coordinates with the HUD, an intergovernmental
380. Id. at 1227–28 (“Equal bargaining cannot be had, however, where the parties know that,
absent an agreement, one side will nevertheless obtain its fundamental goals; yet, this is precisely the
situation that the Part 291 regulations prescribe, where ultimately the tribe will secure gaming
procedures.”).
381. Id. at 1212–13.
382. Id. at 1230.
383. Id. (citing Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring)).
384. Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), 853 F.3d 618 (1st Cir. 2017).
385. Id. at 622.
386. Id. at 623.
387. Id. at 621.
388. Id. at 624–25 (“Although the Federal Act does contain some language limiting the Tribe’s
jurisdiction that language only confirms that the Tribe retains the jurisdiction it has not surrendered in
the Federal Act.”).
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agreement with EPA, a health clinic with assistance from IHS, an
education and scholarship program financed by the BIA, a child welfare
program, a tribal court, etc.389 The First Circuit made clear that IGRA does
not require that the tribe exercise complete governmental power in order
to engage in gaming.390 The First Circuit then went on to hold that IGRA
effected a partial repeal of the Settlement Act.391 It reasoned that the
Settlement Agreement had no language that contemplated that it could not
be modified by future federal laws and that IGRA’s enactment in 1988
removed the control of the commonwealth over class II games like bingo,
pull-tabs, and non-banking card games like poker.392 The case was
remanded so a judgment could be entered in the tribe’s favor.393 In a
related case, the Eastern District of California held that when land is held
in trust, the tribe has sufficient “jurisdiction” over it to operate casino
gaming for the purposes of IGRA.394
In other IGRA related cases, the federal courts: (1) permitted a claim
against California to proceed on the basis that the state violated the terms
of its gaming compact by misusing funds paid to the Special Distribution
Fund;395 (2) held that a legal opinion by the Acting General Counsel of the
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) is not a final “agency
action” subject to judicial review;396 and (3) held that IGRA requires that
management contracts between a tribe and a private company to operate a
casino be approved by the NIGC Commissioner and that failure to receive
approval makes the contract unenforceable.397
2.

Other Gaming Opinions

Not all gaming litigation was necessarily focused on the
requirements of IGRA. In Outsource Services Management v. Nooksack
389. Id. at 625–26.
390. Id. at 626 (“Pursuant to IGRA, ‘the operation of gaming by Indian tribes [is] a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.’ The Town
now seeks to put this logic on its head by requiring the Tribe’s government to be fully developed
before it can have the benefit of gaming revenue. This is not what IGRA requires, nor is it our case
law.”) (internal citations omitted).
391. Id. at 629.
392. Id. at 627–29.
393. Id. at 629.
394. Club One Casino v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 1:16-cv-01908-AWI-EPG, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 196312 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017).
395. Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. California,
No. 16-cv-01713-BAS-JMA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47122 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017).
396. Kansas ex rel. Schmidt v. Zinke, 861 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2017).
397. Sharp Image Gaming, Inc. v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d
362 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). A similar claim brought in federal court was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Osceola Blackwood Ivory Gaming Grp. v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi
Indians, No. 1:17-cv-00394-DAD-BAM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118065 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2017).
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Business Corporation, NBC, a tribal business owned by the Nooksack
Indian Tribe, defaulted on a $15 million loan that was secured to build a
casino on trust land.398 The casino closed before the loan could be fully
repaid.399 Outsource Services Management sought compensation from the
profits generated from the use of the facility itself, despite the casino
closure, because the loan gave Outsource a claim to revenues generated
from the casino complex’s facilities—not merely its profits from
gaming.400 The tribe argued that claiming revenue from non-casino
activity that occurred on the land was equivalent to a claim on the land
itself, which, because the land is held in trust, is prohibited under the
law.401 The trial court disagreed.402 The appellate court affirmed, reasoning
that the pledged security is not the land itself but income generated from
activities on the land.403
Other gaming opinions in 2017 saw the Ninth Circuit hold that the
“doctrine of prevention” makes it a violation of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing for a party to a contract to interfere with a
condition precedent to the agreement, and that the lobbying of the BIA and
a governor by city officials to deny gaming after the city signed a contract
with a tribe for potential casino development violated that doctrine.404
Federal courts also: (1) determined that they could not interpret the
Muscogee Creek Nation’s tribal law prohibiting gaming on an allotment
held by a member of the Kialegee Tribal Town but located on the
Muscogee Reservation;405 (2) upheld a contract between tribes for the
provision of casino management services;406 (3) refused to seal the entire

398. Outsource Servs. Mgmt., LLC v. Nooksack Bus. Corp., No. 74764-9-I, 2017 Wash. App.
LEXIS 790 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2017).
399. Id. at *4–5.
400. Id. at *2–4.
401. Id. at *6. Any contract that encumbers the land must be approved by the Secretary of Interior
under 25 U.S.C. § 81.
402. Id. at *4–5 (“NBC and the Tribe may choose to use the Facilities in a manner that generates
no income; the agreements give them that opinion. If the Facilities are used in a manner that generates
income, however, that income is a Pledged Revenue subject to collection.”).
403. Id. at *10 (“The pledged security is not a legal interest in the land itself. Nor does OSM’s
right interfere with the tribe’s exclusive proprietary control over the land. . . . OSM has limited
recourse financing and retains a right to income from the facilities, but not the right to the land or to
control operation of the facilities. Because the tribe retains complete control over the casino building
and property and can use the facilities for any purpose, there is no encumbrance for purposes of Section
81, and thus the agreements did not require preapproval.”).
404. See Guidiville Rancheria of Cal. v. United States, 704 F. App’x 655 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017).
405. Kialegee Tribal Town v. Dellinger, No. 17-CV-0478-CVE-FHM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
138417 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2017).
406. Yavapai-Apache Nation v. La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians, No. D069556,
2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4430 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2017).
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record of litigation involving a failed gaming compact407 but permitted a
limited redaction;408 (4) refused to amend the appellate record to include
documents not considered by the agency on a challenge to a decision to
disapprove amendments to a gaming compact;409 and (5) determined a
claim by one tribe alleging that another tribe’s gaming facility was in
violation of its gaming compact was subject to a six-year statute of
limitations.410
3.

Non-Indian v. Indian Gaming

Finally, there was one notable case out of the Second Circuit where
non-Indian gaming interests claimed that state rules discriminated against
them by preferring Indian gaming. In MGM Resorts International Global
Gaming Development LLC. v. Malloy, plaintiff MGM filed suit against
Connecticut, alleging that Special Act 15-7 places it at a competitive
disadvantage in the state’s gaming industry.411 Special Act 15-7 permits
Connecticut’s two federally recognized tribes (the Mashantucket Pequot
and the Mohegans) to jointly form a Tribal Business Entity in order to
negotiate with state municipalities about the prospect of building
commercial casinos on non-Indian-owned land.412 MGM attempted to
register as a Tribal Business Entity but was rejected because it was not
affiliated with either, let alone both, of the tribes as required by the Special
Act.413 The Special Act does not mention non-Indian entities, the
significance of which was disputed by the parties.414 The district court
dismissed MGM’s complaint because it lacked Article III standing.415 The
court held that MGM presented no plans to open or compete for a
commercial casino on non-Indian land in Connecticut and so it lacked
standing to bring the claim.416

407. Williams & Cochrane LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, No.
3:17-cv-1436-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132731 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2017).
408. Williams & Cochrane LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, No.
3:17-cv-1436-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184512 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017).
409. Forest Cty. Potawatomi Cmty. v. United States, No. 15-105 (CKK), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147778 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2017).
410. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. Wisconsin, No. 17-cv-249-jdp, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
176596 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 25, 2017).
411. MGM Resorts Int’l Global Gaming Dev., LLC. v. Malloy, 861 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2017).
412. Id. at 43.
413. Id. at 43–44.
414. Id. at 43 (“MGM interprets the statutory language to mean that only the Tribes are
authorized to establish commercial casinos in Connecticut at all. . . . The state argues that nothing in
the Act prevents other developers from soliciting municipalities for contracts, and that it imposes a
unique burden on the Tribes by requiring them to partner with each other. . . .”).
415. Id. at 44.
416. Id.
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The Second Circuit agreed.417 It held that “Connecticut has provided
municipalities with a general authority to enter into contracts under a
separate statute” and so MGM can negotiate for commercial casinos under
that provision.418 MGM replied that even if it negotiated an agreement with
a municipality, Connecticut would hold such a contract void for illegality
as gambling is generally prohibited.419 The Second Circuit recognized that
concern but determined that MGM was free to enter into these contracts
with municipalities, which is all Special Act 15-7 permits tribes to do; the
Special Act still makes all casino operations subject to the agreement of
the Connecticut General Assembly.420
Alternatively, MGM argued that Special Act 15-7 discriminates
against it by giving the Tribal Business Entity the exclusive right to
publish its casino proposal on the Department of Consumer Protection’s
website.421 The Second Circuit agreed that this contention alleges an injury
in fact.422 However the Second Circuit held that because such an injury is
not “imminent” or “certainly impending,” MGM still lacks standing to
challenge the Connecticut law.423
H.

Housing

There were two important cases from federal circuit courts in 2017
regarding the Native American Housing Assistance and SelfDetermination Act (NAHASDA). In Modoc Lassen Indian Housing
Authority v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development,
a group of tribes brought suit against the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD).424 HUD distributes funds under NAHASDA
based on tribes reporting their public housing units.425 The program is
417. Id. at 43.
418. Id. at 46.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. (“MGM’s complaint plausibly alleges that the RFP requirement reallocates state
resources—specifically, space on the website of a state agency—in a discriminatory manner, and that
the Act generally encourages municipalities to favor the Tribes’ projects over others. If MGM’s
assertions are correct, this places it at a disadvantage in attracting negotiating partners for future
development sufficient to trigger protection under the Equal Protection Clause and the dormant
Commerce Clause.”).
423. Id. at 47 (“Here, MGM has pleaded only that it is ‘interested’ in exploring development
opportunities in Connecticut, and that it has made initial studies of the viability of a casino in the state.
It has not alleged any concrete plans to enter into a development agreement with a Connecticut
municipality, or demonstrated any serious attempts at negotiation.”).
424. Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Hous. & Urban Dev., 864 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir.
2017).
425. Id. at 1216–17 (“Critically, HUD relies on each tribe to provide an accurate yearly count of
its eligible housing units.”).
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zero-sum, so if a tribe overstates its units, it necessarily reduces the amount
available to other tribes.426 HUD identified a group of tribes who had
misstated their public housing units and therefore had been overpaid under
the funding model.427 It subsequently reduced future payments to them
under NAHASDA in order to essentially claw back the difference.428 The
tribes sued, arguing the money should not have been withheld without a
hearing.429 The district court held that hearings were required and HUD
appealed.430
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed.431 It first held that hearings
were not required because HUD did not recapture the funds that were
overpaid pursuant to a review or audit covered by 25 U.S.C. § 4165, and
so no hearing was required to recover the overpayments from the tribes.432
In doing so, the Tenth Circuit created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit
and the Federal Court of Claims, which have both come to the opposite
conclusion.433
Having identified that hearings were not required, the three judge
panel of the Tenth Circuit fractured on the remaining issue. Judge Moritz
and Judge Matheson434 concluded that HUD’s reclaiming of overpaid
funds was unlawful.435 However, Judge Bacharach436 joined Judge Moritz,
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. (“These consolidated appeals arise from a government agency’s decision to recapture,
via administrative offset, funds that the agency allegedly overpaid to multiple grant recipients.”).
429. Id. at 1217.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1216.
432. Id. at 1218–20 (“[W]e agree with HUD that the applicable statutes unambiguously establish
that the terms ‘eligible activities’ and ‘certifications’ don’t encompass a tribe’s report on its eligible
housing units.”).
433. Id. (“Accordingly, we part ways with both the Ninth Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims
to the extent those courts have held that when HUD reviews a tribe’s report of its eligible housing
stock, that review falls within the scope of HUD’s authority to review or audit a tribe’s activities and
certifications.”).
434. Judge Matheson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have granted the tribes
the requested relief. He concluded that the tribes are seeking a statutory right—the return of monies
wrongfully taken—to which the federal government’s sovereign immunity defense does not apply. Id.
at 1231 (“The Tribes do not allege the government destroyed or damaged their housing units or that
other harms arose from the government’s recapture of grant funds or failure to pay in a timely fashion.
The Tribes seek only the grant funds themselves—the very thing to which they are entitled. . . . the
Tribes have sued as statutory beneficiaries to enforce a mandate for the payment of money by the
federal government. This is not a suit for damages, § 702’s waiver applies, and sovereign immunity
poses no bar.”).
435. Id. at 1224–25 (“[B]ecause HUD hasn’t advanced on appeal any alternative basis for its
authority to recapture the funds via administrative offset, we therefore affirm the district court’s ruling
that HUD acted illegally by recapturing the alleged overpayments.”).
436. Judge Bacharach, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have concluded that HUD
has the right to recoup the funds from the tribes. But with two votes holding that HUD does not have
that right, he joined with Judge Moritz to conclude that HUD can claim sovereign immunity to claims
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dismissing the claims by the tribe for a return of those funds on the basis
of HUD’s sovereign immunity—no repayment of funds was required.437
A second case decided by the Federal Circuit raised a similar issue.
In Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, the United
States sought review of a decision of the Court of Federal Claims that held
that violations of NAHASDA were money-mandating.438 HUD admitted
that it had miscalculated payments under NAHASDA to plaintiff tribes
(including Lummi, Fort Berthold, and Hopi) and recouped the
overpayment by withholding future funds from the tribes.439 The tribes
sued under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, arguing that
recoupment was unlawful because it denied them funds to which they were
currently entitled.440 The United States moved to dismiss, but the Court of
Federal Claims denied the motion, holding that NAHASDA was moneymandating and that the Secretary was bound to pay to a qualifying tribe
the amount to which it was statutorily entitled under the formula each
year.441 The United States sought interlocutory review.442
The Federal Circuit reversed and ordered that the tribe’s claim be
dismissed.443 It reasoned that to come under the waiver of sovereign
immunity provided by the Tucker Act requires a party asserting a claim
against the United States to identify a separate source of substantive law
that creates a right to money damages.444 The Federal Circuit reversed the
decision of the Court of Federal Claims that NAHASDA is moneymandating.445 The court reasoned that the money won under a successful
for a return of the funds by the tribes. Id. at 1238–39 (“Congress implicitly delegated this commonlaw authority to HUD, authorizing it to recoup overpayments through offset. Indeed, in the absence of
such a delegation, Congress would have left a gaping hole in NAHASDA by requiring HUD to allocate
funds from a finite sum without any power to correct errors, leaving some tribes with too much and
other tribes with too little.”).
437. Id. at 1225–29 (“But this victory for the Tribes is largely a hollow one. That’s because HUD
enjoys sovereign immunity from claims for money damages.”).
438. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, 870 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
439. Id. at 1315–16.
440. Id. at 1316.
441. Id. at 1316–17.
442. Id. at 1317.
443. Id. at 1315.
444. Id. at 1317 (“The Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action; in order to
come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act, a
plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.”).
445. Id. at 1318 (“Under NAHASDA, the Tribes are not entitled to an actual payment of money
damages, in the strictest terms; their only alleged harm is having been allocated too little in grant
funding. Thus, at best, the Tribes seek a nominally greater strings-attached disbursement. But any
monies so disbursed could still be later reduced or clawed back. And any property acquired with said
monies would be ‘held in trust’ by the Tribes, ‘as trustee for the beneficiaries’ of NAHASDA. . . . To
label the disbursement of funds so thoroughly scrutinized and cabined as a remedy for ‘damages’
would strain the meaning of the term to its breaking point.”).
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NAHASDA claim was not so much “damages” as it was a larger share of
future appropriated monies, which was essentially equitable relief.446 The
Federal Circuit ordered the Claims Court to dismiss the tribe’s claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.447
I.

Hunting & Fishing

Many of the cases involving hunting and fishing rights are related to
treaty rights, with a majority of these cases decided in 2017 originating in
the Pacific Northwest.448 There was one particularly interesting case
involving the interpretation of the right to fish that warrants further
discussion. In Makah Indian Tribe v. Quileute Indian Tribe, the Quileute
and Quinault tribes argued that the 1855 Treaty of Olympia’s “right of
taking fish” applies to the taking of whales and seals, which the Makah
Tribe claimed are demonstrably mammals and not fish.449 After a twentythree-day trial, the court held that in 1855, the Quileute and Quinault
understood the “right of taking fish” to include the right to whale and
seal.450 The Makah Tribe and the State of Washington appealed.451 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed.452
The Ninth Circuit applied the Indian canons of construction: “As a
general rule, treaties ‘are to be construed, so far as possible, in the sense
in which the Indians understood them,’ and ‘ambiguous provisions [should
be] interpreted to their benefit.’”453 The court looked at the meaning of the
word “fish” from the 1800s when the treaties were negotiated and
concluded that there was ambiguity.454 The Ninth Circuit recognized that
446. Id. at 1319 (“It is for larger strings-attached NAHASDA grants—including subsequent
supervision and adjustment—and, hence, for equitable relief.”).
447. Id. at 1320.
448. Many of these cases deal with the interpretation of usual and accustomed rights under a
series of treaties signed with tribes in Washington State. Most of these opinions are generally
unremarkable and require no detailed discussion in this annual review. See generally United States v.
Lummi Nation, 876 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017); Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
871 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Washington, No. C70-9213, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140882 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2017); Skokomish v. Forsman, No. C16-5639 RBL, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42730 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2017); State v. Snyder, No. 73893-3-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS
779 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2017).
449. Makah Indian Tribe v. Quileute Indian Tribe, 873 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017).
450. Id.
451. See id.
452. Id. (“The court’s extensive factual findings supported its ultimate conclusion that ‘fish’ as
used in the Treaty of Olympia encompasses sea mammals and that evidence of customary harvest of
whales and seals at and before treaty time may be the basis for the determination of a tribe’s [usual
and accustomed fishing grounds].”).
453. Id. at 1163.
454. Id. at 1162 (“At the time of signing, ‘fish’ had multiple connotations of varying breadth.
For example, Webster’s Dictionary simultaneously defined ‘fish’ broadly as ‘[a]n animal that lives in
water’ (which would include whales and probably seals) and narrowly as a ‘name for a class of animals
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whales and seals were harvested by the tribes in their usual and
accustomed fishing grounds encompassed by the treaty, and so the Indians
may have understood the term “fish” to include whales and seals.455
However, the appellate court concluded that the boundary rights assigned
by the district court to hunt whales and seals were too large and remanded
with instructions for the district court to fashion alternative boundaries that
are more closely related to the tribes’ historical fishing range.456
J.

Indian Civil Rights Act

The Constitution does not restrict the activities of tribal courts and
tribal governments as, unlike states, tribes have never agreed to be bound
by the document.457 In order to ensure that tribal governments protect the
rights of individuals Congress has enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act
which applies many of the rights conferred by the Constitution to
individuals in Indian country.458 However, the only remedy Congress
provided for individuals who have had their rights violated is a habeas
corpus petition.459 The year 2017 saw more than a dozen cases involving
ICRA, but one in particular deserves discussion because it arguably creates
a circuit split between the Ninth and Second Circuits.460
subsisting in water’ that ‘breathe by means of gills, swim by the aid of fins, and are oviparous’ (which
would exclude whales and seals). Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language (1828).”).
455. Id. at 1165 (“As Professor Hoard explained, the Quileute would likely have used ‘?aàlita?,’
which translates as ‘fish, food, salmon.’ Similarly, the Quinault’s term ‘Kémken’ is defined
alternatively as ‘salmon,’ ‘fish,’ and ‘food.’ Because the Quileute and Quinault traditionally harvested
whales and seals for food at and before treaty time, these pieces of linguistic evidence strongly support
the district court’s finding that the tribes ‘would have understood that the treaty reserved to them the
right to take aquatic animals, including . . . sea mammals, as they had customarily done.’”).
456. Id. at 1167–70. The court includes some maps in its opinion to make the boundary issue
very clear.
457. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority. Thus, in
Talton v. Mayes, this Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not ‘[operate] upon’ ‘the powers of
local self-government enjoyed’ by the tribes.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)).
458. The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341 (2012). For a discussion of the rights
conferred by the ICRA, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian
Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 94 (2013) (“ICRA, merely a federal statute,
does not carry the same weight as the United States Constitution and, therefore, provides insufficient
protection for nonmembers in tribal court.”).
459. 25 U.S.C § 1303. For a Supreme Court ruling clarifying that the ICRA may provide rights
that individuals may not be able exercise through suit in federal courts, see Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U.S. 49 (holding that Ms. Martinez cannot challenge her tribe’s denial of the enrollment of her children
in the tribe because the only remedy provided by ICRA is habeas).
460. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 905 (2d Cir. 1996). The
Second Circuit has previously held that permanent banishment from the reservation was sufficient
confinement so as to constitute detention for purposes of the ICRA.
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In Tavares v. Whitehouse, the United Auburn Indian Community
disciplined a group of its members who it claimed had “slandered and
defamed” the tribe by withholding their per capita distributions and
member privileges, and by temporarily banning them from tribal lands.461
The members filed a petition for habeas corpus under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, arguing that their banishment from the reservation for up to
ten years was a form of detention.462 The district court held that the
petitioners’ punishment was not a “detention” and so it lacked
jurisdiction.463 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.464
The majority held that the loss of financial benefits did not constitute
a detention.465 It further held that temporary banishment was not a
“detention” as that term is used in the Act.466 The majority recognized that
“petitioners raise free speech and due process claims that implicate the
substantive protections Congress saw fit to grant Indians with respect to
their tribes through the ICRA”467 but concluded that a temporary exclusion
is not a “detention,” and so the petitioner’s only redress was an appeal to
the tribe itself.468
The dissent would not have distinguished as clearly between the
terms “detention” and “custody” and would have held that being banished
from the tribal lands for ten years was significant enough to constitute a
sufficiently severe restraint on petitioners’ liberty to exercise habeas
jurisdiction.469
Other 2017 ICRA cases held that: (1) the imposition of a $2,355 fine
is not a form of physical confinement that triggers habeas;470 (2) a
conviction obtained without informing the defendant of his right to

461. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2017).
462. Id. at 869.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 878.
465. Id. at 870 (“[T]he loss of quarterly distributions paid to all tribal members is ‘insufficient
to bring plaintiffs within ICRA’s habeas provision. . . .’”).
466. Id. at 871 (“[W]e think Congress’s use of ‘detention’ instead of ‘custody’ when it created
habeas jurisdiction over tribal actions is significant. . . . At the time Congress enacted
the ICRA . . . ‘detention’ was commonly defined to require physical confinement.”).
467. Id. at 878.
468. Id. at 877–78 (“A temporary exclusion is not tantamount to a detention. And recognizing
the temporary exclusion orders at issue here as beyond the scope of ‘detention’ under the ICRA
bolsters tribes’ sovereign authority to determine the makeup of their communities and best preserves
the rule that federal courts should not entangle themselves in such disputes.”).
469. Id. at 880–89 (“Banishment is a uniquely severe punishment. It does ‘more than merely
restrict one’s freedom to go or remain where others have the right to be: it often works a destruction
of one’s social, cultural, and political existence.’ Tavares’s ten-year banishment is not ‘a modest fine
or a short suspension of a privilege . . . but [rather] the coerced and peremptory deprivation of [her]
membership in the tribe and [her] social and cultural affiliation.’”) (internal citations omitted).
470. Scudero v. Moran, 230 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Alaska 2017).
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counsel at his own expense or a jury trial violates ICRA;471 (3) the proper
venue to bring an ICRA challenge is where the petitioner is currently
incarcerated and not where he was convicted;472 (4) ICRA requires the
exhaustion of tribal remedies473 but does not require an appeal to the tribal
governor;474 (5) ICRA requires suit against both the warden who can
physically release the petitioner but also some member of tribal
government to ensure that the petitioner does not get prosecuted again
upon return to the reservation;475 (6) ICRA applies to convictions from
tribal court but does not apply when the defendant is incarcerated under
orders of the federal government; 476 (7) ICRA no longer applies after the
petitioner has been released from tribal custody;477 and (8) being fined for
trespass on tribal land is not the kind of confinement to which ICRA’s
habeas relief is designed to apply.478
K.

Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)

Cases involving ICWA were by far the largest number of Indian law
cases decided in 2017, constituting more than a third of the total at 252 out
of 646.479 It is important to note that while ICWA is a federal law, many
states have adopted their own state versions which may have even stronger
protections or procedures for cases involving Indian children. California,
Michigan, and Minnesota stand out particularly in this regard.480 It is also
important to note that there are thousands of decisions by trial courts

471. Fragua v. Casamento, No. CV 16-1404 RB/WPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69534 (D.N.M.
May 8, 2017).
472. Cheykaychi v. Geisen, No. 17-CV-00514-KG-GBW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70426
(D.N.M. May 9, 2017).
473. Darnell v. Merchant, No. 17-03063-EFM-TJJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195793 (D. Kan.
Nov. 29, 2017).
474. Toya v. Toledo, CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160173 (D.N.M. Sept. 9,
2017).
475. See Talk v. S. UTE Det. Ctr., No. 1:17-cv-00669 WJ/KK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129915
(D.N.M. Aug. 15, 2017); Garcia v. Elwell, No. CV 17-00333 WJ/GJF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80303
(D.N.M. May 25, 2017); Toya v. Casamento, No. CV 17-00258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80091 (D.N.M. May 25, 2017).
476. Adams v. Elwell, No. CV 17-00285 RB/SCY, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99806 (D.N.M. June
27, 2017).
477. United States v. Smith, Nos. CV 16-08160-PCT-GMS (ESW), CR 13-08043-PCT-GMS,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131560 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2017).
478. Napoles v. Rodger, No. 1:16-cv-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106382 (E.D.
Cal. July 7, 2017).
479. See infra Part I.
480. For a discussion of state acts that implement the federal Indian Child Welfare Act and may
provide even greater protections to Indian children, see Caroline M. Turner, Implementing and
Defending the Indian Child Welfare Act Through Revised State Requirements, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 501 (2016).
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involving Indian children that never result in a written opinion and are not
captured through a Lexis search.
This Section could not possibly attempt to cite to every ICWA case
from 2017. Moreover, a majority of the published ICWA cases raise just
one of two issues: (1) violations of a duty to inquire into a child’s status as
an Indian or (2) failure to provide notice to one or more Indian tribes.
Anyone wishing for a complete list of the 2017 ICWA cases is welcome
to contact the author, but for the sake of brevity, only a handful of cases
that raise relatively unique issues under ICWA will be discussed here.
1.

Constitutionality of ICWA

There were a couple challenges to the constitutionality of ICWA in
2017. In A.D. v. Washburn, the plaintiffs, a group of parents who
intentionally left Indian country to try to avail themselves of state law,
challenged the constitutionality of ICWA.481 They alleged that because
ICWA applies only to Indian children it discriminates on the basis of race
in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and that
Congress lacks the power to regulate state court proceedings relating to
parental rights and the custody of children in accordance with the
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment.482 The court dismissed the
claims for lack of standing because none of the plaintiffs could show that
the application of ICWA would have resulted in a different outcome or
delayed their personal adoption proceedings.483
In Doe v. Piper, parents, members of different federally recognized
tribes, wanted to complete a voluntary adoption by selecting a non-Indian
couple as the adoptive parents for their Indian child. 484 The parents
challenged the constitutionality of ICWA and the Minnesota Indian
Family Preservation Act (MIFPA).485 Importantly, MIFPA applies to both
voluntary and involuntary adoptions, requires notice be given to the tribe,
and gives the tribe the right to intervene.486 In this instance the tribes
agreed not to intervene, and the voluntary adoption was completed. The
federal district judge then dismissed the case as moot.487
481. A.D. v. Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38060 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 16, 2017).
482. Id. at *10–11.
483. Id. at *32.
484. Doe v. Piper, No. 15-2639 (JRT/DTS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124308 (D. Minn. Aug. 4,
2017).
485. Id. at *2–4.
486. Id. at *3.
487. Id. at *13–14 (“This case presents significant constitutional questions, including whether
MIFPA’s extension of the tribal notice requirement and intervention right to voluntary adoption
proceedings implicates the biological parents’ fundamental right to care, custody, and control of their
children; whether those portions of MIFPA are entitled to rational-basis review because they are
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Jurisdiction § 1911

Section 1911(a) of ICWA requires that if a child is domiciled on the
reservation, then the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
child.488 Section 1911(b) allows a tribe to request that a state proceeding
involving one of its members be transferred to the tribal court and that a
transfer should be allowed absent “good cause” or objection by the child’s
parents.489 Section 1911(c) allows a tribe to participate in state court
proceedings involving one of their members or children eligible for
enrollment.490 Each of these provisions was contested in 2017.
Section 1911(a): In In re X.C., the court held that when the mother
moved to the reservation after her children were born, and the children
remained in California, the children were not domiciled on the
reservation.491 In State v. State, the Utah appellate court determined that
the children were domiciled in Utah when proceedings began and that the
mother was a member of the Timpanogos Tribe, which is not federally
recognized.492 The fact that the children were later moved to a federally
recognized tribe’s reservation did not give tribal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over the children.493
Section 1911(b): In V.S.O. v. C.G. (In re People), the South Dakota
Supreme Court held that just because the state proceedings had lasted for
more than one year, the length of the proceeding was an insufficient reason
to deny transfer to the tribal court.494 Instead, the lower court needed to
consider all the facts and make a determination on a case-by-case basis
before determining whether there was good cause not to transfer the case
after a request for transfer was properly made.495 In In re Dependency of
authorized by federal law or further a federal policy benefitting Indians; and whether the statute could
survive strict scrutiny, if applicable, under either theory. Presented in the proper context, these
questions merit careful consideration. But the Court cannot reach them due to jurisdictional
constraints. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss the Does’ action as
moot.”) (internal citations omitted).
488. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012).
489. Id. § 1911(b).
490. Id. § 1911(c).
491. In re X.C., No. B272461, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8881, at *21–23 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 29, 2017) (“As respondents point out, none of the cases Mother cites holds that a child’s domicile
is with a parent who was recently granted primary physical custody but with whom the child is not yet
cohabitating, as opposed to the parent with whom the child has lived his entire life.”).
492. State v. State, 2017 UT App. 237, ¶ 6 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2017).
493. Id. ¶¶ 18–21.
494. V.S.O. v. C.G. (In re People), 2017 SD 30, 896 N.W.2d 652 (Dakota 2017).
495. Id. at 655 (“[I]n determining whether the motions to transfer were timely, the court was
required to consider all the particular circumstances of this case, not simply the amount of time that
had passed since the proceedings first began. . . . Without knowing the Tribe’s and Mother’s reasons
for waiting to seek transfer, the circuit court necessarily did not consider all the circumstances of this
case.”).
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B.M.A., a mother abandoned her four children at the local Indian Child
Welfare office but then subsequently objected when the father requested
the case be transferred to tribal court.496 The father appealed the court’s
refusal to transfer, but the Washington appellate court held that under
ICWA state courts cannot transfer to tribal courts over the objection of a
parent and that the mother remained a parent even if she had left her
children.497 In Gila River Indian Community v. Department of Child
Safety, the Arizona Supreme Court held that since pre-adoptive and
adoptive placements after parental rights have been terminated are not
included under § 1911(b), a transfer to tribal court is not required.498 In
San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. M.S. (In re G.S.),
the father appealed the decision of the California court to transfer the
proceedings to Picuris Pueblo in New Mexico (the mother’s tribe) without
giving notice to the Osage Nation (the father’s tribe).499 The California
appellate court agreed the transfer was in error but held that the court could
not order relief because the transfer had already happened and, therefore,
California courts had lost jurisdiction.500
Section 1911(c): In In the Interest of J.T.T., the Texas juvenile court
recognized that the child was a member of the Navajo Nation but denied
the tribe’s motion to intervene in the proceedings because it was
untimely.501 The Texas appellate court reversed, holding that the plain
language of § 1911(c) allows the tribe to participate even if the tribe moves
to intervene at the final hearing.502 The appellate court also concluded that
while Texas law requires a written request to intervene, ICWA does not
require the request be in writing and ICWA preempts Texas state law.503
496. In re Dependency of B.M.A., No. 75404-1-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1379, at *1–4 (Wash.
Ct. App. June 12, 2017).
497. Id. at *28–31.
498. Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 395 P.3d 286, 290 (Ariz. 2017)
(“Congress’s differentiation throughout ICWA indicates its desire to place certain federal mandates
on states for foster care placement and termination-of-parental-rights actions but not preadoptive and
adoptive placements. The latter are not presumptively subject to transfer to tribal court under
§ 1911(b).”).
499. San Bernardino Cty. Children & Family Servs. v. M.S. (In re G.S.), No. E068000, 2017
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8409 (Cal Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017).
500. Id. at *10 (“[T]he dependency case was dismissed by the court. Therefore, neither this court
nor the juvenile court has any further jurisdiction. Even though we agree that the juvenile court erred
in failing to notice any of the Indian tribes and in transferring the case to the Picuris Pueblo tribal court
over father’s objection, if we order a reversal of the transfer order, no effective relief could be gained
at the juvenile court level.”).
501. In the Interest of J.T.T., No. 08-17-00162-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11801 (Tex. App.
Dec. 20, 2017).
502. Id. at *7–8 (“Courts should not infer a waiver of the right to intervene simply because the
Indian’s child tribe does not intervene at the first opportunity.”)
503. Id. at *9–10 (“Intervention by the tribe insures that the child will not be removed from the
Indian community and consequently lose touch with Indian traditions and heritage. A state procedural
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Notice § 1912(a)

Section 1912(a) requires that in an involuntary proceeding involving
a foster care placement or the termination of parental rights, if the court
knows or has reason to know an Indian child is involved, notice must be
given to the child’s tribe.504 The following are a sampling of the more than
one hundred cases that raised the issue of notice in 2017.
In In re Breanna S., the court held that although notice was sent to
the Yaqui tribe, and the tribe replied verifying that the child was not an
Indian child under Yaqui law, because the notice did not include all the
required information about Yaqui ancestors, the notice was incomplete.505
The Department objected, arguing that even if the great-grandmother was
a full-blooded Yaqui, the child would not be eligible for membership,
being no more than one-eighth Yaqui by blood and therefore below the
one-fourth threshold written into the tribal law;506 however, the court held
that under ICWA it is up to the tribe to decide for itself the application of
its laws related to membership eligibility.507
Many states had cases decided on the question of notice. Arizona
held that when the mother told the court that she was not enrolled but that
she was eligible for enrollment in either the Oglala Sioux (through her
mother) or Spirit Lake (through her father), notice must be sent to those
tribes.508 California held that when a parent raises “Blackfoot’” as their
Indian ancestry, the court has an obligation to determine whether the
parent meant “Blackfeet,” which is a federally recognized tribe and
requires notice under ICWA, or “Blackfoot,” which is not.509 Colorado
held that even though the mother did not claim membership in any
federally recognized tribe, her repeated assertions of Apache heritage
required notice be sent to the Apache tribes.510 Kansas held that courts
rule which would deny the right to intervene in a child custody proceeding because the tribe did not
file a written pleading prior to the hearing directly conflicts with this purpose. Accordingly, we
conclude that Section 1911(c) preempts Rule 60’s requirement of a written pleading because it stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional objectives.”) (internal citations omitted).
504. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012).
505. In re Breanna S., 8 Cal. App. 5th 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
506. Id. at 654.
507. Id. at 654–55 (“‘[M]embership . . . is a tribe’s determination based on tribal law’ . . . .
[A]lthough the Department accurately quotes language from the Pascua Yaqui Constitution, we are
unwilling to determine in the first instance the tribe’s membership eligibility requirements, particularly
since we are without benefit of testimony regarding how that language has been applied by the tribe
and whether exceptions have been created by tribal custom and practice.”).
508. Michelle M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 401 P.3d 1013 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
509. Tehama Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. B.M. (In re Z.B.), No. C084117, 2017 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 8303, at *5–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017). “When Blackfoot heritage is claimed, part
of the [Department’s] duty of inquiry is to clarify whether the parent is actually claiming Blackfoot or
Blackfeet heritage so that it can discharge its additional duty to notice the relevant tribes.”. Id. at *7.
510. People v. L.L., 2017 COA 38, 395 P.3d 1209 (Colo. App. 2017).
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must continue treating children as Indian children when a prospective tribe
had requested more information about their ancestry and had not yet made
a determination of their eligibility for membership.511
Massachusetts held that the new ICWA guidelines require courts to
verify that proper notice was sent to each potential tribe by reviewing
return receipts or other proofs of service.512 Michigan held that while
juvenile courts have an obligation to inquire into the Indian status of all
children within their jurisdiction, the failure to do so was harmless because
the mother never alleged the child was an Indian child.513 However, a
Texas court held that a father’s allegation that he “had ‘Indian blood’” and
that his family was “part of a reservation” was enough to trigger the
notification requirement of ICWA.514
4.

Active Efforts § 1912(d)

Section 1912(d) requires that before a foster care placement or a
termination of parental rights can be entered by the court, the court must
conclude that “active efforts” have been made to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family.515 Numerous cases were decided on this provision in
2017; however, most of them turned heavily on the specific factual
situation.516 I will highlight just two cases here, one a published opinion
out of California and the other a divided opinion by the Alaska Supreme
Court.
In In re T.W.-1, the father argued that active efforts had not been
made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family—specifically, that the
initial case plan failed to identify any service providers placing the burden
on the father to locate services. 517 Subsequent case plans included a
service provider but no contact information or information on
enrollment.518 Some case plans failed to include any substance abuse
counseling or any assessment related to substance abuse, and the father
was never tested despite district court direction that the plan include

511. In the Interest of D.H., 401 P.3d 163, 172–74 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
512. Adoption of Uday, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 51, 52–53 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017).
513. In re York, No. 333672, 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 498 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017).
514. In the Interest of C.C., No. 12-17-00114-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6036, at *7–8 (Tex.
App. June 30, 2017).
515. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1912(d) (2012).
516. See e.g., Bob S. v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017); Jude M. v.
State, 394 P.3d 543 (Alaska 2017); Carlos R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 16-0372, 2017
Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2017); Ritter v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
511 S.W.3d 343 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017); In re J.L., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. M.L.M. (In re L.M.G.M.), 388 P.3d 353 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
517. In re T.W.-1, 9 Cal. App. 5th 339, 341–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
518. Id. at 346.
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“testing protocols.”519 Additionally, the record was unclear whether there
were any services specifically related to parenting skills or avoiding
criminal activity, which would be instrumental in preventing the breakup
of the family.520 Finally, the father was provided with only one telephone
visit despite his request for more interaction and the fact that visitation is
a critical component of a reunification plan.521 Accordingly, the California
appellate court concluded that active efforts were not made to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family, and it reversed the lower court’s termination
of parental rights.522
In Margot B. v. State, a divided vote of the Supreme Court of Alaska
(3–2) affirmed the termination of parental rights by concluding that active
efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.523 The
majority suggested that it was proper to look at the entire period in which
social services was involved in order to decide whether active efforts had
been made.524 The majority recognized that there was a seven-month
period between when the mother graduated from Mental Health Court and
the actual termination proceedings, where limited efforts occurred.525
However, the majority ultimately relied on the trial court’s finding that the
Office of Child Services (OCS) had developed case plans throughout the
case, which had included visitation, urine analysis tests, numerous
referrals to parenting classes, individual and couple’s counseling, and
substance abuse assessments.526 Accordingly, it affirmed the lower court
order that active efforts had been made.527
The dissent would have held that the facts indicated that active efforts
had not been made.528 It noted that both the mother’s counselor and the
couple’s counselor felt that six months of additional services might better
prepare the parents to resume custody of their children.529 Further, it would
have held that OCS did not make the required active efforts.530 The dissent
519. Id. at 346–47.
520. Id. at 347.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 349.
523. Margot B. v. State, Nos. S-16318, S-16331, S-16332, 2017 Alas. LEXIS 38 (Alaska Mar.
22, 2017).
524. Id. at *11.
525. Id. at *11–12.
526. Id. at *13.
527. Id. at *20.
528. Id.
529. Id. at *20–21.
530. Id. at *24–25 (“The caseworker’s trial testimony reveals that she did not update Margot’s
case plan between December 2014 and March 2016; that she did not meet with Margot at any time
after her graduation from Mental Health Court in July 2015; and that she never conveyed her
expectation that Margot would continue to engage in the counseling that had been part of her treatment
program in Mental Health Court.”).
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placed particular weight on the mother’s testimony that she did not know
what else OCS expected of her in order to be compliant with her case
plan.531 Accordingly, the dissent would have reversed the lower court and
allowed six additional months of services to try to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family.532
5.

Procedure for a Foster Care Placement (§ 1912(e)) or
Termination of Parental Rights (§ 1912(f))

ICWA requires that before an Indian child can be placed in foster
care (§ 1912(e)) and/or before a parent’s parental rights to an Indian child
are terminated (§ 1912(f)), the court must determine, on the record, that
the continued custody of the child by its parents would likely result in
serious emotional or physical harm to the child.533 The determination must
be based at least in part on testimony from a qualified expert.534 In 2017,
many courts were faced with appeals from parents arguing that the lower
court erred in determining that continued custody would harm the child or
that the court’s decision was not based upon the testimony of a qualified
expert.
Continued Custody Likely to Result in Serious Harm: In 2017, courts
held that the same information that justified an emergency removal could
not also be used to justify the § 1912(e) requirement that continued
custody would likely result in serious harm to the child,535 that the
evidence that demonstrates that serious harm would result from continued
custody does not have to be solely provided by a qualified expert,536 that a
finding of serious harm must be formally made on the record,537 and that
marijuana use alone does not qualify as evidence that continued custody
would result in serious harm to the child.538
Qualified Expert: In 2017, courts held that the qualified expert did
not have to be a social worker but could be someone with knowledge of
prevailing social and cultural standards or child-rearing practices within

531. Id. at *25.
532. Id. at *25–26.
533. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1912(e)–(f) (2012).
534. Id.
535. In the Interest of D.E.J., Nos. 116,103, 116,104, 116,106, 2017 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS
293, at *23–24 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2017).
536. Jude M. v. State, 394 P.3d 543, 558–59 (Alaska 2017) (“We have interpreted ICWA to
require that ‘[t]he expert testimony constitute[] some of the evidence upon which the judge bases this
finding. But it does not need to be the sole basis for that finding; it simply must support it.’”).
537. In re Welfare of Child S.R.K. & O.A.K., No. A16-2067, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS
457, at *12–14 (Minn. Ct. App. May 15, 2017).
538. Los Angeles Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. William B. (In re W.B.), No.
B279288, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7105, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017).
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the tribe,539 that a member of the Indian child’s tribe who is recognized by
the tribal community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to
family organization and child-rearing practices is a qualified expert,540 that
even when a person is reluctant to consider themselves an “expert” or an
“elder,” they may still possess the qualifications of an expert for the
purposes of ICWA,541 that even if the evidence was otherwise clear that
continued custody would cause serious harm to the children, the court
must have some testimony from a qualified expert,542 and that when the
tribe designates the expert, the parents cannot contest that the expert is not
qualified.543
6.

Other ICWA Issues

There are three related issues that were discussed by the courts this
year but that do not fit neatly into the categories described above that
correspond directly to ICWA’s statutory provisions: (1) the severance of
a non-Indian parent’s rights under ICWA, (2) whether the state has an
obligation to assist parents in enrolling their children with their respective
tribes, and (3) who is a “parent” under ICWA.
Non-Indian Parental Rights: In S.S. v. Stephanie H., the Arizona
appellate court determined that ICWA applied to a proceeding in which an
Indian parent sought the termination of the non-Indian parent’s parental
rights.544 The court reasoned that ICWA applies to any “child custody
proceeding” involving an “Indian child.”545 Since the children at issue
were Indian children and the severance of parental rights was a child
custody proceeding, the requirements of ICWA governed the proceeding:
“[T]he plain language of the act reveals its focus is not on custody
539. Caitlyn E. v. State, 399 P.3d 646, 652 (Alaska 2017). The Court concluded that the expert
here met those qualifications; she had
Yupik upbringing as a member of the Native Village of Tununak and her six years of work
in social services for the Tribe in Bethel. Charlie worked with children on cultural and
subsistence awareness as a youth coordinator for five years; the Tribe then promoted her
to Social Services Director, and she supervised the departments for ICWA, rural child
welfare, and youth services for a year and a half. The Tribe also approved Charlie’s
participation as an expert witness in this case.
Id.
540. In the Interest of L.M.B., 398 P.3d 207, 217–19 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
541. In re Dependency of KS, No. 75169-7-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1464, at *18–24 (Wash.
Ct. App. June 19, 2017).
542. See Gaddie v. K.S.D. (In re K.S.D.), 2017 ND 289, ¶¶ 27–29, 904 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 2017).
The Chief Justice dissented on this point, arguing that the likelihood the decision of the lower court
would be challenged was so small that he would have upheld the termination without sending the case
back to the lower court to gather testimony from the expert witness. Id. ¶¶ 32–35.
543. In re Children of S.R.K., No. A17-1194, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1007, at *3–4
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017).
544. S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
545. Id. at 573.
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proceedings that affect Indian parents, but instead is on custody
proceedings that affect Indian children.”546
Duty to Enroll: In Solano County Health & Social Services v. R.E.
(In re A.E.), the Department sent notice to the Cherokee tribes and received
a reply that the children did not meet ICWA’s definition of an “Indian
Child” but that they were eligible for enrollment through their paternal
great-grandmother, who was a member.547 The Department sent the
Cherokee Nation the information it needed to determine whether it would
intervene in the lawsuit but did not take steps to enroll the children.548 The
father argued that the Department had a duty to enroll the children.549 The
court disagreed. It recognized that California law does require the
Department to assist Indian children with tribal enrollment, but only if they
are already Indian children.550 Because the children in this instance were
eligible for enrollment but were not yet Indian children, the Department
had no duty to assist them with their enrollment.551
In San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. J.P. (In re
A.W.), the father claimed that he had been born on the reservation and was
enrolled as a child but that he was adopted off the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation at a young age and did not have the proper records to show
enrollment.552 The tribe represented to the court that a fire fifteen to twenty
years ago had destroyed the enrollment records and that the father was in
the process of reenrolling.553 The father asked for several continuances to
give him time to get enrolled so that ICWA would apply to the
proceedings.554 The lower court ultimately denied a further continuance,
held that because the father was not enrolled at that time that the child was
not an Indian child, and proceeded to terminate the father’s parental

546. Id. at 574.
547. Solano Cty. Health & Soc. Servs. v. R.E. (In re A.E.), No. A149302, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 4077, at *26 (Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2017).
548. Id. at *27.
549. Id. at *28.
550. Id. at *28–31 (“We likewise reject Father’s argument that the Department violated its duties
under rule 5.484(c)(2), which provides that efforts to provide services to an Indian child ‘must include
pursuit of any steps necessary to secure tribal membership for a child if the child is eligible for
membership in a given tribe, as well as attempts to use the available resources of extended family
members, the tribe, tribal and other Indian social service agencies, and individual Indian caregivers.’
Our high court has made clear that this mandate applies to those who meet the definition of Indian
children, not to those who, like Minors, are eligible for tribal membership but do not meet that
definition.”).
551. Id. at *29.
552. San Bernardino Cty. Children & Family Servs. v. J.P. (In re A.W.), No. E067059, 2017
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5540, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).
553. Id. at *6–7.
554. Id. at *6–9.
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rights.555 The father argued that CFS had a duty to help him enroll.556 The
court disagreed.557 It held that the lower court does not have a duty to assist
a parent in enrolling or to wait indefinitely for a parent to enroll.558 While
the court recognized that it may be appropriate for a court to extend a
proceeding “‘a few days or weeks while a parent or child pursues an
application for tribal membership,’ if such a delay would be in the child’s
best interest[,]” the court concluded that the continuances here had already
lasted 4.5 months.559 The appellate court ultimately concluded that
because the child was not an Indian child at the time the court refused a
continuation and terminated parental rights, ICWA did not apply.560
Who Is a Parent: In E.T. v. R.B.K. (In re B.B.), a sharply divided Utah
Supreme Court concluded that the biological father was a “parent” under
ICWA and remanded for proceedings in which the father could
participate.561 The facts read like a movie plot. The biological father and
mother are both enrolled members of the Cheyenne River Reservation.562
The mother got pregnant, and the father supported her for six months until
the mother decided to move to Utah.563 In Utah, the mother met an exboyfriend and then cut off contact with the biological father.564 Only
twenty-four hours and six minutes after giving birth to their son, she
relinquished parental rights and consented to an adoption.565 The mother
lied to the hospital and listed her brother-in-law as the biological father.
The brother-in-law also executed a termination of rights in relation to the

555. Id. at *9–10.
556. Id. at *18 (“Father argues that even after the Northern Cheyenne Tribe had intervened and
was processing Father’s application to enroll, ICWA required CFS to delve into ‘the particulars’ of
Father’s status with the Tribe rather than wait for the Tribe to determine for itself whether it wished
to declare Father an enrolled tribal member and move to transfer the case to the Tribal court.”).
557. Id. at *18–19. The father cited to a California statute and Section 1912(a) for the proposition
that the Department had a duty to assist his enrollment and to report proactively about his enrollment
status. The court held that “[n]either code requires CFS to investigate Father’s Native American
ancestry on behalf of the Tribe, nor to provide the court with detailed reports on Father’s status.” Id.
at *19.
558. Id. at *10–11 (“In Abbigail A., our Supreme Court clarified that a court can apply ICWA to
dependency proceedings only when the child is an Indian Child at the time the court makes the ICWA
determination, not when it is possible that the child could be determined to be an Indian Child at some
future date.”).
559. Id. at *13.
560. See id. at *20.
561. E.T. v. R.B.K. (In re B.B.), 2017 UT 59 (Utah 2017).
562. Id. ¶ 2.
563. Id. ¶ 4.
564. Id. ¶ 2.
565. Id. ¶ 6.
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adoption.566 The mother denied having any Indian ancestry, and no notice
was sent to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or to the biological father.567
After executing the adoption, the mother returned to South Dakota
and told the biological father what she had done.568 The biological father
then moved to intervene in the adoption proceedings, seeking custody.569
At the same time, the mother attempted to withdraw her consent to the
adoption.570 The Utah Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the
father was a “parent” for the purposes of ICWA and, therefore, entitled to
intervene in the adoption proceedings.571 A 3–2 majority of the court
determined that the biological father was a parent under ICWA, and so the
case was remanded for further proceedings in which the father could
participate.572
The majority held that the appropriate definition of a parent under
ICWA should be determined by reference to a federal standard for
paternity and not the state standard.573 The majority applied a reasonability
standard to paternity, which the biological father could meet in this case.574
The majority then reasoned that ICWA, under § 1912(a), gives a “parent”
the right to notice and the right to intervene in the proceedings.575 After
mother filed an affidavit informing the court she had misrepresented the
birth father, the proceedings were no longer voluntary because at least one
of the parents was objecting, and so the real biological father was entitled
to notice and a right to intervene under ICWA.576
566. Id.
567. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
568. Id. ¶ 8.
569. Id. ¶ 9.
570. Id.
571. Id. ¶ 2.
572. Id. ¶ 3.
573. Id. ¶ 59 (“‘Parent’ is a critical term under ICWA. Whether an individual qualifies as a
‘parent’ determines whether he or she may benefit from the heightened protections for parental rights
available under ICWA. There is ‘no reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for
the definition of [this] critical term.’”).
574. Id. ¶ 71. (“We acknowledge that ICWA does not explicitly define the procedures and timing
required, but in light of the congressional findings and the purpose of ICWA as discussed above, as
well as its protectiveness of parental rights pertaining to Indian children, we conclude that the
requirements must be less exacting than those for establishing paternity under Utah law. Instead, we
conclude that a reasonability standard applies to the time and manner in which an unwed father may
acknowledge or establish his paternity.”).
575. Id. at ¶ 86.
576. Id. ¶ 88 (“[I]n light of ICWA’s policy ‘to protect the best interests of Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families,’ 25 U.S.C. § 1902, it would be
inconsistent to deny a parent the right to receive notice and to intervene in proceedings for the
termination of his or her parental rights just because the termination of the other parent’s rights was
voluntary. Thus, we conclude that the proceedings in this case are involuntary as they pertain to Birth
Father. Birth Father therefore was entitled to notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to
intervene.”).
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The dissent would have held that the biological father was not a
parent within the meaning of ICWA because the parents were unwed and
paternity had not been established.577 The dissent would have applied
Utah’s state law on paternity to determine that the biological father never
acknowledged his paternity and therefore is not a parent subject to
intervene in the proceedings.578
7.

Scope

There were many challenges to the scope of the Indian Child Welfare
Act and its related state counterparts during 2017. While I do not have
space to include a summary of all of the cases, this section summarizes
some of the opinions dealing with the scope of the act divided by state.
An Alaska court held that the ICWA applies whenever the children
are being removed from their parents and not returned, even if the person
removing them is an extended family member.579 An Arizona court
required compliance with ICWA’s placement preferences even when the
mother completed enrollment with her tribe after her parental rights had
been terminated. 580 An Arkansas court held that the ICWA does not apply
because there was no evidence a child was an Indian when the child’s
father applied for tribal membership nine days before a hearing and the
father never informed the court whether the application was successful.581
A California court held that the ICWA is not triggered when a child
is placed with a legal parent, even if that party is not the biological
parent.582 When a new tribe was federally recognized in the middle of
custody proceedings, the ICWA did not require that the parties go back
and restart the process or revisit past decisions on the termination of
parental rights.583 The court further held that ICWA requires a child’s
biological parents to be Indian and does not apply when only the adoptive

577. Id. ¶ 162 (ICWA “states that a ‘parent’ is ‘any biological parent or parents of an Indian
child,’ not including ‘the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.’ Id.
§ 1903(9).”).
578. Id. ¶ 192.
579. Rice v. McDonald, 390 P.3d 1133, 1136–37 (Alaska 2017).
580. Alexandra K. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 16-0340, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 278 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2017).
581. Davis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 275 (Ark. App. 2017).
582. In re M.R., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
583. Contra Costa Cty. Children & Family Servs. Bureau v. T.G. (In re Z.J.), A147446, 2017
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1470, at *19–25 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017).
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parents are Indian,584 and that courts are not required to prove paternity
through genetic testing whenever the father claims Indian heritage.585
A Colorado court held that a judge must make an ICWA inquiry both
when the child is removed to foster case and again when the parent’s rights
are terminated.586 A federal court in Georgia held that ICWA does not
apply when the alleged tribe is not federally recognized.587 A Michigan
court held that its state act applies when one parent involuntarily gives up
custody even if it is to the other parent because the child has been
“removed,” but does not apply when custody is given up by one parent to
the other voluntarily.588 A Missouri court held that a tribe may appeal a
decision issued by a state court on behalf of its members even if the parent
does not appeal.589 A Montana court held that when the mother appealed
only the placement of her child, but not the termination of her rights, that
she lacked standing to proceed because she no longer possessed parental
rights.590 A New Jersey court held that “vague and casual references” to
possible ancestry were insufficient to trigger ICWA as the court still does
not have reason to know the child is an Indian child.591 A North Carolina
court held that the burden of proving ICWA applies is on the party asking
for ICWA’s application.592 A Wisconsin court held that when a father
never had custody of the children he could not raise an ICWA objection.593
L.

Indian Country

Indian country describes the land over which tribes exercise their
authority and demarcates much of the line between state and tribal

584. San Diego Cty. HHS Agency v. Christopher M. (In re C.M.), D071165, 2017 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1843, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2017).
585. See In re G.A., B282730, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8285, at *11–12 (Cal. Ct. App.,
Dec. 5, 2017).
586. People ex. rel. C.A., 2017 COA 135, 2017 Colo. Appp. LEXIS 1333, at *9–11 (Colo. Ct.
App. Oct. 19, 2017).
587. Thomas v. Disanto, NO.: 5:17-cv-7, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97296, *12-15 (S.D. Ga. June
23, 2017).
588. In re Detmer/Beaudry, No. 336348, 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1350 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug.
22, 2017).
589. In re S.E. & B.E., 527 S.W.3d 894, 899–901 (Mo. App. Sept. 12, 2017).
590. In re C.B D., 387 Mont. 347, 349–50 (Mont. 2017).
591. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.N., NO. A-4390-15T1, 2017 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 855, *15 (Sup. Ct. N.J. Apr. 6, 2017).
592. In re L.W.S., 804 S.E.2d 816, 818–19 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017).
593. Kewaunee Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.I. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to
M.J.), No. 2017AP1697, 2017 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1094, at *7 (Wisc. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017) (“In
Adoptive Couple, the Supreme Court held § 1912(f) does not apply where a parent never had physical
or legal custody of the Indian child prior to any child custody proceedings. Adoptive Couple, 133 S.
Ct. at 2562. On this point, the Court interpreted the phrase ‘continued custody’ in § 1912(f) as referring
to ‘custody that a parent already has (or at least had at some point in the past).’”).

882

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:805

jurisdiction.594 When an event occurs in Indian country different
jurisdictional rules may apply.595 Given the importance of jurisdiction to
the practice of Indian Law the issue of whether or not an event has
occurred in “Indian country” has been decided repeated by the Supreme
Court.596
1.

In the Context of Criminal Jurisdiction

Several cases decided in 2017 required their respective courts to
determine whether a crime was committed in Indian country. Arguably the
most important of these criminal cases, as it involved the death penalty,
was Murphy v. Royal.597 In Murphy, a member of the Muscogee Creek
Nation was convicted of murder in an Oklahoma state court and sentenced
to death.598 The defendant appealed, arguing that he was an Indian and his
crime occurred in Indian country; therefore, the federal government and
not the state had the sole authority to prosecute him.599 The Tenth Circuit
agreed.600 It reasoned that once land is set aside as a reservation it does not
matter if the state later takes an interest in the land; the land remains Indian
country until Congress determines otherwise.601 It expressly rejected the
State’s argument that the Creek Nation’s reservation had been diminished,
which would have given the state authority over the crime.602
To determine whether Congress intended the reservation to be
diminished the Tenth Circuit applied the three part test from Solem.603
First, it concluded that there was no explicit statutory language suggesting
594. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
595. For example, a number of federal criminal laws only apply if the crime occurred in Indian
Country. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012); Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (2012).
596. For a discussion of four Supreme Court cases in the last three decades that have had to
determine whether a reservation was diminished, see Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1076
(2016); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S.
399, 409 (1994); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 (1984).
597. Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2017).
598. Id. at 1171.
599. Id. (“[W]hen an Indian is charged with committing a murder in Indian country, he or she
must be tried in federal court. Mr. Murphy is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Because the
homicide charged against him was committed in Indian country, the Oklahoma state courts lacked
jurisdiction to try him.”).
600. Id. at 1172.
601. Id. at 1183 (“[R]eservation status depends on the boundaries Congress draws, not on who
owns the land inside the reservation’s boundaries: ‘[W]hen Congress has once established a
reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by
Congress.’. . . ‘Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian Reservation and no matter what happens
to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until
Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.’”) (internal citations omitted).
602. Id. at 1190.
603. Id. at 1187–90.
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the reservation had been diminished.604 The court cited to Parker for the
proposition that even if the statutory language is unclear, it is still possible
for a court to determine that a reservation has been diminished.605
However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that there was insufficient evidence
to support a finding of diminishment because the events surrounding
passage were ambiguous.606 The court also determined that a change in the
Indian character alone is not enough to find congressional intent.607
Because the crime was committed by an Indian in Indian country the state
had no jurisdiction over the crime and the Tenth Circuit overturned the
tribal member’s conviction.608 The state petitioned for a rehearing en banc
which was subsequently denied by the Tenth Circuit.609
A couple other opinions decided this year discussed whether a crime
was committed in Indian Country. In United States v. Jackson, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed federal jurisdiction over felony charges occurring on the
Red Lake Reservation because it had never been diminished.610 The Court
applied the Supreme Court’s test for diminishment and noted that in 1934
the Secretary of Interior observed that “Red Lake has remained a ‘closed’
reservation, meaning almost all lands are held communally, ‘apparently
one of only two reservations in the nation to enjoy this status.’”611 The lack
of clear congressional intent to diminish the reservation was indicated by
the large portions of land held communally. Because the Red Lake

604. Id. at 1215–18 (“Congress never expressly terminated the Creek Reservation in any of the
statutes, nor did it use the kind of language recognized by the Supreme Court as evidencing
disestablishment. It has long been clear ‘the Congresses that passed the surplus land acts’ were hostile
to the reservation system; indeed they ‘anticipated [its] imminent demise’ and ‘passed the acts partially
to facilitate the process,’ but Solem prevents courts from “extrapolat[ing]” this general congressional
expectation into ‘a specific congressional purpose’ with respect to a given reservation.”).
605. Id. at 1220–21 (“When the statutory text at step one does not reveal that Congress has
disestablished or diminished a reservation, such a finding requires ‘unambiguous evidence’ that
‘unequivocally reveals’ congressional intent.”).
606. Id. at 1226 (“None of the step-two evidence, whether viewed in isolation or in concert,
shows unmistakable congressional intent to disestablish the Creek Reservation. The State’s historical
evidence supports the notion that Congress intended to institute a new government in the Indian
Territory and to shift Indian land ownership from communal holdings to individual allotments. But
this does not show, unequivocally or otherwise, that Congress had erased or even reduced the Creek
Reservation’s boundaries.”).
607. Id. at 1232. Finally, even though the Creek reservation is now 73% White and only 16%
American Indian the Court concluded that the demographic history was insufficient without some
language from the statute and/or events surrounding passage to justify diminishment. (“The
demographic evidence does not overcome the absence of statutory text disestablishing the Creek
Reservation.”).
608. Id. at 1233 (“Because Mr. Murphy is an Indian and because the crime occurred in Indian
country, the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction. Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction.”).
609. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017).
610. United States v. Jackson, 853 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2017).
611. Id. at 440.
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reservation had not been diminished, the crime had occurred in “Indian
country” and the federal government had jurisdiction.612
In Hackford v. Utah, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation had been disestablished because of the clear language
of “cession” coupled with the payment of a “sum certain” that created a
presumption of diminishment that the petitioner could not overcome.613
Finally, in United States v. Antonio the federal district court for New
Mexico applied the Pueblo Land Act Amendments of 2005 to conclude
that the United States had jurisdiction over the defendant’s conduct on a
highway running through a Pueblo regardless of whether that land was
actually part of the Sandia Pueblo because it had been within any land
grant from a prior sovereign.614
2.

In the Context of Civil Jurisdiction

Two important Indian country cases arose from circuit courts in the
civil context, each attracting a divided opinion and a spirited dissent. In
Penobscot Nation v. Mills, the Penobscot Nation filed suit against the state
of Maine after the Maine Attorney General issued an opinion that allowed
the Nation to regulate hunting on islands within the river channel but could
not regulate fishing or restrict access to the river itself.615 The district court
agreed with the Attorney General and held that the tribe’s control extended
to the islands in the river but not the waters or the land under the waters.616
The tribe appealed and the First Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion.617
The majority reasoned that the language of the Maine Implementing Act

612. See id. at 446–47.
613. Hackford v. Utah, 845 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 2017). The area had originally been part of the
Uintah and Ouray reservation, but in 1910 Congress directed the Secretary of Interior to pay the tribe
$1.25 per acre for the land so it could be used as a future reservoir. The Act concluded that after this
payment “[a]ll right, title, and interest of the Indians in the said lands are hereby extinguished.” Id. at
1328 (citing Act of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Stat. 285.)
614. United States v. Antonio, No. CR 16-1106 JB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85436, at *69–71
(D.N.M. June 5, 2017) (“The jurisdictional inquiry is not whether the collision site is located within
the Sandia Pueblo’s present-day boundaries; rather, the jurisdictional inquiry is whether the collision
site is located ‘anywhere within the exterior boundaries of any grant from a prior sovereign, as
confirmed by Congress or the Court of Private Land Claims to a Pueblo Indian tribe of New
Mexico.’ . . . The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, because the collision site is located within
the exterior boundaries of the May 16, 1748, grant to the Sandia Pueblo, as confirmed by the Act of
December 22, 1858, 11 Stat. at 374.”)
615. Penobscot Nation v. Mills, 861 F.3d 324, 328 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[T]he . . . Nation may
lawfully regulate hunting on, and restrict access to, the islands within the River from Medway to Old
Town that comprise its Reservation, but may not regulate activities occurring on, nor restrict public
access to, the River itself . . . .”).
616. Id. at 327.
617. Id.

2018]

The Year in Indian Law 2017

885

(MIA) was clear on its face that the Tribe’s reservation included only the
islands and not the water.618
Judge Torruella dissented: “Everything in US history is about the
land—[including] who . . . fished its waters.”619 He would have held that
Reservation includes the main stem of the Penobscot River because “the
Supreme Court has held that a grant of ‘lands’ and ‘islands’ to Indians
includes ‘submerged lands’ and ‘surrounding waters.’”620 Judge Torruella
also would have held that “the Settlement Acts provide for the Penobscot
Nation to have the right to fish within its Reservation, yet if the majority
view prevails, the Nation’s ‘fishing’ will only take place in the uplands of
their islands, on dry land where there are no fish and no places to fish.”621
Accordingly, Judge Torruella concluded that the language of the Maine
Implementing Act was ambiguous and both controlling Supreme Court
precedent in Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918),
and the Indian canons of construction, require that ambiguities in the
statutes be interpreted to the Indians’ benefit.622
In Wyoming v. EPA, the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho
applied to regulate some clean air programs on the Wind River reservation
under the Tribe as State provision of the Clean Air Act.623 The State of
Wyoming contested the application arguing that the tribe lacked
jurisdiction over parts of the reservation since it had been diminished in
1905.624 The EPA, relying on analysis from Interior, concluded the
reservation was not diminished and Wyoming appealed.625 A divided
panel of the Tenth Circuit concluded the reservation was diminished
utilizing the three part test adopted first in Solem v. Bartlett.626
The majority began with the language of the 1905 Act: “cede, grant,
and relinquish to the United States, all right, title, and interest . . .” which
the majority determined “aligns with the type of language the Supreme
Court has called ‘precisely suited’ to diminishment. . . . We believe
Congress’s use of the word ‘cede’ can only mean one thing—a diminished
618. Id. at 331–35 (“[T]he statute is clear that the role of the treaties is simply to define which
‘islands’ are included in the Reservation, not to alter the plain meaning of the term Reservation itself”).
619. Id. at 338.
620. Id. at 338–39.
621. Id. at 339.
622. Id. at 339–40.
623. Wyoming v. EPA, 849 F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 2017).
624. Id. at 865.
625. Id. at 868 (“In their comments, Wyoming and the Farm Bureau argued the Reservation was
diminished by the 1905 Act, which, they contended, established the current boundaries of the
Reservation. Based on these objections, the EPA asked the Department of the Interior for an analysis
of the competing claims. In 2011, the solicitor issued a legal opinion concluding the 1905 Act had not
changed the boundaries established by the 1868 treaty. Relying on this analysis, the EPA issued its
final decision granting the Tribes’ application.”).
626. Id. at 869–89.
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reservation.”627 The Tribe argued that the lack of a lump sum or sum
certain payment proved that Congress did not intend to diminish the
reservation but the majority described a hybrid method of compensation
where funds were directed for specific activities and programs, and further
cited Hagen v. Utah for the proposition that while “the provision for
definite payment can certainly provide additional evidence of
diminishment, the lack of such a provision does not lead to the contrary
conclusion.”628
Judge Lucero, in dissent, would have found the reservation was not
diminished.629 His opinion placed great weight on the lack of a sum certain
payment to buttress the cession language described by the majority, and
would have held a reservation diminished only with the cession language
coupled with an unconditional commitment to pay for the land or language
returning the land to the public domain.630 The tribe’s petition for a
rehearing en banc was denied.631
Other 2017 opinions involving Indian country included a decision (1)
that a section of land originally reserved for schools in California was not
part of the Chemeheuvi reservation,632 (2) that a village located entirely
within the original boundaries of the Oneida Nation was entitled to
conduct discovery on the question of whether the reservation was
diminished633 but that it ultimately had the burden to prove
diminishment,634 (3) that New York could not assert its ad valorum tax
over land parcels on the Cayuga Nation,635 (4) that a decision on a land
parcel’s status as Indian country in state court is preclusive in federal
court,636 and (5) that a dispute between non-Indian landowners on a
diminished reservation belongs in state court.637
627. Id. at 870–72.
628. Id. at 872–73.
629. Id. at 882.
630. Id. 872–74 (“By deriving an intent to diminish absent sum-certain payment or statutory
language restoring lands to the public domain, the majority opinion creates a new low-water mark in
diminishment jurisprudence.”).
631. Wyoming v. EPA, 875 F.3d 505 (10th Cir. 2017).
632. Chemeheuvi Indian Tribe v. McMahon, No.: ED CV 15-1538-DMG (FFMx), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143446 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2017).
633. Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, No. 16-C-1217, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114712 (E.D.
Wisc. April 19, 2017).
634. Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, No. 16-C-1217, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174662 (E.D.
Wisc. Oct. 23, 2017).
635. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca County, 260 F. Supp. 3d 290 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2017).
636. Navajo Nation v. Rael, No. 1:16-cv-00888 WJ/LF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55797 (D.N.M.
Apr. 11, 2017), Navajo Nation v. Rael, No. 1:16-cv-00888 WJ/LF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107136
(D.N.M. July 11, 2017).
637. Austin v. Dietz, No. 2:16-cv-459-DB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36057 (D. Utah Mar. 13,
2017).
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Land Into Trust

The last section discussed when land could be termed “Indian
country” for purposes of federal law.638 The Indian Reorganization Act
established a process by which the United States could take new land into
trust for Indian tribes.639 These decisions are contentious as any land taken
into trust is removed from the tax base of the state/county in which it sits
and becomes subject to the tribe’s jurisdictional authority. This section
will summarize an important Ninth Circuit opinion and then briefly
summarize two other district court opinions that were decided on land into
trust issues in 2017.
In County of Amador v. United States Department of Interior, the
County challenged a decision of the Department of the Interior to take land
into trust for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians and permit the Band to
operate a casino on the property.640 The County argued that Ione Band was
not eligible to have land taken into trust under the IRA because the law
requires that the Band be recognized back in 1934 (it was formally
recognized in 1995), or alternatively, that the lands do not qualify for the
“restored lands of a restored tribe” exception to IGRA.641 The district court
disagreed and gave summary judgment to the Band.642 The Ninth Circuit
unanimously affirmed.643
The Ninth Circuit explained that the IRA statute permits Interior to
take land into trust for the purpose of providing land to Indians and defines
“Indian” as “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.”644 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court in Carcieri defined ‘now under
Federal jurisdiction’ to mean those tribes who were under the jurisdiction
of the United States in 1934, but that the Supreme Court left open when
federal recognition had to occur.645 The Ninth Circuit held “Given the
IRA’s text, structure, purpose, historical context, and drafting history—
638. Contrary to the commonsense perspective that all land within a reservation is owned by the
federal government for the benefit of tribes (held in trust), much of this land was parceled out and sold
to non-Indians under the Dawes Act. This Act resulted in non- Indians owning land in fee on the
reservation, further complicating the jurisdictional questions presented to tribal courts. For discussions
of the Dawes Act, see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
639. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et. seq. (2011).
640. County of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2017).
641. Id. at 1018–19.
642. Id. at 1019–20.
643. Id. at 1015.
644. Id. at 1020.
645. Id. at 1020 n.8 (“There is a third question left open by Carcieri: Are the ‘now under Federal
jurisdiction’ and ‘recognized’ requirements even distinct, or do they comprise a single requirement?
The Court in Carcieri did not explicitly hold that the two requirements are distinct but, as Justice
Souter noted in his opinion, ‘[n]othing in the majority opinion forecloses the possibility that the two
concepts, recognition and jurisdiction, may be given separate content.’”).
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and Interior’s administration of the statute over the years—the better
reading of § 5129 is that recognition can occur at any time.” 646
Accordingly, the court held that a tribe qualifies to have land taken into
trust for its benefit under § 5108 if it (1) was “under Federal jurisdiction”
as of June 18, 1934, and (2) is “recognized” at the time the decision is
made to take land into trust.647
The Ninth Circuit went on to adopt Interior’s interpretation of the
phrase “under federal jurisdiction” which broadly asks “whether the
United States had . . . taken an action or series of actions . . . sufficient to
establish or that generally reflect[ed] Federal obligations, duties,
responsibility for or authority over the tribe by the Federal Government . .
. .”648
The court reasoned that such a flexible interpretation of the phrase is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s language in United States v. John.649
The Ninth Circuit applied this standard to the Band and determined that
there were sufficient dealings with the United States both before and
during 1934 to conclude that the Band was under federal jurisdiction for
the purposes of the IRA.650
Finally, the Ninth Circuit determined that the acquisition of land for
the Band by Interior falls within the IGRA’s restored land to restored tribes
provision.651 The County argued that because the Band was
administratively recognized by Interior outside of the section 83 process
the Band did not qualify for the IGRA exception.652 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed, holding instead that Congress’ intent was to permit a qualifying
tribe to be “restored” at any time.653 The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the
decision of the district court granting summary judgment to the Band and
the United States and permitting the land to be taken into trust for the
purpose of gaming.654
646. Id. at 1024.
647. Id.
648. Id. at 1026.
649. Id. at 1027 (“‘[T]he fact that federal supervision over [a tribe] has not been continuous’
does not ‘destroy[] the federal power to deal with’ that tribe.”).
650. Id. at 1027–28. (“A 1941 letter from an Interior official in California to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs states that efforts to purchase land for the Ione Band resumed in 1935, but that the
efforts once again failed, this time because of ‘mineral rights and values.’ Given that efforts were made
by the federal government on the Band’s behalf a few years before and just one year after 1934, it was
reasonable for Interior to conclude that the Band’s ‘jurisdictional status remained intact in 1934.’”).
651. Id. at 1028–31.
652. Id. at 1030.
653. Id. at 1030–31 (“Because Congress did not clearly intend for the ‘restored lands’ exception
to be unavailable to those tribes administratively re-recognized outside the Part 83 process,
grandfathering in those tribes would not frustrate congressional intent. Accordingly . . . Interior’s
decision to grandfather in the Ione Band under 25 C.F.R. § 292.26(b) was permissible.”).
654. Id. at 1031.
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District courts also grappled with challenges to a decision to take
land into trust. Two notable decisions were decided in 2017 in which one
tribe challenged the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust for another
tribe. In Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians. v. United States Department
of Interior, the Colusa tribe asked the Court to reconsider the denial of its
summary judgement motion contesting the decision by the Secretary to
take land into trust for the benefit of the Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of
the Enterprise Rancheria.655 The Court denied the request to reconsider,
holding that it could not say as a matter of law that the decision by the
Secretary to take land into trust was arbitrary and capricious, and that
under IGRA the Secretary was not required to consider the adverse effects
of the decision on the Colusa Band because it was located more than 25miles away from the subject of the land into trust decision. 656
In Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, the Cherokee Nation challenged the
2011 decision of the Department of the Interior to take a seventy-six acre
parcel of land into trust for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee that
was located on the reservation of the Cherokee Nation.657 The Cherokee
Nation argued that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, would violate
treaties with the Cherokee, and would require the Cherokee’s consent.658
The Eastern District of Oklahoma agreed and sent the decision back to the
BIA Region for consideration.659 The court relied on 25 C.F.R. § 151.8660
to conclude that the Cherokee Nation must consent to the transfer because
the land, although belonging to a member of another tribe, was located
within the outer boundaries of its reservation and that the decision to take
the land into trust violated the 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee.661

655. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians v. U.S. Dept of Interior, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9107
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2017).
656. Id. at *15–17.
657. Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. CIV-14-428-RAW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82896 (E.D.
Okla. May 31, 2017).
658. Id. at *2.
659. Id. at *26.
660. Id. at *20–21 (“[T]hat an individual Indian or tribe ’may acquire land in trust status on a
reservation other than its own only when the governing body of the tribe having jurisdiction over such
reservation consents in writing to the acquisition.’”).
661. Id. at *22–23 (“The court agrees with the Cherokee Nation’s arguments that taking land
into trust within the Cherokee Nation’s former reservation without its consent violates its treaties, is
contrary to precedent, and ignores the jurisdictional conflicts. The 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee
Nation provides: ‘The United States guarantee to the people of the Cherokee Nation the quiet and
peaceable possession of their country and protection against domestic feuds and insurrections, and
against hostilities of other tribes.’ The members of the UKB are also Cherokee; thus, this could be
considered a ‘domestic feud or insurrection.’ The UKB is also an independent tribe; thus, this could
be considered ‘hostility of another tribe,’ as the UKB has announced its intention to assert exclusive
jurisdiction over the Subject Tract. In either event, the 1866 Treaty guaranteed the Cherokee Nation
protection against it.”) (internal citations omitted).

890

Seattle University Law Review
N.

[Vol. 41:805

Payday Lending

The payday lending cases all derive from questions of tribal
sovereignty. Tribes are generally not subject to state law, and tribes have
used this exception to expand their economic development in a number of
different sectors. Some tribes have opted to operate or help facilitate
payday lending because tribal entities are otherwise exempt from state
usury laws.662 While there were no groundbreaking cases involving
payday lending in 2017, this section will highlight a couple circuit court
cases and will briefly summarize some of the more notable cases from
other courts.
In Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., the plaintiff, an individual from
North Carolina, entered into a loan agreement with Great Plains, a lender
wholly owned by the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians.663 North Carolina
law prohibits loans with an interest rate over 16% as usurious, but
plaintiff’s loan had an effective interest rate of 440.18%.664 The plaintiff
electronically signed the loan agreement which included a clause that the
loan was subject only to the laws and jurisdiction of the Otoe–Missouria
Tribe and “no other state or federal law or regulation shall apply to this
Agreement, its enforcement, or its interpretation.”665 The Fourth Circuit
found this case indistinguishable from a 2016 case holding identical
language was unenforceable as a matter of law.666 In addition to finding
the choice of law provision unenforceable because it attempted to waive
rights granted by federal statutes, the Fourth Circuit also held that the
contract violated public policy.667
In Finn v. Great Plains Lending LLC, the plaintiff took out a payday
loan from the same defendant.668 After the defendant made repeated
automated calls to the plaintiff’s phone in an attempt to collect, the

662. Victor D. Lopez, When Lenders can Legally Provide Loans with Effective Annual Interest
Rates Above 1,000 Percent, Is it Time for Congress to Consider a Federal Interest Cap on Consumer
Loans?, 42 J. LEGIS. 36, 58 (2016) (“In recent years, lenders aligned with Indian tribes across the
country have successfully used tribal immunity in many states to defeat usury laws. Despite criticism
from consumer advocates and industry groups, as well as the mostly unsuccessful efforts of state
attorneys general to enforce regulations, tribal-affiliated lenders operate with relative impunity.”).
663. Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017).
664. Id. at 331.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 335 (“[W]e interpret these terms in the arbitration agreement as an unambiguous
attempt to apply tribal law to the exclusion of federal and state law. . . . [W]e conclude that the
arbitration agreement functions as a prospective waiver of federal statutory rights and, therefore, is
unenforceable as a matter of law.”).
667. Id. at 336 (“[W]hen a party uses its superior bargaining power to extract a promise that
offends public policy, courts generally opt not to redraft an agreement to enforce another promise in
that contract. . . . Accordingly, we hold that the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable.”).
668. Finn v. Great Plains Lending LLC, 689 Fed. Appx. 608 (10th Cir. 2017).
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plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.669 The
defendant claimed that it was a corporation run by the Otoe–Missouria
Tribe of Indians and therefore asked the court to dismiss on the basis of
sovereign immunity.670 The plaintiff argued the defendant was actually run
for the benefit of a non-tribal entity and asked for limited discovery on the
question of tribal immunity.671 The district court denied the plaintiff’s
request and dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.672 The Tenth
Circuit reversed.673 It reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations were specific
and plausible and that the court needed more information before
determining that the defendant was entitled to assert its immunity
defense.674 The Tenth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to
permit limited discovery.675
State and federal district courts also decided payday pending cases in
2017. A federal court upheld indictments against a non-Indian who had
allegedly engaged the tribe’s immunity through a series of ‘sham business
relationships’ to operate a payday lending network. 676 The court rejected
the defendant’s attempt to hide behind the tribe holding, “a tribe has no
legitimate interest in selling an opportunity to evade state law.”677 In the
same lawsuit, the court ordered the production of attorney documents
related to the defendant’s businesses, the plaintiff having successfully
argued that the crime-fraud exception justified their production. 678
In another federal case, the District Court of New Jersey refused to
recognize tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians subject to a payday
loan agreement despite the presence of a choice of law clause specifying
tribal law. 679 The court reasoned that the choice of law clause violated the

669. Id. at 609.
670. Id. at 609–10.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 610.
673. Id. at 611.
674. Id. (“‘[D]iscovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific
facts crucial to an immunity determination,’ and a discovery order should be ‘narrowly tailored . . . to
the precise jurisdictional fact question presented.’”).
675. Id. at 611–12.
676. United States v. Tucker, 16-cr-91 (PKC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134265 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
1, 2017).
677. Id. at *9.
678. United States v. Tucker, 254 F. Supp. 3d 620 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017).
679. Macdonald v. CashCall Inc., No. 16-2781, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64761 (D.N.J. Apr. 28,
2017) (The loan agreement purported to apply only the law of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and
specifically disclaimed the applicability of any state or federal law. The initial $5,000 loan carried a
116.73% interest rate. Taken out in December 2012, by April 2016 “Defendants had collected a total
of $15,493.00 from Plaintiff on his $5,000 loan. This included $38.50 in principal, $15,256.65 in
interest, and $197.85 in fees. At the time of the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff still owed more than
$7,833.91.” Id. at *2–3. (internal citations omitted)).
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state’s public policy and was therefore unenforceable. 680 California state
appellate courts remanded several cases to the lower courts after the
California Supreme Court clarified that it is the burden of the tribal entity
alleging sovereign immunity to prove that it qualifies as an ‘arm of the
tribe,’ making it harder for payday lenders in that state from raising the
sovereign immunity defense when sued by unhappy borrowers. 681
O.

Recognition of Indian Tribal Status

The United States maintains a formal recognition process for Indian
tribes.682 Only tribes that have been federally recognized are eligible for
most federal benefits and programs designed for Indian tribes and Indian
persons.683 There are currently 573 federally recognized tribes,684 a
complete list of which is required by the Federally Recognized Tribes List
Act (List Act) to be published annually in the Federal Register.685 Some
tribes have not been federally recognized but are recognized by the state
in which their traditional lands are located.686 These tribes are given
whatever rights their states afford them and may qualify for a small
number of federal programs by virtue of their state recognition.687 In 2017
there were a handful of cases deciding issues related to the recognition of
various Indian tribes.

680. Id. at *18–28.
681. See Baille v. Processing Sols. LLC, A144105, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6771 at *21
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017); Baille v. Tucker, A142101, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6757 at
*10–11 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017); Rosas v. AMG Servs., A139147, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 6756 at *6–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).
682. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2018).
683. See Mark D. Myers, The State of Native America and its Unfolding Self-Governance:
Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 271–72
(2001).
684. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 20, Pg. 4235 (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-201801-30/pdf/2018-01907.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXZ6-XV7F]. (The Federal Registrar recognized 567
federally recognized tribes, but on January 29, 2018 the President signed H.R. 984, the Thomasina E.
Jordan Indian Tribes of Virginia Federal Recognition Act of 2017 which added six new federally
recognized tribes bringing the total to 573. See Press Release, The White House, President Donald J.
Trump Signs H.R. 984 and H.R. 4641 into Law, (Jan. 29, 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-signs-h-r-984-h-r-4641-law/ [https://perma.cc/T2AGLD33].
685. Federally Recognized Indian Tribes List Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–454, 108 Stat. 4791
(1994).
686. For a discussion of state recognition see Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Federalism and
the State Recognition of Native American Tribes: A Survey of State-Recognized Tribes and State
Recognition Processes Across the United States, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79 (2008) (The survey
finds that as of 2008 there were 62 tribes that were recognized by states but not by the federal
government spread across 16 states. Id. at 84.).
687. See id.

2018]

The Year in Indian Law 2017
1.

893

Federal Recognition

In Wyandot Nation v. United States, the Wyandot Nation of Kansas
claimed to be a federally recognized tribe as the successor in interest to the
Historic Wyandot Nation.688 The Wyandot Nation of Kansas brought two
claims against the United States for breach of trust related to two treaties
signed with the Historic Wyandot Nation.689 The first claim was for
monetary damages, and the second claim was for recognition that the
Wyandot Nation of Kansas has an ownership interest in the Huron
Cemetery, a Wyandot burial ground.690 The Court of Federal Claims
dismissed the claims for lack of standing and jurisdiction, and the
Wyandot Nation appealed.691
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the List Act “exclusively
governs federal recognition of Indian tribes”692 and therefore the Wyandot
Nation of Kansas is not a federally recognized tribe and cannot to seek an
accounting of trust monies.693 Since the tribe had previously petitioned
Interior for recognition and was denied, the Federal Circuit held it was
appropriate to dismiss the petitioner’s claim.694 For the same reason the
Wyandot Nation of Kansas has no claim to the cemetery lands.695
In Allen v. United States, plaintiffs were a group of eighteen persons
who lived on or near the Pinoleville Rancheria, most of whom were
previously members of the federally recognized Pinoleville Pomo Nation.
696
Plaintiffs gave up their tribal membership and petitioned the BIA to
recognize them as a new tribe and permit them to organize under the
IRA.697 The BIA denied the request and plaintiffs filed suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act, arguing the decision to deny their
recognition was arbitrary and capricious, and was not supported by
substantial evidence.698
688. Wyandot Nation v. United States, 858 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
689. Id. at 1394.
690. Id. at 1396.
691. Id. at 1394.
692. Id. at 1398.
693. Id. at 1402–04 (“We hold that tribal recognition is within the primary jurisdiction of Interior
and that we thus cannot independently make a determination of the effects of the various treaties or
resolve the various conflicting legal and factual contentions about whether, apart from the Interior
determination, Wyandot Nation is a federally recognized Indian tribe.”).
694. Id. at 1403 (“For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the threshold issue of
whether the appellant is in fact a federally recognized successor tribe to the Historic Wyandot Nation
is within the primary jurisdiction of Interior, and that the Claims Court properly dismissed without
prejudice.”).
695. Id.
696. Allen v. United States, No. C 16-04403 WHA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194497, *2–4 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 27, 2017).
697. See id. at *6.
698. Id. at *6–7.
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The federal district court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.699 The court reasoned that the Regional Director
concluded that the plaintiffs were a subset of an existing federally
recognized tribe,700 which was further supported by the record.701 The
court held that neither the IRA nor federal regulations permit recognition
of a subset of an existing tribe.702 Finally the court rejected the plaintiffs
contention that the Regional Director’s decision to deny recognition on the
basis that they are a subset of an existing tribe announced a new ‘one-tribeonly’ rule—or essentially that each reservation must consist of a single
tribe.703
Other cases decided in 2017 relating to recognition include (1) a
determination that a tribe seeking federal recognition in federal court must
first exhaust its administrative remedies,704 (2) a clarification that
Congress is the body to whom a band of Indians claiming to be recognized
by a prior treaty should direct their appeal,705 (3) a decision that challenges
to a tribe’s recognition need to be brought in the federal district where the
tribe claims to be located,706 (4) a refusal to block a tribal election because
a group of tribal members believe they should be separately recognized as
a tribe,707 (5) an affirmation of an agency decision that the California
Valley Miwok tribe contains more than five recognized members,708 (6) a
decision that a non-federally recognized tribe is ineligible for Indian

699. Id. at *22.
700. Id. at *14 (The Regional Director “found that plaintiffs fell outside of the definition of tribe
set forth in the IRA by dint of being ‘only a subset of the Indians for whom the Pinoleville Rancheria
was set aside.’ This finding was based upon a rational interpretation of the relevant statutes as applied
to the record, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”) (internal citations omitted).
701. Id. at *17–9 (“Indeed, plaintiffs are descendants of several of the Indians for whom the
rancheria was established in 1911 (a fact each of them notes in their declarations submitted to the
BIA), which is ultimately what gave them the right to settle on the reservation. This, of course,
supports the Regional Director’s conclusion that plaintiffs are only a subset of the descendants of the
Indians for whom the reservation was set aside.”)(internal citations omitted).
702. Id. at *11–15.
703. Id. at *20–21 (“Plaintiffs point to the Wind River Reservation, where two recognized tribes
reside, as proof that the one-tribe-per-reservation rule is contrary to the IRA. Those tribes, however,
both fall within the IRA’s first definition of tribe, which includes historically recognized tribes. The
Regional Director’s decision in no way defies such an arrangement and does not rest on a newly
created one-tribe-per-reservation rule, as plaintiffs contend.”) (internal citations omitted).
704. See Mdewakanton Sioux Indians v. Zinke, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2017).
705. Bruette v. Sec’y of Interior, No. 17-C-286, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152917, *19–20 (E.D.
Wisc. Sept. 20, 2017).
706. See Tsi Akim Maidu of Taylorsville Rancheria v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 16-cv-07189LB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80732 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2017).
707. See Mdewakanton Sioux Indians v. Zinke, 255 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. June 9, 2017).
708. See Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Zinke, NO. 2:16-01345 WBS CKD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84282, at *11-16 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2017).
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gaming under the IGRA,709 and (7) a resolution of a tribal leadership
dispute which clarified that the appropriate person to claim funds a tribe
was entitled to as proceeds from a class action suit was the factional leader
recognized by Interior.710
2.

State Recognition

2017 also saw several challenges by state recognized tribes. In
Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Tribal Nation v. Hoffman, the Tribe brought an
action against the State alleging a violation of its rights under the New
Jersey Constitution and common law when the State denied and repudiated
the State’s prior recognition of the Tribe as an American Indian tribe. 711
The New Jersey Superior Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the
claim, holding that the Tribe had alleged a sufficient injury to overcome a
motion to dismiss.712
Like some of the cases involving federal recognition, there are also
disputes among factions of state recognized tribes, each faction seeking
legitimacy for its claim to speak for the tribe. In Schaghticoke Tribal
Nation v. State, the plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, brought suit
against the State of Connecticut for breaching various duties conferred by
statute, constitution, and common law.713 Connecticut defended itself by
arguing that the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation did not have the ability to
appear in court as a representative of the Schaghticoke tribe the State had
recognized.714 The State pointed out there is a second faction, the
Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, and that the Tribal Nation alone cannot assert
claims on behalf of the state recognized tribe.715 The court disagreed,
holding that the Tribal Nation has associational standing to sue, however

709. Frank’s Landing Indian Cmty. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 242 F. Supp. 3d 1156
(W.D. Wash. 2017).
710. See Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Jewell, No. 90 CV 957 JAP/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108514 (D.N.M. July 11, 2017).
711. Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Tribal Nation v. Hoffman, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1691
(N.J. Super. Ct. July 10, 2017).
712. See id. at *10 (The benefits of state recognition include “plaintiff has suffered and will
continue to suffer the loss of: the ability to market and sell products as ‘Indian-made’ under the Indian
Arts and Crafts Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 305 to 310; grants from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Administration (HHS) for Native Americans; the ability to do business as a certified tribal
company; educational opportunities and funding; loss of funding from HHS’s block grant program;
membership and standing in professional organizations, including the National Congress of American
Indians; approval for lines of credit; and eligibility for government contracts.”).
713. Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. State, X07HHDCV166072009S, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS
4452 (Sup. Ct. Conn. Sept. 19, 2017).
714. Id. at *1.
715. Id. at *1–2.
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the court was careful to limit the effect of its decision to the unique parties
and facts before it.716
P.

Religion

Every year, courts decide a handful of cases related to the religious
rights of American Indians. Many of these cases are appeals from
prisoners. With so many different American Indian religious traditions, it
can be hard for prisons to accommodate the variety of requests for
religious accommodation. This section includes a short discussion of four
cases in which incarcerated Indians prevailed in some way on a freedom
of religion claim. The section proceeds to review several cases where the
government has been accused of infringing on American Indian religious
traditions.
1.

Prisoners

The courts decided a number of cases where American Indian
prisoners alleged violations of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).717 In Hildalgo v. Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, petitioner, a Mohawk Indian, complained that
the only American Indian religious service offered at the prison was led
by a Lakota and that the Mohawk do not smudge or engage in other
traditions led by the Lakota leader.718 After petitioner complained, he was
denied the right to participate in any Native American religious services.719
The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and permitted
the case to proceed.720
716. Id. at *7–8 (“[T]he Schaghticoke Tribal Nation is a group composed of Schaghticoke
Indians who could have brought this lawsuit on their own but chose to do it as a group. Nothing here
prevents the state from saying the other group purporting to represent the Schaghticoke tribe (which
in fact has moved to intervene) or even the tribe members themselves are necessary parties to fairly
resolving this litigation. Nothing here sheds any light whatsoever on the many other weighty questions
of the case, including whether the state ever wronged the Schaghticokes and whether it is too late to
do anything about any wrongs the state might have committed. It also doesn’t decide the state’s claim
that it may not be sued without its permission and hasn’t given it—its claim of sovereign immunity.”).
717. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et. seq., 114 Stat.
803 (Sept. 20, 2000).
718. Hildalgo v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 3:14-CV-03012-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, *3–4
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2017) (“Native American religious practices dictate that when many nations come
together, ‘it is up to the individual to decide whether . . . he or she chooses to smudge with the herbs
being used.’ For smudging, ‘the herbs used are different for all [n]ations.’ The Native Americans at
[the prison] are ‘told to follow a Lakota teaching’ even though members of many other tribes are
there.”) (internal citations omitted).
719. Id. at *5 (“The result of these events is that Hildalgo was ‘banned from participating in
Native American [s]ervices and removed from the [p]rison [c]all out sheet.’”).
720. Id. at *12–3 (The Court clarified that the Plaintiff’s claims which would proceed to
discovery include (1) the right to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment, (2) the
prohibition of the religious practice violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
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The court also allowed the petitioner’s claim to proceed under
RLUIPA in Dorsey v. Shearin.721 The petitioner had made multiple
requests for Native American religious services, but the warden denied the
requests because the services included the use of ceremonial tobacco.722
The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordered briefing
on the merits within thirty days723 stating, “[p]rison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.”724
In White v. Davis, the petitioner sued the prison director and the
warden because he was in ill health and under the mandate of his tribal
religious practice he needed to die with long hair; however the prison
denied his request, telling him to grow a beard instead.725 The plaintiff
argued that the prison’s grooming policy, which prevented men from
having long hair, was not the least restrictive means to achieve its
compelling government interest and therefore violated his constitutional
rights.726 The court recognized that 38 states and the federal prison system
have an accommodation for hair length, and that the Supreme Court had
recently disfavored a ban on beard length.727 In Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme
Court held that a prison ban on hair length was not the least restrictive
means because less restrictive means were available to protect the
compelling government interest in prison safety.728 In White v. Davis, the
magistrate judge concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed
regarding whether the ban on hair length was the least restrictive means to
accomplish prison safety and so recommended that the summary judgment
(RLUIPA) wherein the failure to provide religious accommodation substantially burdens his First
Amendment rights, and (3) that corrections officers illegal retaliated against him for asserting his First
Amendment rights.).
721. Dorsey v. Shearin, No. GLR-15-3645, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38483 (D. Md. Mar. 17,
2017).
722. Id. at *1.
723. Id. at *14.
724. Id. at *9 (citation omitted).
725. White v. Davis, A-16-CA-059-LY, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120453 *2–3 (W.D. Tex. August
1, 2017) (“Plaintiff maintains it is his deeply held religious belief that he must have long hair upon his
death in order to be recognized and taken into eternity by his ancestors, none of whom grew beards.
Plaintiff asserts, prior to entering prison, he had never cut his hair.”).
726. Id. at *10–11 (On the RLUIPA claim the court focused on the least restrictive means
analysis “Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff sincerely believes growing long hair is mandated by
his faith and do not argue whether TDCJ ‘s grooming policy substantially burdens his ability to grow
long hair. Therefore, the Court focuses on whether TDCJ’s short-hair grooming policy is the least
restrictive means to advance its compelling interests in maintaining security and safety and controlling
costs in light of the security risk presented by Plaintiff.”)
727. Id. at *15.
728. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015) (“[I]ts contraband argument would still fail
because the Department cannot show that forbidding very short beards is the least restrictive means of
preventing the concealment of contraband.”).
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motions filed by both parties be denied and that the case timely proceed to
trial.729
In Schlemm v. Litscher, the plaintiff, an American Indian prison
inmate, had previously won a verdict that the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections had violated the plaintiff’s RLUIPA rights by failing to
accommodate his religious request for a multi-colored headband, game
meat, and fry bread at the annual Ghost Feast. 730 Here, the same plaintiff
requested some modifications to that order including that he be permitted
to acquire ‘fresh’ food brought in by a volunteer, local tribes, or a caterer,
and that the court find the defendants in contempt for their refusal to
comply with previous court orders.731 The court denied all of the plaintiff’s
requests.732 It concluded that there was no evidence that dried game meat,
if prepared without nitrates or chemicals, would place a substantial burden
on the plaintiff’s religious practice nor was there evidence in the record
that professional preparation of food was required.733
2.

Other Religion Cases

In Morris v. Huebsch, the plaintiff, a member of the Red Cliff Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa, brought suit against Wisconsin police officers
for violating his First Amendment rights when they issued him a citation
for playing his spiritual Chippewa drum in violation of a rule against
playing any instrument in the capitol building without a permit.734 The
citation was later dismissed.735 The court recognized that “[t]o the
Chippewa people, drumming is a sacred form of musical expression that
communicates feelings and spiritual energy, which cannot be expressed
with the voice alone.”736
The question left for the court was whether the officer had official
immunity when he violated the First Amendment rights of the plaintiff.737
The court determined that the rule against musical instruments in the

729. White, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19.
730. Schlemm v. Litscher, 11-cv-272-wmc, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156975, at *1 (W.D. Wisc.
Sept. 26, 2017).
731. Id. at *1–2.
732. Id. at *2.
733. Id. at *9–10 (“Plaintiff provided no further testimony during the trial on his own belief that
certain preparations of food are required for a meaningful Ghost Feast or that preserved foods would
be inadequate. Nor did he explain the basis for these beliefs.”).
734. Morris v. Huebsch, 12-cv-319-wmc, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30770, *1-2 (W.D. Wisc. Mar.
3, 2017).
735. Id. at *8.
736. Id. at *4–5.
737. Id. at *1.
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capitol was content-neutral and thus applied intermediate scrutiny.738 The
court concluded that the government has a substantial interest in protecting
its citizens from unwanted noise.739 It further concluded that a ban on
instruments without a permit was narrowly tailored enough because
instruments can be much louder than voices and a permit permits officers
to plan for loud noises which might otherwise limit their ability to be heard
in an emergency.740 Finally it held there were other alternatives, the use of
the voice, application for a permit, or playing the drum outside.741
In Wingra Red-Mex Inc. v. Burial Sites Preservation Board, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had not presented evidence to overcome the
Burial Sites Preservation Board’s conclusion that “in the absence of
contravening evidence, prehistoric Indian mounds—including effigy
mounds [as in this case]—are properly considered to be human burial
sites.”742 The circuit court later granted a motion to reconsider and
reversed itself, removing protections for the Ward Mound.743 The
appellate court reversed the circuit court and ordered that the Ward Mound
remain protected.744 Of particular interest in the opinion was the religious
significance of the Ward Mound to the Ho-Chunk people.745 The court
relied upon this testimony to conclude that the original agency review that

738. Id. at *15 (“[T]o survive intermediate scrutiny, a regulation must be ‘narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest’. . . and they must ‘leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.’”).
739. Id. (“[T]here is no real dispute that the government has ‘a substantial interest in protecting
its citizens from unwelcome noise . . . .’”).
740. Id. at *16–17 (“The rule requiring a permit to play an instrument does not clearly violate
these principles. As a general matter, musical instruments can reach volumes far exceeding the limits
of the human voice; in fact, drumming in the Capital has, in the past, proven to be so loud that officers
were concerned they would not be heard if they needed to order an evacuation. By requiring a permit
for instruments, and banning them otherwise, the Capitol police ensure that they are aware of, and can
plan for, the use of instruments.” (internal citations omitted)).
741. Id. at *18.
742. Wingra Redi-Mex Inc. v. Burial Sites Pres. Bd., No. 2014AP2498, 2017 Wisc. App. LEXIS.
563, at *9–10 (Wisc. Ct. App. July 31, 2017).
743. Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. State Historical Soc’y, Nos. 2015AP1632, 2015AP1844, 2017
Wisc. App. LEXIS 564, at *1 (Wisc. Ct. App. July 31, 2017).
744. Id. at *2.
745. See id. at *10–11 (“Both witnesses testified about Ho-Chunk religious and spiritual beliefs
concerning burial of the dead and that, according to Clan Leader Funmaker, the Ho-Chunk believe
that one of the purposes of effigy mounds is to provide spiritual ‘protection’ to the dead interred within
them. Clan Leader Funmaker testified that Ho-Chunk people believe that when the remains of a dead
person are disturbed, ‘the spirit . . . goes wandering and it gets lost. They’re never at rest, they’re never
at peace.’ Based on this belief, disturbing the dead after they have been buried is spiritually forbidden.
Clan Leader Funmaker testified that, for the above reasons, the Ho-Chunk people consider the
proposed disturbance of the Ward Mounds by Wingra Stone a desecration of those burial sites.”).
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denied Plaintiff’s request to remove the Ward Mound from the catalog of
protected cites was based on substantial evidence.746
Q.

Sovereign Immunity

Tribal sovereignty is at the core of Indian law.747 It is also the basis
of more than fifty opinions decided by federal and state courts in 2017.748
There was a wide range of topics covered in relation to tribal sovereign
immunity this year, including: whether federal statutes of general
applicability apply to tribes,749 whether tribes are obligated to pay

746. Id. at *12 (“We are satisfied that DHA’s decision is based on substantial evidence. There
was testimony that the Ho-Chunk people consider as sacred all of the effigy mounds throughout the
Four Lakes region, which include the Ward Mounds, and believe that desecration of burial sites in
general, and the Ward Mounds specifically, is spiritually forbidden for the reason that the remains of
Native American people who have died will wander, get lost, and not rest in peace if the burial sites
are disturbed.”).
747. Wenona Singel, Labor and Employment Laws in Indian Country: The Institutional
Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 487, 489 (2008) (“[M]uch of Indian
law scholarship focuses on arguments based on the core attributes of tribal sovereignty”).
748. See, e.g., Comenout v. Whitener, No. 15-35261, No. 15-35268, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
10640 (9th Cir. June 9, 2017); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Great Plains Lending LLC, 846 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2017); Montella v. Chugachmiut, 3:16-CV-00251 JWS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156013
(D. Alaska, Sept. 25, 2017); Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
No. CV-16-08077-PCT-SPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147432 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2017); Dine Dev.
Corp. v. Fletcher, No. CIV 17-0015 JB/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34590 (D. N.M. March 10,
2017); Forsythe v. Reno Sparks Indian Colony, No.: 2:16-cv-01867-GMN-VCF, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140453 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Runyon, No. 3:17-cv-00038-AA, 97
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 445, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33006 (D. Ore. March 8, 2017); Oglala Lakota Coll. v.
Hudson Ins. Grp., CIV. 16-5093-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152932 (D.S.D. Sept. 20, 2017);;;
Douglas Indian Ass’n v. Cent. Council of Tlingit, No. S-16235, No. 7198, 2017 Alas. LEXIS 112
(Alaska, Sept. 8, 2017); Churchill Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. ClearNexus Inc., 802 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. App.
2017); Scott v. Dir. of Dep’t of Licensing, No. 75664-8-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1486 (Wash. Ct.
App. June 26, 2017).
749. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Great Plains Lending LLC, 846 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2017). The Ninth Circuit reiterated the proposition that “laws of general applicability govern tribal
entities unless Congress has explicitly provided otherwise.” Id. at 1053. Because Congress did not
write in an exception for Indian tribes, the Court reasoned that the Consumer Finance Protection Act
applies to tribal businesses. Id. In contrast, see Pancheco v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty.,
No. CV-16-01947-PHX-GMS 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23352, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 15, 2017)
(holding the Family Medical Leave Act does not apply to tribes “[w]ithout any explicit reference to
‘court enforcement, suing or being sued, or any other phrase clearly contemplating suits against’ the
tribe, the tribe’s adoption of FMLA policies do ‘not amount to an unequivocal waiver’ of sovereign
immunity”); see also Bruguier v. Lac du Flambeau Band, 237 F. Supp. 3d 867, 870 (W.D. Wis. 2017)
(holding that the Tribe is not an ‘employer’ for purposes of Section VII of the Civil Rights Act and
therefore may raise sovereign immunity as a defense to claims of discrimination); Montella v.
Chugachmiut, No. 3:16-CV-00251 JWS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156013 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2017)
(a second case concluding that a tribe may raise immunity to a Title VII action).
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attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act,750 and whether tribal entities other
than the tribe itself are eligible to assert immunity.751
The rest of this section will focus on four larger subsets of immunity
cases. The first deals with cases involving whether the tribe waived
immunity, the second discusses whether tribal immunity extends to cases
in rem and not just in personam, the third raises the relatively new issue
of tribes licensing their immunity to drug companies, and the final section
reviews a development in Alabama where that state’s supreme court has
questioned the very existence of tribal sovereign immunity.
1.

Waiver of Immunity

Generally a waiver of immunity cannot be implied but must be
clearly and unequivocally expressed. In Casino Caribbean LLC v. Money
Centers of America, QCA, a tribal casino run by the Quapaw Tribe, filed
a claim against the bankruptcy trustee to recover funds it claimed are owed
to it separately and not part of the bankruptcy estate. 752 The trustee
counterclaimed to recoup money transferred in the last 90 days as allowed
under the bankruptcy code.753 The trustee also brought a claim to recoup
funds against Thunderbird, another tribal casino (owned by the Absentee
Shawnee of Oklahoma).754 Both casinos moved to dismiss on the basis of
sovereign immunity.755

750. See Elem Indian Colony of Pomo Indians v. Ceiba Legal, LLP, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 115052 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
751. See Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. BIA, No. CV-16-08077-PCT-SPL,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147432, at *11–12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2017) (Navajo Transitional Energy
Company is a necessary party to an action to close a coal plant on the reservation and could not be
joined because it enjoys the tribe’s sovereign immunity); Ireson v. Avi Casino Enters., No. 2:17-CV987 JCM (VCF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106651, at *4 (D. Nev. July 10, 2017) (tribe’s casino
enterprise was entitled to assert the tribe’s immunity); Churchill Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. ClearNexus Inc.,
802 S.E.2d 85, 90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that Churchill is entitled to claim immunity as an arm
of the tribe and therefore dismissing the action. “This result may seem unfair, but that is the reality of
[tribal] sovereign immunity[.]” Id.); United States ex. rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 862
F.3d 939, 940 (9th Cir. 2017) (remanding to the district court to determine whether a Tribal College
is an ‘arm of the tribe’ and, therefore, not a person for purposes of the False Claims Act); Howard v.
Plain Green, LLC, No. 2:17cv302, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137229, at *19 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2017)
(corporation owned by the tribe’s holding company closely enough related to be considered an ‘arm
of the tribe’ for purposes of raising a sovereign immunity defense).
752. Casino Caribbean, LLC v. Money Ctrs. of Am. (In re Money Ctr. of Am., Inc.), 565 B.R.
87, 92 (D. Del. 2017).
753. Id. at 93.
754. Id. at 94.
755. Id. at 97–98 (holding that the casinos are capable of asserting the tribe’s immunity; “Tribal
sovereign immunity may extend to subdivisions of a tribe, including those engaged in economic
activities, provided that the relationship between the tribe and the entity is sufficiently close to
properly permit the entity to share in the tribe’s immunity”).
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The trustee argued that the bankruptcy code abrogated tribal
immunity because tribal governments are “governmental units” under
106(a) and 101(27).756 The federal district court recognized there is a
circuit split between the Ninth Circuit ruling that tribes are governmental
units757 and the Eighth Circuit and Eastern District of Michigan ruling that
states that tribes are immune under the Bankruptcy Code.758 The Delaware
court was ultimately more persuaded by the Eighth Circuit.759 It relied
upon the prior holdings which noted that Congress need not use ‘magic
words’ but needs to clearly express its intent to abrogate immunity before
an abrogation of immunity can be presumed.760 In a similar 2017 case, the
Eastern District of California came to the opposite conclusion.761
Following Ninth Circuit precedent, it held that the tribe could not claim
immunity in the bankruptcy proceeding.762
In Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Lewis Tein, former
attorneys for the Miccosukee Tribe filed civil tort claims against the tribe
for malicious prosecution related to the tribe’s activity in four previous
proceedings which had been resolved in the former attorneys’ favor. 763
The tribe moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based
upon the defense of sovereign immunity.764 The trial court denied the
motion claiming the tribe waived its immunity in a previous action where
it had advanced money to members in order to pay lawyers bills and that
filing continuous frivolous lawsuits constituted a waiver of immunity with
regard to the matter.765
The Florida appellate court reversed.766 It held that absent an express,
clear, explicit, and unmistakable waiver of immunity or congressional
abrogation of immunity tribes are immune to the civil jurisdiction of
756. See id. at 101–02 (“This Court concludes that Congress has not unequivocally abrogated
the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes under sections 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
Id. at 103.
757. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2004).
758. In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2012); In re Greektown Holdings LLC, 532
B.R. 680, 700–01 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
759. See Casino Caribbean, LLC, 565 B.R. at 103 (“The Court finds that, as neither the terms
‘Indians’ nor ‘Indian tribes’ were included in the language of section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress did not unequivocally express an intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes
in section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
760. Id.
761. See Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe v. McFarland, No. CIV. NO. 2:17-00293-WBS, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 152372 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017).
762. Id. at *6 (“because the Tribe has failed to demonstrate that § 106(a)’s reference to § 544
should be limited to § 544(a), the court finds the bankruptcy court was correct in concluding that the
Tribe’s sovereign immunity has been abrogated.”).
763. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Lewis Tein, P.L., 227 So. 3d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
764. Id. at 660.
765. Id. at 668–69.
766. Id. at 669.
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courts.767 Tribal immunity survived because no waiver was present in this
case.768 The court reasoned that a waiver of immunity exists only for the
particular matter in which immunity was waived.769 In this instance the
tribe waived immunity related to its attorney’s release of copies of checks
that were loaned by tribal members to pay legal bills related to a wrongful
death lawsuit.770 The tribe’s immunity was waived only for the disclosure
of checks and no further.771 Furthermore the appellate court held that even
evidence of vexatious and bad faith litigation did not amount to a waiver
of immunity;772 this is true “even where the results are deeply troubling,
unjust, unfair, and inequitable.”773 Additionally, the court held that a tribe
that waives immunity by participating in one piece of litigation has not
waived immunity for a second, related piece of litigation, and “[i]f the
unfairness and inequity of a tribal employee negligently killing or
battering someone is not enough to waive immunity, it follows that
allegations of vexatious and bad faith litigation are also not enough to
waive or abrogate it.”774
Holdings by other courts in 2017 affirm this notion that there is a
high—but not insurmountable—bar for a finding that sovereign immunity
has been waived or abrogated. For example, courts held that (1) producing
documents to the United States waives a tribes ability to claim immunity
to prevent it from producing the same documents to opposing parties in
litigation,775 (2) a tribe is not a ‘person’ under the False Claims Act and so
can claim immunity,776 (3) a choice of forum clause selecting Suffolk
County as the place to resolve conflicts in a contract was not an
unequivocal waiver of immunity,777 (4) they will assume tribes and their
767. Id. at 658 (“Whatever its wisdom, tribal immunity endures, and Indian tribes are not subject
to the civil jurisdiction of our courts absent a clear, explicit, and unmistakable waiver of tribal
sovereign immunity or a congressional abrogation of that immunity. Because neither exception to
tribal immunity has been established in this case, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the Miccosukee
Tribe’s motion to dismiss.”).
768. Id.
769. See id. at 661–64 (“If the Tribe dips its toe in the litigation waters, the reasoning goes, it
can be asked about its toe but not the whole body.”).
770. Id. (“The Tribe was immune from the Bermudez lawsuit but waived its immunity to a
limited extent to allow Roman’s deposition about the disclosure of the sixty-one checks and check
stubs.”).
771. Id. at 664.
772. Id. at 666.
773. Id. at 667.
774. Id.
775. United States v. Encore Servs. LLC, No. GF-16-19-GF-BMM-JTJ 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23973, at *2–3 (D. Mont. Feb. 21, 2017).
776. Dahlstrom v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, NO. C16-0052JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40654,
at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 21, 2017).
777. Aron Sec. Inc. v. Unkechaug Indian Nation, 54 N.Y.S. 3d 668, 671 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2017)
(“Although this choice of forum clause requires ‘any claim or controversy’ regarding the contract to
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officials are immune from suit, tribal officials need not appear themselves
to assert sovereign immunity,778 (5) even if a contract contains a valid
waiver of immunity, if the contract is not valid the tribe may still raise the
immunity defense to have the case dismissed,779 (6) “a tribe does not waive
its sovereign immunity from actions that could not otherwise be brought
against it merely because those actions were pleaded in a counterclaim to
an action filed by the tribe,”780 (7) merely accepting federal money,
without more, does not constitute a waiver of immunity,781 (8) one tribe
may raise sovereign immunity to a claim brought by another tribe,782 and
(9) tribal sovereign immunity applies to individual employees acting in
their official capacity.783
2.

In Rem Jurisdiction

As noted in Section III, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari
on a Washington State Supreme Court case regarding a tribe’s sovereign
immunity defense in an in rem proceeding.784 In a 5–4 opinion, the
Washington State Supreme Court held that a tribe’s sovereign immunity
defense does not prevent litigation from going forward in an in rem
proceeding because the state court has control over the property.785 After
Lundgren was decided, the Wisconsin state courts came to the contrary
conclusion in a case involving the imposition and collection of state taxes
on tribally owned timber.786
In Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v. Timber & Wood
Products, the Wisconsin’s Department of Natural Resources brought suit
against Lac Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wisconsin to recover taxes owed under Wisconsin’s Forest Cropland
be resolved in Suffolk County, it does not require that such claim or controversy be resolved by a state
court. Rather, under the clause, a party could bring a claim before a mediator, an arbitrator, a tribal
court, a state court, or a federal court, as long as the selected forum was located in Suffolk County.
Thus, unlike the cases involving arbitration clauses, this clause does not unequivocally express the
defendant’s agreement to be sued in a state court.”)
778. Harper v. White Earth Human Res., No. 16-1797 (JRT/LIB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25608,
at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2017).
779. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Washington, NO. 3:16-cv-05566-RJB, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 126381, at *21–22 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2017).
780. Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson, 868 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2017).
781. Forsythe v. Reno Sparks Indian Colony, No.: 2:16-cv-01867-GMN-VCF, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140453, at *8–9 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017).
782. Douglas Indian Ass’n v. Cent. Council of Tlingit, No. S-16235, No. 7198, 403 P.3d 1172,
1179 (Alaska Sept. 8, 2017).
783. WD at the Canyon, LLC v. Honga, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0468, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS
1715 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017).
784. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017).
785. See supra Section III.B.2
786. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Timber & Wood Prods., No. 2017AP181, 2017 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 1053 (Wisc. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017) (recommended for publication in official reporters).
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Law.787 The Department also sued the property itself in rem.788 The lower
court granted the tribe’s motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign
immunity.789
The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the
Department’s action.790 First, the court concluded the tribe did not waive
its immunity by agreeing to comply with Wisconsin’s Forest Crop law.791
The court reasoned that the tribe’s agreement to comply with state law
may have created ambiguity regarding the availability of the sovereign
immunity defense but that any waiver of immunity must be clear and
unambiguous.792
The Wisconsin appellate court also rejected the Department’s
attempt to proceed to collect the tax through asserting in rem jurisdiction
over the timber itself. The court began by articulating a difference between
a tribe’s ‘sovereign authority’ and its ‘sovereign immunity’ from suit, and
it used the difference to help explain the various cases cited to it by both
the tribe and the Department.793 After articulating that difference the court
focused on the defense of sovereign immunity.794 It concluded that while
the state may impose its tax against the tribe, it cannot sue the tribe to
collect if the tribe does not pay;795 “In other words, while the Tribe’s
property is not synonymous with Tribe for purposes of the imposition of
the tax, the property at issue is synonymous with the Tribe for purposes of
collection.”796 Accordingly it extended the tribe’s sovereign immunity
from suit to the wood products and denied the Department’s attempt to
proceed against them in rem.797

787. Id. at *8.
788. Id. at *1.
789. Id. at *9.
790. Id. at *1.
791. Id. at *11 (“The law is clear, however, that ‘[t]here is a difference between the right to
demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.’ Consistent with that
principle, courts throughout the country have repeatedly held that a tribe’s mere agreement to comply
with a particular law does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the tribe’s sovereign immunity.”).
792. Id. at *11–12.
793. Id. at *23 (“‘Tribal sovereign authority and tribal sovereign immunity are distinct doctrines
with different origins and purposes.’ A tribe’s sovereign authority ‘concerns the extent to which a tribe
may exercise jurisdictional authority over lands the tribe owns to the exclusion of state jurisdiction.’
It is ‘inherently distinct from the notion of tribal sovereign immunity—the plenary right to be free
from having to answer a suit.’”) (internal citations omitted).
794. Id. at *23–24.
795. Id.
796. Id. at *24.
797. Id. at *29.
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Drug Patents

In Allergan Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Allergan filed a
letter with the court notifying it that it had assigned its rights to the
pharmaceutical patents contested in the litigation to the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe and that the tribe had granted Allergan an exclusive license
to the patents at issue.798 Allergan is paying $13.5 million up front and then
$15 million a year to obtain the exclusive license.799 Defendants argued
that the purpose of the assignment was to utilize the tribe’s sovereign
immunity to cut off pending challenges to the validity of the patents with
the Patent Office.800 The court recognized the defendant’s concerns noting
that the tribe has already sought to enter a special appearance in litigation
pending before the Patent and Trademark Office.801 The issue in this
opinion was whether the tribe should be added as a plaintiff under rule
25(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which relates to transfer of
interest.802
The court strongly rebuked the attempted legal strategy.803 The court
even suggested that it might refuse to enforce the agreement between
Allergan and the tribe on the basis of public policy.804
798. Allergan Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
170825, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
799. Id.
800. Id. (“Allergan ‘has admitted in other forums that the intent is to employ Native American
sovereign immunity and attempt to cut-off pending validity challenges with the Patent Office.’ Mylan
argued that ‘Allergan is attempting to misuse Native American sovereignty to shield invalid patents
from cancellation.’”).
801. Id. at *7.
802. See id. at *8.
803. See id. at *10–11 (“The Court has serious concerns about the legitimacy of the tactic that
Allergan and the Tribe have employed. The essence of the matter is this: Allergan purports to have
sold the patents to the Tribe, but in reality it has paid the Tribe to allow Allergan to purchase—or
perhaps more precisely, to rent—the Tribe’s sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR
proceedings in the PTO. This is not a situation in which the patentee was entitled to sovereign
immunity in the first instance. Rather, Allergan, which does not enjoy sovereign immunity, has
invoked the benefits of the patent system and has obtained valuable patent protection for its product,
Restasis. But when faced with the possibility that the PTO would determine that those patents should
not have been issued, Allergan has sought to prevent the PTO from reconsidering its original issuance
decision. What Allergan seeks is the right to continue to enjoy the considerable benefits of the U.S.
patent system without accepting the limits that Congress has placed on those benefits through the
administrative mechanism for canceling invalid patents.”).
804. Id. at *12 (“Although sovereign immunity has been tempered over the years by statute and
court decisions, it survives because there are sound reasons that sovereigns should be protected from
at least some kinds of lawsuits. But sovereign immunity should not be treated as a monetizable
commodity that can be purchased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal
responsibilities. It is not an inexhaustible asset that can be sold to any party that might find it
convenient to purchase immunity from suit. Because that is in essence is what the agreement between
Allergan and the Tribe does, the Court has serious reservations about whether the contract between
Allergan and the Tribe should be recognized as valid, rather than being held void as being contrary to
public policy.”).
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Ultimately, the court allowed the tribe to be added as a co-plaintiff.805
The court explained that the defendants did not show they would be
prejudiced by the joinder of a co-plaintiff and given the current procedural
posture of the case the tribe’s joinder will not cause a delay in the
proceedings.806 The court was clear that it was not allowing the addition
because the assignment of the patent rights in Restasis was valid.807 Rather,
the court was allowing it as a precaution against future challenges in which
the assignment might be upheld and, thus, any future decisions rendered
by the court be voided for failure to join a necessary party.808
4.

Scope of Immunity (Alabama Cases)

In 2017, the Alabama Supreme Court decided three notable cases in
which it seemed to suggest that it was time to officially reexamine whether
Indian tribes may assert sovereign immunity from suit, at least in the
context of tort actions.809 In Harrison v. PCI Gaming Authority, plaintiffs
brought suit against entities owned and controlled by the Poarch Band of
Creek Indians for dram shop liability stemming from a drunk driver who
caused an accident where plaintiff’s son was killed.810 The lower court had
dismissed on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.811 The Alabama
Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, holding that the doctrine
of tribal sovereign immunity should be revisited and reversed.812 The court
remanded for consideration of subject matter jurisdiction after recognizing
the parties disagreed about the application of subject matter jurisdiction.813
The tribe claims the wrongful act was the serving of alcohol which
occurred on tribal lands, but the plaintiff claims that the injury occurred
805. Id. at *20.
806. Id. at *19–20 (“[I]n light of the fact that the trial and the post-trial briefing in the case has
been completed, the presence of the Tribe as a co-plaintiff will not interfere with the prompt entry of
the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court’s the final judgment in this case.
Allergan has represented that ‘the joinder will not otherwise impact the substantive issues in the
litigation.’ And, as the successor-in-interest to Allergan, the Tribe would be bound by any judgment.”)
(internal citations omitted).
807. Id. at *19.
808. Id. at *20 (“[T]he Court does not hold that the assignment of the patent rights to the Tribe
is valid, but instead proceeds on the ground that the assignment may at some point be held valid, and
that joining the Tribe as a party in this action is necessary to ensure that the judgment in this case is
not rendered invalid because of the absence of a necessary party.”).
809. See Harrison v. PCI Gaming Auth., 1130168, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 98 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017);
Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority, 1151312e, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 105 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017); Rape v.
Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 1111250, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 103 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017).
810. Harrison, 2017 Ala. LEXIS at *1–2.
811. Id. at *3.
812. Id. at *21 (“[T]his Court today in the case of Wilkes, supra, declines to extend the doctrine
of tribal immunity to actions in tort, in which the plaintiff has no opportunity to bargain for a waiver
and no other avenue for relief.”).
813. Id. at *21–22.
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on the highway or was where the petitioner’s son died which were both in
Alabama and not on the reservation.814
In Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority, plaintiffs were injured in an
automobile accident when their vehicle was hit by another vehicle driven
by an intoxicated employee of the defendant, a gaming enterprise owned
and operated by the Poarch Band of Indians.815 The trial court had
dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity,816 and the Alabama
Supreme Court reversed.817 It refused to extend tribal sovereign immunity
into the realm of tort cases.818 Citing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kiowa, the
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that sovereign immunity is improper
in tort cases where the plaintiff lacked an opportunity to negotiate with the
tribal defendant for a waiver of immunity.819
In Rape v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, a non-member alleged that
he won a triple multiplier on a jackpot win of $459,000 resulting in a
$1,377,015.30 prize during a ‘spin bet’ at a casino run by the Poarch Band
of Creek Indians.820 When the defendant failed to pay, claiming instead
that the machine had malfunctioned, the casino patron filed a claim in state
court.821 The lower court dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.822
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal823 but refused to issue
an opinion on the basis of immunity.824 Instead the court held that the
plaintiff was in a “Catch-22.”825 The court reasoned that it is possible that
under Carcieri the Poarch Band was not ‘under federal recognition’ in
1934 and so its lands should not have been taken into trust, and therefore
the gaming took place on state land.826 But if that is true—the gaming was
unlawful as the county in which it took place does not permit bingo, and
the Alabama Supreme Court will not assist a plaintiff to recover the
814. Id.
815. Wilkes, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 105 at *1.
816. Id. at *4.
817. Id. at *10–11 (“In light of the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly
acknowledged that it has never applied tribal sovereign immunity in a situation such as this, we decline
to extend the doctrine beyond the circumstances to which that Court itself has applied it; accordingly,
we hold that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity affords the tribal defendants no protection from
the claims asserted by Wilkes and Russell. As Justice Stevens aptly explained in his dissent in Kiowa,
a contrary holding would be contrary to the interests of justice, especially inasmuch as the tort victims
in this case had no opportunity to negotiate with the tribal defendants for a waiver of immunity.”).
818. Id. at *12.
819. Id. at *10–11.
820. Rape, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 103 at *2.
821. Id. at *4.
822. Id.
823. Id. at *38.
824. Id. at *26.
825. Id. at *27.
826. Id. at *27–28.
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proceeds of illegal activity.827 On the other hand, it is possible that the land
the Poarch Band’s casino operates on was properly taken into trust.828 In
that case the proper forum to resolve the dispute is tribal court, and the
state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.829 Without deciding which of
those possibilities exists, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal.830
R.

Taxation

In 2017, there were about twenty cases decided by federal courts
involving taxation. By far the most common procedural posture was the
state attempting to tax conduct on the reservation.831 The Supreme Court
has generally held that a state may not tax persons or activity on the
reservation if the imposition of the tax would infringe upon the tribe’s right
to govern itself or if it is preempted.832 Indian preemption is a little
827. Id. (“The activity out of which Rape’s claim arose, however, was gambling. If it occurred
on land within the regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction of the State of Alabama, that activity was
illegal. . . . It is well established that this Court will not aid a plaintiff seeking to recover under an
illegal contract but, instead, will simply leave the parties where it finds them.”).
828. Id. at *22–23.
829. See id. at *37 (The Alabama Court reasoned “[o]n the one hand, if the dispute here arises
from activity determined to be ‘permitted by Federal law’ and thus to be the subject of a congressional
delegation of ‘regulatory authority’ to the Tribe, then disputes arising out of the same would, as noted,
likewise be a legitimate adjudicative matter for the Tribe, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Rape’s
claims would have been proper on that basis. But conversely, even if it were to be determined that the
gaming at issue were illegal under the provisions of IGRA and therefore not the subject of an ‘express
congressional delegation’ of regulatory authority to the Tribe, it would be that very illegality that
would also prevent our state courts from providing relief to Rape under the principles discussed
previously.”).
830. Id. at *38.
831. See Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, No. 2:15-cv-00940-BJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1646
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2017); Seneca Nation of Indians v. Paterson, No. 1:10-CV-00687 (MAT), 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9060 (W.D. NY January 23, 2017); Lake Cty. v. State, No. DV 16-206, 2017 Mont.
Dist. LEXIS 14 (Mont. Dist. Jan. 27, 2017); Desert Water Agency v. United States DOI, 849 F.3d
1250 (9th Cir. 2017); Cougar Den, Inc. v. Dep’t of Licensing, 392 P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2017); Smith v.
Dep’t of Revenue, TC-MD 160383R, 2017 Ore. Tax LEXIS 39 (Ore. Tax Ct. Mar. 16, 2017); New
York v. UPS, 253 F. Supp. 3d 583 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017); New York v. UPS, 15-cv-1136 (KBF),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80907 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, Docket No. 28120-14, 148 T.C. No. 11 (U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 5, 2017); Agua Caliente
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside Cty, No.: ED CV 14-0007-DMG (DTBx), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92592 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Khouri, No: 2:16-cv-121,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101890 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2017); Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach,
CIV 14-4171, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150037 (D.S.D. Sept. 15, 2017); People ex rel Becerra v. Rose,
16 Cal. App. 5th 317 (Cal. App. 2017); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski, No. 16-62775-CivScola, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169009 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2017); Mitchell v. Tulalip Tribes of
Washington, NO. C17-1279-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182243 (W.D. Wash., Nov. 2, 2017);
Comenout v. Pittman, NO. 3:16-cv-05464-RJB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205941 (W.D. Wash., Dec.
14, 2017).
832. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n
v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Mescalero Apache v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Warren
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different than traditional constitutional preemption and looks more like
interest balancing. When the interests of the state to levy its tax are weaker
than the interests of the tribe and the United States to allow the tribe to be
free from the tax, then the state’s authority to tax is preempted.833 This
section cannot possibly highlight the detailed analysis of every tribal tax
case and so presents a couple of the most detailed decisions and a brief
summary of some of the others.
In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside County , the
tribe contested the authority of the county to impose a Possessory Interest
Tax (PIT) on non-Indian lessees who occupied land on the Agua Caliente
Band’s reservation.834 Both the tribe and the county sought summary
judgment on three issues: (1) whether the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)
preempts the state tax, (2) whether Bracker should result in preemption,
and (3) whether the PIT infringes on the Tribe’s sovereignty.835 The court
held that the county may assess the PIT.836
The court recognized that the IRA does have a provision which
prohibits state taxes from being levied on land taken into trust under the
IRA, but the court concluded that the Band’s land was held for them since
before the IRA was enacted, not through the IRA’s land into trust
mechanism.837 Accordingly, the IRA’s prohibition of taxation does not
apply to the Band’s land because it was not taken into trust pursuant to the
statute.838
The United States, as amicus, took the position that Bracker should
preempt the state taxation of reservation lands leased to non-Indians.839
The district court concluded that the federal interests were sufficient to
preempt state taxation absent sufficient state interests;840 however, the
Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136 (1980).
833. White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144–145 (1980).
834. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside Cty, No.: ED CV 14-0007-DMG
(DTBx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92592, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017).
835. Id. at *18.
836. Id. at *53.
837. Id. at *19–28 (“[T]wo executive orders that long predate the IRA and the 1955 Act
established and expanded the Reservation, taking this case outside of section 465’s purview.”).
838. Id. at *28–29.
839. Id. at *32–33 (“The United States, as amicus curiae in this case, contends that the
comprehensiveness of the federal and regulatory scheme governing the leasing of Indian land, coupled
with the federal interest in tribal sovereignty, ‘weigh heavily against state and local taxation.’”).
840. Id. at *34–35 (“Given the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncements on the federal statutory and
regulatory scheme of Indian leasing, the Secretary’s thorough and persuasive interpretation of the
statutes and regulations it administers, and the federal policy of promoting Indian welfare and
economic independence, the Court concludes that the federal interests here, like those at stake in
Bracker and Ramah, are pervasive enough to preclude the burdens of a tax, absent sufficient state
interests.”).
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court concluded the state had asserted sufficient interests, ranging from
“public road maintenance and animal and pest control services, to larger
undertakings such as public safety, law enforcement, and education.”841
Although, the court concluded that the PIT taxes give the state more than
a mere interest in raising revenue; the PIT taxes were directly related to
the services that the state provides to non-Indian lessees and therefore were
sufficient to defeat the presumption of preemption based on the alleged
federal interests.842 Therefore, the court held that the county’s tax was not
preempted by Bracker’s interest balancing.843
Finally, the court concluded that the County’s tax did not infringe on
the right of the tribe to make its own laws and be governed by them.844 It
pointed out that the tribe could assert its own taxes in addition to those
imposed by the County.845
In Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, the tribe sought a court
order to prevent South Dakota from levying its taxes on purchases made
by non-members on the reservation.846 South Dakota attempted to collect
its use tax on the sale of goods and services to non-members at the tribe’s
Royal River Casino & Hotel and First American Mart (the tribal store).847
South Dakota also argued that it could condition the reissuance of a liquor
license on the collection and remittance by the tribe of the state use tax.848
The tribe sought summary judgment, arguing that the imposition of the
state use tax was preempted by the IGRA and/or preempted in general
because it infringes on tribal sovereignty and thus contradicts established
tribal and federal interests.849
After some lengthy discussion the court concluded that state taxation
of all activity that is related to gaming was preempted by the IGRA.850 It
841. Id. at *40.
842. Id. at *41–43 (“[T]he PIT and the allocation of its revenues appear to be based, at least in
part, on the share of services and benefits that the lessees enjoy. . . . the state interest in raising revenues
here is at its strongest because, by and large, ‘the taxpayer is the recipient of state services.’”).
843. See id. at *43.
844. Id. at *52–53.
845. Id. at *51 (“Agua Caliente has not provided this Court with evidence of the PIT’s actual
obstruction of tribal governance. As explained above, the Tribe may impose its own tax concurrently
with that of the County. Thus, this is not a case where the state has ‘tak[en] revenue that would
otherwise go towards supporting the Tribe and its programs.’”).
846. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, CIV 14-4171, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150037, at
*2 (D.S.D. Sept. 15, 2017).
847. Id. at *2–3.
848. Id. at *5.
849. Id. at *6.
850. Id. at *34–35 (“[T]he Court holds that the slots, table games, food and beverage services,
hotel, RV park, live entertainment events, and gift shop are directly related to class III gaming . . .
regulation and taxation is, therefore, compactable between a tribe and a state. As the State and the
Tribe did not include a provision providing for such taxation in the gaming compact, the application
of the use tax to such amenities is preempted by IGRA and the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment
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reasoned that the state could have asked to negotiate for the inclusion of
the tax as part of the compacting process, but that the compact was silent
on the collection of the use tax and so was preempted.851 However, the
court concluded that state taxation of sales at the tribal store were not
preempted by the IGRA as sales at the store were not sufficiently related
to the gaming enterprise to fall within the preemptive scope of IGRA.852
The court then proceeded to ask whether those sales not preempted
by the IGRA may yet still be preempted by strong tribal and federal
interests under Bracker.853 The court concluded that the value generated
by the store was not value typically generated on the reservation and so
had a weaker claim to preemption.854 Additionally, the court reasoned that
the state has an interest in the uniform application of its tax code and in
the provision of services to South Dakotans.855 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the imposition of the use tax on the sale of goods by the
tribal store to non-members was not preempted by tribal and federal
interests.856
Finally, the Tribe argued that the imposition of the state tax is
discriminatory because South Dakota gives a tax credit to state residents
who have paid sales or use taxes to other states when those states offer a
reciprocal credit to its residents, but South Dakota provides no reciprocal
credit for taxes paid to the tribe even though it offers a credit for taxes paid
to South Dakota.857 The court disagreed, reasoning that tribes and states
are differently situated and so it is not discriminatory to treat them
differently.858
is granted to that extent. Even had the State negotiated for such a provision, though, the State would
have to earmark those funds for services that are also directly related to the operation of gaming
activities as well as offer meaningful concessions in return . . . . The remittance of those taxes into a
general fund with unlimited potential uses, such as the State’s general fund here, would not satisfy
Rincon and would be preempted by IGRA as an impermissible negotiation topic.”).
851. Id. at *33–35.
852. Id. at *35.
853. Id. (“[I]t is still necessary to determine if the use tax, where not preempted by plain
implication of IGRA—in other words, the sale of goods and services at the Store—is not otherwise
preempted under the Bracker balancing test.”).
854. Id. at *39.
855. Id. at *41.
856. Id. at *40–41 (“[T]he State does not interfere with the Tribes’ power to regulate tribal
enterprises when it simply imposes its tax on [use by] nonmembers.’ ‘Nor would the imposition of
[the] tax on these purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for the simple reason
that nonmembers are not constituents of the governing tribe.’”) (internal citations omitted).
857. Id. at *41–42.
858. Id. at *46–47 (“Although the proceeds of the use tax enter the State’s general fund, which
is not earmarked for any expenditures in particular, the Tribe does indeed benefit from off-reservation
road maintenance and public safety services leading to the Store, the licensure of some food vendors,
as well as other services. Further, nonmember consumer residents of South Dakota benefit from a wide
range of general services offered by the State when off the reservation. Therefore, the State tax is not
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In Cougar Den Inc. v. Department of Licensing, the plaintiff, a
Yakima Nation corporation, asserted that the “right to travel” clause in
Article III of the Treaty with the Yakima includes the right to import fuel
without an importer’s license and without paying a state tax on the fuel. 859
The majority of the Washington Supreme Court (7–2) held that the treaty’s
right to travel preempted the state’s ability to tax.860 It began by
emphasizing that Indian treaties should be interpreted as the Indians
themselves understood them.861 The majority highlighted the importance
of travel to the Yakima to support the conclusion that the right to travel
would include the right to move goods.862 The opinion drew on Ninth
Circuit precedent in relation to the Yakima that refused to draw a
distinction between trade and travel.863 The court accordingly held that the
imposition of a state tax on fuel imported unto the reservation was
preempted by the treaty’s guarantee of a right to travel.864
The dissent would have implied a difference between the right to
travel and the right to trade: “The Yakima Nation’s treaty right to travel
applies to trade only when it cannot be meaningfully separated from travel,
not when travel is merely necessary for trade.”865 Because the imposition
of a tax on imported fuel is a restriction of trade, and not travel, it would
have upheld the power of the state to tax.866
In 2017, courts decided many other issues related to Indian tribes and
taxation. For example, courts held (1) that when the Bureau of Indian
Affairs determines that land has been taken into trust that land should be
discriminatory, as the Tribe is not similarly situated to other states which have been granted a tax
credit.”).
859. Cougar Den Inc. v. Dep’t of Licensing, 392 P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2017) (The treaty provides
“the right of way, with free access from the same to the nearest public highway, is secured to them; as
also the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highway”).
860. Id. at 58.
861. Id. at 60–61 (“It is our responsibility to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so
far as possible, in accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the tribal
representatives at the council, and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this
nation to protect the interests of a dependent people.”).
862. Id. at 62 (“Travel was woven into the fabric of Yakama life in that it was necessary for
hunting, gathering, fishing, grazing, recreational, political, and kinship purposes . . . . At the time the
treaty was drafted, agents of the United States knew of the Yakamas’ reliance on travel. During
negotiations, the Yakamas’ right to travel off reservation had been repeatedly broached, and
assurances were made that entering into the treaty would not infringe on or hinder their tribal
practices.”).
863. Id. at 67 (“We hold that the right to travel provision in the treaty protects the Tribe’s
historical practice of using the roads to engage in trade and commerce.”).
864. Id.
865. Id. at 74.
866. Id. at 70 (Citing Wagnon and Mescalero Apache Tribers it would have held that “[a]bsent
express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been
held subject to nondiscriminatory state law. This includes state fuel excise taxes.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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removed from county tax rolls,867 (2) that Indian treaties may contain taxexemptions and should be read broadly,868 (3) that alternative dispute
resolution with the United States on tax matters is not required when
settlement with the United States is unlikely,869 (4) that a state agency
could not challenge an Interior regulation that may remove its authority to
levy taxes on water users on the reservation until one of those users refuses
to pay the tax,870 (5) that income earned by a tribal member on the
reservation is not subject to state income tax,871 (6) that UPS can be liable
for knowingly shipping untaxed cigarettes from the reservation to other
non-member purchasers,872 (7) that when goods are imported from outside
the reservation and sold to non-members the state has legitimate interest
in raising revenue to support off-reservation services which make onreservation commerce possible,873 and (8) that tribes selling cigarettes to
non-members have an obligation to collect and remit cigarette taxes to the
State of California.874
S.

Treaty Rights

There are many cases discussed in this update that deal in some way
with treaties and the rights conferred upon tribes. However, there is one
dispute originating from Washington State that deserves special mention
because the denial of a rehearing en banc in the Ninth Circuit drew a strong
dissent. In United States v. Washington,875 a group of twenty-one
867. Lake Cty. v. State, No. DV 16-206, 2017 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 14 at *6 (Mont. Dist. Jan. 27,
2017).
868. Perkins v. United States, No. 16-CV-495(LJV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123543 at *5
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017).
869. Perkins v. United States, 16-CV-495V, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186169, at *16 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2017) (“[T]he applicability of the Canandaigua Treaty and the 1842 Treaty is a binary
proposition—those treaties either do exempt plaintiffs’ income, or do not. A settlement of the case for
an amount less than what plaintiffs paid is theoretically possible but unlikely, since any such amount
would not reflect where the parties would stand after a full resolution of the treaty issue. For these
reasons, the Court will release the parties from the automatic referral to ADR . . . .”).
870. Desert Water Agency v. U.S. Dept’ of Interior, 849 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 2017).
871. Smith v. Dep’t of Revenue, TC-MD 160383R, 2017 Ore. Tax LEXIS 39 (Ore. Tax Ct. Mar.
16, 2017).
872. New York v. UPS, 253 F. Supp. 3d 583 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017). In a subsequent
proceeding to determine damages the court imposed large fines. New York v. UPS, 15-cv-1136 (KBF),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80907, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017) (The court ordered large damages to
specifically send a message to UPS and others who would facilitate the transfer and sale of untaxed
cigarettes to non-members living off the reservation. The court awarded New York
State $165,817,479 and New York City was awarded $81,158,135.).
873. Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, No. 2:15-cv-00940-BJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1646, at
*25 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2017).
874. People ex rel Becerra v. Rose, 16 Cal. App. 5th 317, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
875. Since time of writing the article, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari,
seeWashington v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 602 (2018).
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Washington tribes brought a claim under the Stevens treaties claiming that
Washington had violated their off-reservation treaty rights to fish at their
usual and accustomed places by building barrier culverts.876 The district
court ordered Washington to remove its barrier culverts over a period of
seventeen years in order to comply with the treaty.877 The Ninth Circuit
agreed.878
Washington argued that under the treaties it was permitted to block
all of the streams because a treaty right to take fish does not guarantee that
there will continue to be fish to harvest.879 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.880
It held that Indian treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians would have
understood them at the time the treaty was signed and the Indians would
not have understood the treaties as preventing the flow of salmon up and
down the rivers and streams.881 In describing the treaty negotiations the
court reasoned; “[e]ven if Governor Stevens had not explicitly promised
that ‘this paper secures your fish,’ and that there would be food ‘forever,’
we would infer such a promise.”882 The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the
decision of the district court.883
The State of Washington appealed, asking the Ninth Circuit to hear
the case en banc. In United States v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit issued
a written opinion in which it refused to hear the case en banc.884 The
rehearing was denied over the objection of nine judges on the Ninth
Circuit.885

876. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2017). When Washington builds
roads or structures over streams it builds culverts to accommodate the passage of water underneath.
When those structures prevent the flow of salmon fry down river or adult salmon back up the river
they become barrier culverts.
877. Id. at 954.
878. Id.
879. Id. at 962 (“Washington concedes that the clause guarantees to the Tribes the right to take
up to fifty percent of the fish available for harvest, but it contends that the clause imposes no obligation
on the State to ensure that any fish will, in fact, be available.”).
880. Id.
881. Id. at 963–64 (“The Indians did not understand the Treaties to promise that they would have
access to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but with a qualification that would allow the
government to diminish or destroy the fish runs. Governor Stevens did not make, and the Indians did
not understand him to make, such a cynical and disingenuous promise.”).
882. Id. at 964–65.
883. Id. at 980 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining Washington to correct
most of its high-priority barrier culverts within seventeen years, and to correct the remainder at the
end of their natural life or in the course of a road construction project undertaken for independent
reasons.”).
884. United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1018 (9th Cir. 2017).
885. Id. at 1023. Ninth Circuit Judges O’Scannlain, Kozinski, Tallman, Callahan, Bea, Ikuta,
N.R. Smith, Bybee, and M. Smith all dissented from the decision not to order a rehearing en banc.
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Judge O’Scannlain wrote for those dissenting from rehearing.886 He
argued that while the litigation over salmon has been going on for fifty
years, the parties only now found an obligation that the State of
Washington expend as much as $1.88 billion to create additional salmon
habitat by removing culverts under state maintained roads that impede
salmon.887 The dissent alleged four errors. First, it reasoned that the treaties
have been misread to require not just sharing of the salmon in common
with the people of Washington but that the state has an affirmative duty to
ensure there are enough salmon for the tribe to make a “moderate
living.”888
Second, the dissent reasoned the remedy of removing all of the
culverts is too extreme.889 The dissenting opinion reasoned that many
factors beyond the culverts could impact fish populations, and it cited
shared concerns raised by Idaho and Montana that the ruling could be used
to block development in other areas where natural resources are
threatened.890
Third, the dissent argued that the tribe’s claims are barred by
laches.891 It would have held that the United States approved of many of
the highway designs that include the barrier culverts that it is now
demanding that Washington pay to remove, and that since the culverts
were approved by the federal government, that same federal government
could not now demand their removal.892 The dissent focuses on Sherrill
where the Supreme Court suggested that laches is a defense which can be
raised against the United States.893
Finally, the dissent argued that the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation was
overbroad.894 The dissent highlighted that many private barrier culverts
886. Id. Judges Bybee and M. Smith joined all of Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion except for the
part about laches and the application of Sherrill.
887. Id. at 1023–24 (See specific discussion of actual cost to replace all culverts at footnote 1).
888. Id. at 1026 (“[T]he Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel did not hold that the Tribes were
entitled to any particular minimum allocation of fish. Instead, Fishing Vessel mandates an allocation
of 50 percent of the fish to the Indians, subject to downward revision if moderate living needs can be
met with less.”).
889. Id. at 1028 (“There seems little doubt that future litigants will argue that the population of
various birds, deer, elk, bears, and similar animals, which were traditionally hunted by the Tribes, have
been impacted by Western development.”).
890. Id.
891. Id. at 1030–31.
892. Id. at 1029 (“[I]t was the federal government, now bringing suit in its capacity as trustee for
the Tribes, which ‘specified the design for virtually all of the culverts at issue.’”).
893. Id. at 1030–31 (“Presumably, the State’s alleged violation of the Treaties was complete
when it constructed the culverts (and relevant highways) in the 1960s. The United States first brought
suit to enforce the Tribes’ fishing rights in 1970. Yet, the United States found no problem with the
culverts until 2001.”) (internal citations omitted).
894. Id. at 1031–33 (“Being forced to replace even a single barrier that will have no tangible
impact on the salmon population is an unjustified burden.”).
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exist that are not addressed by the order so the state will be required to
remove culverts which will not increase salmon runs.895
Judges Fletcher and Gould wrote a concurrence to support their
original panel opinion.896 They argued that “there is nothing in the Court’s
opinion that authorizes the State to diminish or eliminate the supply of
salmon available for harvest.”897 The panel reasoned that it has not opened
the floodgates to future suits because future claims against states by private
parties or tribes seeking to block development would be blocked by the
Eleventh Amendment.898 The concurrence distinguished Sherrill because
the tribes in this instance were not attempting to reassert sovereignty over
land, and no party was resting on its rights because the parties had been in
conflict over the issue for a century.899 Finally, the concurrence concluded
that the order was not overbroad because it did not require remediation of
every culvert but instead required remediation of some, but not all, of the
culverts within seventeen years.900
T.

Voting

The year 2017 saw several court cases involving American Indians
and voting rights, mostly concentrated around alleged disenfranchisement
of Indian voters. This manifested either through access to the polls or
through judicial districts that unconstitutionally pack American Indian
voters into districts in order to diminish their potential representational
strength.
In Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, the Navajo Nation and several
tribal members brought suit against Utah’s San Juan County alleging that
both the county commission and school board districts violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth
Amendment, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 901 San Juan County
is roughly evenly divided between White persons and American Indian
persons.902 The court had previously found the districts unconstitutional
because the county had packed American Indians into as few districts as
possible in order to diminish the voting strength of tribal members and the
895. Id. at 1032–33.
896. Id. at 1018–23.
897. Id. at 1020.
898. Id. (“Because of the Eleventh Amendment, a further suit against Washington State seeking
enforcement of the Treaties cannot be brought by the Tribes.”).
899. Id. at 1021.
900. Id. at 1022–23.
901. Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1344 (D. Utah 2017).
902. Id. at 1360 (The County is roughly evenly divided between American Indian and nonHispanic Whites, with American Indians having a slight majority of both the overall population
(52.17%) and the voting age populations (50.33%)).
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districts did not contain roughly equal numbers of residents, thus violating
the principle of one-person/one-vote.903 The county presented the court
with new proposed districts which it submitted had cured the potential
defects.904 The district court disagreed.905 It held that race was a
predominate factor used by the county in developing the revised
commission and school board maps and therefore the proposed districts
remained unconstitutional.906
In reviewing the proposed plan Judge Shelby began by recognizing
that the submitted plans had ameliorated the previous problem of oneperson/one-vote with districts that are within acceptable population
differentials.907 To comply with the Voting Rights Act the county
attempted to achieve proportional representation where each racial group
could have the opportunity to elect members in proportion to the county’s
demographics.908 However, the court concluded that in doing so the county
had drawn maps using race as the predominant factor.909 Because the
Navajo Nation was able to prove that race was the primary criteria for
creating some of the districts, the burden shifted to the county to prove that
it narrowly tailored its decision to achieve a compelling government
interest.910 The county was unable to identify any governmental interest
903. Id. at 1346.
904. Id. at 1345.
905. Id. (“For the reasons below, San Juan County’s remedial plans fail to pass constitutional
muster. Specifically, the court concludes race was the predominant factor in the development of
District 3 of the School Board plan and Districts 1 and 2 of the County Commission plan. The County’s
consideration of race requires strict scrutiny analysis of these districts. The court concludes the County
has failed to satisfy strict scrutiny and, therefore, these districts are unconstitutional.”).
906. Id. at 1366 (“The record establishes that San Juan County predominated racial
considerations over other traditional districting criteria when drawing its County Commission Districts
1 and 2 and School Board District 3, and it did so without providing any reason to think it would
violate the Voting Rights Act if it simply drew districts based on race-neutral factors. To the contrary,
it did so even while maintaining there was no Section 2 issue that required it to take race into account
in redistricting. This runs afoul of Supreme Court pronouncements against racial classifications in
drawing voting districts.”).
907. Id. at 1353.
908. Id. at 1348–49 (“Proportional representation presented a challenge in San Juan County,
which is roughly half Native American and half White but with an odd number of voting districts—
five for the School Board and three for the County Commission. [The County’s] goal, therefore, was
to create two safe Native American School Board districts, two safe White School Board districts, and
a district where the racial mix reflected the County’s overall demographics—approximately 52%
Native American and 48% White. Similarly, his goal was to create one safe White County Commission
district, one safe Native American County Commission district, and a third district that reflected the
racial composition of the County generally.”).
909. Id. at 1361 (“Because the County’s attempt at compliance with Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act entailed nothing more than proportionality (meaning the establishment of racial targets for
the resulting districts); and because compliance with the Voting Rights Act was the County’s highest
priority, save one-person, one-vote; the court concludes San Juan County adopted a countywide policy
of prioritizing racial targets above all other traditional redistricting criteria.”).
910. Id. at 1364.
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that would justify the primary use of race and so the court held the new
maps submitted by the county were unconstitutional.911
The court had previously indicated that if the county’s newly revised
districts failed to pass constitutional muster it would approve districts
submitted by the Navajo Nation.912 However, the court refused to comply
with its previous order; “[i]n view of this reality, the court believes
adopting Navajo Nation’s proposed redistricting plans—the product of an
adversarial, litigation-driven process—could jeopardize, and possibly
undermine confidence in, the legitimacy of the County’s new legislative
districts.”913 Instead the court decided to appoint a special master to assist
in the formulation of lawful remedial districts with input from all
parties.914
Later in 2017, the special master had completed the work of drawing
newly proposed boundaries which complied with the mandates imposed
by the constitution.915 In Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, the county
objected to the new boundaries proposed by the special master.916 The
federal district court approved the districts over the objections of the
county because they now complied with all constitutional principles
including one-person one-vote and did not use race as a predominant
factor.917 It ordered the new maps be used during the 2018 election.918 The
new maps are included in the opinion.919
Courts also decided a pair of cases focused on the potential
disenfranchisement of American Indian voters. In Navajo Nation Human
Rights Commission v. San Juan County, the Navajo Nation Human Rights
Commission brought suit against San Juan County alleging voting
discrimination. 920 Before 2014 the county operated nine in-person polling
911. See id. (“The County did not explicitly identify any governmental interest it contends it was
trying to achieve, nor did it argue that its race-based considerations were narrowly tailored to achieve
any specific interest. Because law places the burden to make this showing on the County, its failure to
address the issue necessarily means the County’s redistricting fails strict scrutiny review.”).
912. Id. at 1366–67 (“The court previously stated it would evaluate Navajo Nation’s proposed
redistricting plans if the County’s plans failed. The court indicated that if it reached the Navajo
Nation’s plans, and if they were legally sound, the court likely would enter its plans as a final order.
Having considered the issue more carefully in the time that has passed since its earlier Order, the court
no longer believes such an approach would lead to a satisfactory result.”).
913. Id. at 1367.
914. Id.
915. See Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., No. 2:12-cv-00039, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211230 at
*1 (D. Utah, Dec. 21, 2017).
916. Id.
917. Id. at *2–23.
918. Id. at *51.
919. Id.
920. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty, No. 2:16-cv-00154-JNP-BCW,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145159, at *5 (D. Utah Sept. 7, 2017).
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places with Navajo language assistance.921 For the 2014 election and
subsequent elections the county moved to a mail-in voting system with a
single in-person polling place located in the northern, white-majority part
of the county.922 The plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of the Voting
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.923 In 2016, the county opened
three additional in-person voting places all located on the Navajo
reservation, provided Navajo language assistance at all four polling
stations, and expressed its intention not to return to the 2014 procedures.924
However in-person early voting was still located solely in the
predominately white northern portion of the County.925 The court
concluded that the plaintiff’s original complaint regarding the 2014 voting
procedures was now moot and dismissed those claims.926
The court then permitted the Commission to amend its complaint to
allege that the 2016 procedures still violate section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.927 The Commission alleged that the early voting location solely in the
white northern portion of the county gives those voters benefits denied to
the Navajo-majority portion of the county.928 The plaintiffs also alleged a
violation of section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.929 They claimed that the
county has no formal training for Navajo interpreters, that there is
inadequate publicity to voters, that the publicity that did exist was
confusing, and that some voters that needed assistance did not receive it.930
The county replied that its actions substantially complied with the Voting

921. Id. at *4.
922. Id.
923. Id. at *5.
924. Id. at *6.
925. Id. at *54.
926. Id. at *9–10 (“Here, the court concludes that the County’s abandonment of the 2014
procedures has mooted Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief regarding those procedures. The County
has not used the 2014 procedures for an entire election cycle, choosing instead to implement entirely
different procedures for both the primary and general elections in 2016. Moreover, neither the current
County Clerk nor the County government has openly expressed any intention to reinstitute the 2014
procedures.”).
927. Id. at *22–26.
928. Id. at *55 (“First, they assert that the provision of early in-person voting only in Monticello
means that the average white voter, who lives closer to Monticello, has proportionately more days in
which to vote than the average Navajo voter, who is more likely to live further from Monticello.
Second, Plaintiffs assert that the provision of early in-person voting only in Monticello provides the
average white voter with ‘additional benefits, including the ability to request a [new] ballot (if, for
instance, the ballot was lost in the mail) or receive troubleshooting help if a [voting] problem arises.’
Plaintiffs also argue that the option of mail-in voting does not alleviate this inequity, because, among
other barriers, the average Navajo lives more distant from post office locations than the average white
voter and certain majority-Navajo precincts lack sufficient post office boxes to accommodate
demand.”) (internal citations omitted).
929. Id. at *22.
930. Id. at *64.
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Rights Act’s requirements.931 After reviewing the evidence the court
denied both parties summary judgment motions concluding that there
remains a genuine issue of material fact about whether the 2016 voting
procedures violate the VRA.932 Litigation on San Juan County’s alleged
disenfranchisement of Native voters continues.
The second case involving voter disenfranchisement arose in South
Dakota. In Poor Bear v. County of Jackson the petitioners originally sued
the state of South Dakota seeking to establish a satellite office on the
reservation for purposes of voter registration and in-person absentee
voting.933 The South Dakota Secretary of State’s Office and Jackson
County arranged to support a satellite office during all federal elections
through 2023, and the case was then dismissed for ripeness in 2016.934
Petitioners then filed an action seeking reimbursement of attorney’s fees
under the Voting Rights Act.935
The federal district court dismissed the petition because Poor Bear
and others were not prevailing parties in the original action.936 There are
two requirements to be considered a prevailing party when a claim is
dismissed for ripeness: (1) a material alteration of the legal relationship
between the parties, and (2) the relief is judicially sanctioned.937 The court
reasoned that there was not a material alteration of the legal relationship
between the parties because the county voluntarily changed its position to
open the satellite office.938 Moreover, the court reasoned that the result was
not judicially sanctioned.939 Because neither requirement was met, the
court denied the motion for attorney’s fees.940
Finally, Michigan appellate courts addressed an interesting quirk in
the state constitution’s limits on the eligibility for elected office. In Paquin
v. City of St. Ignace, the petitioning tribal member brought suit against the
city after it found him ineligible to run for city council because he was a
convicted felon.941 While serving as chief of police and as an elected
member on the Board of Directors of the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
931. Id. at *64–65.
932. Id. at *72.
933. Bear v. Cty. of Jackson, 5:14-CV-05059-KES, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 590, *2–3 (D. S.D.
Jan. 4, 2017).
934. Id. at *3.
935. Id. at *2.
936. Id. at *14.
937. Id. at *4.
938. Id. at *8–9.
939. Id. at *12–13 (“A court mediated agreement is not the same as a judgment on the merits, a
consent decree, or a preliminary injunction—all of which involve a measure of court action and
potential continued court oversight.”).
940. Id. at *14.
941. Paquin v. City of St. Ignace, No. 334350, 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1696, *2-4 (Mich. App.,
Oct. 19, 2017).
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the petitioner was convicted (plead guilty) of conspiracy to defraud the
United States related to the misuse of federal funds granted to tribal police
departments and was sentenced to serve one year and one day in prison (a
felony).942 The Michigan Constitution makes a person ineligible for
elected or appointed office if, in the last twenty years, they have been
convicted of a felony involving dishonesty while holding elected office or
a position of employment in local, state, or federal government.943 The
district court ruled that under this provision the plaintiff was ineligible.944
The plaintiff appealed the decision of the district court; “The
issue . . . is whether plaintiff’s employment with a federally recognized
sovereign Indian tribe constituted employment in ‘local, state, or federal
government,’ for purposes of Const 1963, art 11, § 8. This is an issue of
first impression involving the interpretation of a constitutional
provision.”945 The Michigan appellate court upheld the lower court’s
determination of ineligibility.946 It reasoned that the Tribe is a ‘local
government’ under the plain meaning of the phrase at the time of the
Constitutional provision.947
U.

Water

In 1908, the Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States and
held that Indians were entitled to reasonable use of water in order to
irrigate their lands.948 The Winters doctrine has sparked costly and ongoing
litigation between competing water uses for decades and has spurred large
settlements between tribes and the United States in recent years.949 Indian
water rights continue to be litigated regularly in both state and federal
courts.
The Ninth Circuit held for the first time that Winters rights extend to
groundwater in Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella
Valley Water District.950 The court reasoned that the United States
reserved for the tribe rights to groundwater when it created the
942. Id. at *1–2.
943. Id. at *2–3.
944. Id. at *5.
945. Id.
946. Id. at *12–13.
947. Id. at *8–9 (“‘Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2007), p 730, defines ‘local
government’ as: ‘1. the government of a specific local area constituting a major political unit (as a
nation or a state).’’”).
948. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
949. For discussion of just one of these settlements see Erin B. Agee, In the Federal Government
We Trust? Federal Funding for Tribal Water Rights Settlements and the Taos Pueblo Indian Water
Rights Settlement Act, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 201 (2011).
950. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262,
1270 (9th Cir. 2017).
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reservation.951 The Winters doctrine only reserves water to the extent
necessary to accomplish the purposes of creating the reservation, but once
Winters rights are established they vest “on the date of the reservation and
[are] superior to the rights of future appropriators.”952 The court then
determined that the primary purpose of the creation of the Agua Caliente
reservation envisioned continual water use953 and that groundwater was
appurtenant to the reservation.954 Finally, the court held that it does not
matter that the tribe has not historically tapped groundwater because state
water rights are preempted by federal reserved rights, the lack of historical
use does not prevent usage of groundwater now, and the right to water
does not depend on the tribes need for the water but rather on whether the
right to the water was intended to be reserved by Congress.955
Unlike the application of Winters rights to groundwater, claims to the
waters that feed Pyramid Lake have been in the federal courts for several
decades. In 2017, the Ninth Circuit issued another opinion in this long
running contest of water rights. In United States v. Board of Directors of
the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, the court revisited a set of claims
by the United States and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe against the
irrigation district to recover for water that was willfully diverted in
violation of federal law. 956 In this iteration of the proceedings, the lower
court denied any recoupment by the tribe for water illegally diverted
during 1985–1986.957 The Ninth Circuit reversed.958 It reasoned that the
lower court misread judicial orders from 1985 and 1986, and that those
orders did not prevent the Irrigation District from complying with federal
rules and procedures and so the District could not be excused from non951. Id. at 1268 (“The creation of these rights stems from the belief that the United States, when
establishing reservations, ‘intended to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the waters
without which their lands would have been useless.’”).
952. Id.
953. Id. at 1270 (“Water is inherently tied to the Tribe’s ability to live permanently on the
reservation. Without water, the underlying purpose—to establish a home and support an agrarian
society—would be entirely defeated. Put differently, the primary purpose underlying the establishment
of the reservation was to create a home for the Tribe, and water was necessarily implicated in that
purpose.”).
954. Id. at 1271 (“Appurtenance, however, simply limits the reserved right to those waters which
are attached to the reservation. It does not limit the right to surface water
only. . . . The Winters doctrine was developed in part to provide sustainable land for Indian tribes
whose reservations were established in the arid parts of the country. And in many cases, those
reservations lacked access to, or were unable to effectively capture, a regular supply of surface water.
Given these realities. . . . [W]e hold that the Winters doctrine encompasses both surface water and
groundwater appurtenant to reserved land.”).
955. Id. at 1272.
956. United States v. Bd. of Dirs. of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., No. 16-15507, 2017
U.S. App. LEXIS 17876, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2017).
957. Id. at *3.
958. Id.
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compliance by judicial orders.959 The lower court had also refused to
consider the calculations of recoupment submitted by the Tribe and the
United States on the basis that they were calculated on a monthly instead
of an annualized basis which had been the methodology at trial.960 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that while that decision would ordinarily be within
the broad discretion of the district court, in this case such a decision would
prevent an equitable result and therefore ordered those calculations
admitted.961 The Ninth Circuit proceeded to fashion its own equitable
remedy. It awarded the United States and the Tribe 8,300 acre feet of water
and remanded for an entry of that order with all costs assessed to the
Irrigation District.962
However not all Indian reservations come with Winters rights. In
United States v. Abousleman, the federal district court entered the
recommendation of a magistrate that Pueblos lack Winters rights to their
lands. 963 The court recognized that the Pueblos actually and exclusively
used the water before the arrival of the Spanish, and that to extinguish
aboriginal water rights the act of the sovereign must be ‘clear and
unambiguous,’ but held that Spanish actions toward the Pueblos met that
standard.964
Other water rights cases involved the (1) Havasupai Tribe965 and (2)
the Ak-Chin Community966 having claims dismissed for failure to join the
United States as an indispensable party, (3) a challenge by the Crow Creek
Sioux was dismissed because even though the United States built a pair of
959. Id. at *5.
960. Id. at *6.
961. Id. at *7–8 (“Permitting TCID to escape liability for its repeated violations of federal law
because the case is now in a posture that requires the United States and the Tribe to base any request
for recoupment on historical—and apparently uncontroverted—data that was admitted for a different
purpose at trial plainly contravenes the spirit of Bell II.”).
962. Id. at *9.
963. United States v. Abousleman, 83cv01041 MV/WPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164733 at *4
(D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2017).
964. Id. at *11–12 (“Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, the Pueblos were able to increase their
use of public waters without restriction. After its arrival, the Spanish crown insisted on its exclusive
right and power to determine the rights to public shared waters. Spanish law plainly provided that the
waters were to be common to both the Spaniards and the Pueblos, and that the Pueblos did not have
the right to expand their use of water if it were to the detriment of others. Although Spain allowed the
Pueblos to continue their use of water, and did not take any affirmative act to decrease the amount of
water the Pueblos were using, the circumstances cited by the expert for the United States and Pueblos
plainly and unambiguously indicate Spain’s intent to extinguish the Pueblos’ right to increase their
use of public waters without restriction and that Spain exercised complete dominion over the
determination of the right to use public waters adverse to the Pueblos’ pre-Spanish aboriginal right to
use water.”).
965. Havasupai Tribe v. Anasazi Water Co., 321 F.R.D. 351 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2017).
966. Ak-Chin Indian Cmty. v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., No. CV-17-00918-PHXDGC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117846 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2017).
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dams on the Missouri River the tribe was still able to draw all the water it
needed,967 and (4) a court rejected Freeport Minerals Corporation’s
attempt to change where it was drawing its water from the Gila River.968
Also in 2017, (5) Nevada tribes lost an appeal seeking to overturn the
Bureau of Land Management’s approval of the first phase of a plan to
divert water from northern part of the state down toward Clark County,969
(6) the Montana Supreme Court held that non-Indian land owners who
bought an allotment that used to be in trust had until 2019 to seek a
declaration of water rights to run with that property,970 and (7) the Ninth
Circuit rejected a challenge from the Navajo Nation to the Department of
the Interior’s guidelines on rights to water from the Colorado River during
surplus and shortage years but permitted the tribe’s breach of trust claim
to move forward. 971
V.

Other Developments

There were a number of one-off Indian law decisions that did not
lend themselves into the development of larger themes covered by section
IV but which an annual survey would be remiss if it ignored entirely. This
section is intended to capture those one-off themes and provide brief
discussion—but thorough and complete citation—for readers who are
interested in reading more.
638 Contracting: The District of Montana decided a pair of opinions
on the eligibility of the Northern Arapaho Tribe to qualify for 638
contracting for its tribal court. 972 The court emphasized the situation is

967. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 408 (Ct. Fed. Claims June 1, 2017).
968. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation District, 859 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2017).
969. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, No. 2:14-cv-00226APG-VCF, 2017 U.S Dist. LEXIS 137089, at *53–56 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017) (The Goshute tribe
argued that BLM had failed to comply with this consultation process in relation to the water diversion.
The district court disagreed; it held that the record showed that BLM’s field manager, Nevada State
Director, BLM’s project manager, ethnographer, and associate field manager all had meetings with
the tribe over a period of five years. This included at least six meetings on the reservation and resulted
in a 137-page cultural resources inventory and a 147-page ethnographic assessment which altogether
is a much more detailed consultation process than courts have approved on other projects for
compliance with NHPA and shows BLM’s good faith effort to include the tribe in its decision making
process. The court did not block the first phase of the water diversion project.).
970. Scott Ranch LLC., 402 P.2d 1207, 1211–12 (Mont. 2017).
971. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017).
972. Northern Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte, CV-16-11-BLGS-BMM; CV-16-60-BLGS-BMM
(Consolidated), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32350 (D. Mont. Mar. 7, 2017) (While negotiations are still
ongoing the issues raised by the Northern Arapaho were not ripe for review); Northern Arapaho Tribe
v. LaCounte, CV-16-11-BLG-BMM; CV-16-60-BLG-BMM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97525 (D. Mont.
June 22, 2017) (The Northern Arapaho argued that a 638 court operated only by the NAT could still
serve Eastern Shoshone by asserting criminal jurisdiction over them and opening its court’s
jurisdiction to civil actions filed by Eastern Shoshone members. The federal court remanded to Interior
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particularly complicated because while the Wind River Reservation is
treated as one reservation, there are two different tribes that maintain
separate tribal governments and services (Eastern Shoshone & Northern
Arapaho).973 The Eastern Shoshone ended their support for a unified court
and asked Interior to reinstate a CFR court while the Northern Arapaho
sought to continue to operate its tribal court under a 638 contract.974
§ 1983 Claims: In Morales-Alfonso v. Francisco Enterprises, the
District of Arizona clarified that the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not
extend to parties acting under the color of tribal law.975 The plaintiff
brought several claims against Tohono O’odham officials alleging he was
treated poorly and forced to leave while attempting to trade at a swap
meet.976 His complaint alleged that his poor treatment was because of
“racial/ethnic troubles with the staff” and that he was told “in Indian
territory you have no rights.”977 The Court dismissed his 1983 claims
because the statute does not apply to a defendant acting under color of
tribal law.978
Attorney Qualifications: In Rose v. Office of Professional Conduct
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the disbarment of plaintiff Susan Rose for
violations of Utah’s Rules of Professional Conduct which occurred in
federal and tribal (Navajo) courts.979 Plaintiff objected, arguing that the
state should not be able to sanction her for activity that occurred outside
of state courts.980 The Utah Supreme Court held that it has jurisdiction over
all lawyers licensed by the state regardless of where they practice; “[t]he
question of whether we have jurisdiction over Rose’s discipline case is
different from whether we would have had jurisdiction to hear the
underlying case. We do not have jurisdiction to hear an Alaskan divorce
case; we do, however, have jurisdiction over a Utah attorney who commits
a breach of the rules of professional conduct while practicing in

to consider these arguments when determining NAT’s eligibility for a 638 contract for judicial
services).
973. Northern Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32350, at *3–4; Northern
Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97525m at *3–4.
974. Id. at *4–5. Both decisions discuss the problems that emerge when two different federally
recognized tribes, that maintain two separate tribal governments, share a single reservation.
975. Morales-Alfonso v. Francisco Enters., CV 15-0200-TUC-JAS (LAB), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 69058 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2017).
976. Id. at *2.
977. Id.
978. Id. at *5.
979. Rose v. Office of Prof’l Conduct, 2017 UT 50 (Utah 2017).
980. Id. ¶ 68 (“Rose seems to believe that because she practiced in federal and Navajo courts,
the State of Utah has no business basing sanctions upon violations of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct that are alleged to have occurred there. She calls our jurisdiction in this case an invasion of
‘US and [Navajo Nation] sovereignty.’”).
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Alaska.”981 The Court accordingly affirmed petitioner’s disbarment for
violating its rules of professional conduct while practicing in federal and
Navajo courts.982
Bad Men Among the Whites: The Treaty of Fort Laramie has an
interesting provision in it which makes the United States liable for actions
committed by ‘bad men among the whites.’983 This provision has been
cited in more than forty cases over the years and had a substantial impact
in one important case decided by the Federal Circuit in 2017. In Jones v.
United States Utah state police attempted to stop a car near but not on the
reservation.984 The car turned onto the reservation and stopped about 25
miles inside the reservation borders.985 The driver and passenger split up
and the driver was apprehended without incident.986 State police officers
testified that after being cornered, and after shots had been exchanged, the
passenger turned his gun on himself and fired.987 State officers handcuffed
the passenger but provided no medical assistance.988 The passenger was
still alive thirty minutes later when an ambulance arrived, but was
pronounced dead upon arriving at a medical center.989 The medical
examiner found a bullet had entered from the back of the head and found
no soot on the passenger’s hands, but declared it a suicide; although the
medical examiner later testified that he could not rule out an execution
style shot.990 No autopsy was performed and an illegal gun found near the
body was destroyed by the FBI.991 Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the United
States was responsible for the actions of federal and local officials in the
murder and subsequent cover up of the Indian passenger under the Treaty
of 1868.992
The Federal Circuit vacated the Court of Federal Claims order
dismissing the claims, concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged a
981. Id. ¶ 70.
982. Id. ¶ 104.
983. Jones v. United States, 846 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (In the 1868 Treaty the United
States agreed that no persons but those authorized by the government “shall ever be permitted to pass
over, settle upon, or reside in the Territory described in this article” and that “[i]f bad men among the
whites or among other people, subject to the authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong
upon the person or property of the Indians, the United States will . . . proceed at once to cause the
offender to be arrested and punished according to the laws of the United States, and also reimburse
the injured person for the loss sustained.”).
984. Id. at 1346.
985. Id.
986. Id.
987. Id.
988. Id.
989. Id.
990. Id. at 1347.
991. Id.
992. Id. at 1350.
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plausible case for recovery.993 It held that the treaty’s provision applies
only to criminal wrongs because the United States was to “arrest” the
alleged wrongdoers.994 The Court remanded to the Court of Federal Claims
to determine whether the wrongs alleged by the plaintiff would subject the
accused members of law enforcement to arrest under “the law of the
United States.”995 It clarified that those “wrongs” need not necessarily be
affirmative acts, but that omissions could constitute wrongs if failing to
act could have necessitated violent retaliation and asked the lower court to
conduct a more thorough review.996 Finally, the Court went on to discuss
the geographic scope of the treaty provision and concluded that wrongs
begun on the reservation but continuing elsewhere (like at the medical
center) fall within the scope of the treaty provision.997
Cultural Property: There were several cases decided involving tribal
cultural property in 2017. In Round Valley Indian Tribes of California v.
United States Department of Transportation tribal plaintiffs sued the
Department for failure to consult under NHPA and NEPA before
commencing a highway project which could destroy ancestral, cultural,
and archeological resources.998 The district court allowed litigation to
continue holding that the plaintiffs had stated a demand for relief sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss.999 In Roskelly v. Washington State Parks &
Recreation Commission a divided state appellate court allowed 279 acres
of Mount Spokane State Park to be opened for recreational skiing despite
its central importance to the religion of local tribes.1000 The dissent would
have found the Commission’s decision arbitrary and capricious because
the Department of Archeology and Historic Preservation had classified
Mount Spokane as traditional cultural property.1001 Finally, in Caddo
993. Id. at 1359.
994. Id. at 1355–56.
995. Id. at 1357.
996. Id. at 1357–59.
997. Id. at 1359–61 (“[Plaintiff] does not argue that the bad men provision is unlimited in
geographic scope, but argues that a wrong committed on reservation land and continuing offreservation land is cognizable. We agree with this general principle.”).
998. Round Valley Indian Tribes of Cal. v. United States DOT, No. 15-cv-04987-JSW, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34923, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017).
999. Id. at *21–22.
1000. Roskelly v. Wash. State Parks & Rec. Comm’n, No. 48423-4-II, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS
747, at *1–2 (Wash. App. Mar. 28, 2017).
1001. Id. at *38–43 (“As a singular peak, Mount Spokane is a significant landscape feature for
Native American tribes. Mount Spokane was and is used by tribal elders and others for gathering
traditional plants, including bear grass, huckleberries and serviceberries. Tribal elders report that some
berries taste sweeter on the higher elevations of the mountain. Western red-cedar, which grows within
the PASEA, is sacred to the tribes; its bark and bows are used for ceremonies and in medicine. The
Spokane Tribe has been intimately connected to Mount Spokane for as long as oral history recounts.
For the Spokane Tribe, the significance of Mount Spokane includes: the location of a creation myth;
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Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes the Caddo Nation
challenged the construction of a tribal history center on the basis that it
may disrupt the remains of Caddo children who had attended a nearby
Indian school.1002 The Tenth Circuit ultimately dismissed the challenge as
moot because the tribal history center had completed its construction and
so there was no further danger of disruption of tribal burial grounds.1003
Divorce: In Horning v. Horning, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed
a decision of the superior court that did not value or assign health care
benefits between the parties in a divorce.1004 Instead the superior court
equated the wife’s eligibility for healthcare from the Indian Health Service
to the husbands earned benefits through the military’s TRICARE
program.1005 The wife appealed, arguing that her IHS benefit is separate
property but her husband’s military benefits are marital property subject
to equitable distribution.1006 The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed.1007 It
held that healthcare benefits, including TRICARE, are martial property to
the extent the benefits are earned during marriage but that the wife’s
“eligibility to receive IHS healthcare was [ ] acquired before marriage and
is separate property.”1008 The court remanded for proper distribution of
marital property.1009
Equal Protection: In Cole v. Oravec, a Crow tribal member was shot
and killed by a non-Indian on the reservation.1010 The FBI investigated and
declared it a non-crime, which foreclosed some statutory benefits for the
victim’s family.1011 The family of the deceased brought suit against the
government alleging a violation of their equal protection rights.1012 The
district court dismissed the claim for lack of standing.1013 The Ninth
Circuit reversed; “[W]hen the government imposes a discriminatory
barrier making it more difficult for members of a group to obtain a
a vision quest and prayer site; an important hunting and gathering location for first foods and medicinal
plants; and a territorial marker.”).
1002. Caddo Nation v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 877 F.3d 1171, 1775 (10th Cir. 2017).
1003. Id. at 1177 (“We thus constrain our analysis to the relief Caddo Nation sought below: a
temporary restraining order on construction of the History Center.”).
1004. Horning v. Horning, 389 P.3d 61 (Alaska 2017).
1005. Id. at 63.
1006. Id.
1007. Id. at 64.
1008. Id.
1009. Id. at 65.
1010. Cole v. Oravec, No. 14-35664, 700 Fed. Appx. 602, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2017).
1011. Id. at 604.
1012. Id. (“[t]he Bearcrane Family Members alleged that Defendants’ conduct has caused them
to suffer several distinct injuries. They claimed that they receive fewer and less-adequate law
enforcement services and are therefore less secure than other citizens, which has severely impacted
them, both emotionally and economically.”).
1013. Id.

930

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:805

benefit . . . , the injury of unequal opportunity to compete confers
standing.”1014 The court went on to determine that the complaint alleged a
plausible violation of equal protection rights because it showed a higher
rate of crime committed against Native Americans than non-Native
Americans, alleged that the FBI has abdicated its responsibility to
investigate crimes involving Indian victims, found that the FBI regularly
destroys relevant evidence involving reservation crime, and concluded
that the Montana field office regularly closes cases involving Indian
victims without investigating.1015 It remanded the case for further
proceedings.1016
Federal Courts are not Tribal Appellate Courts: There were a series
of cases in 2017 in which petitioners in federal actions tried to use federal
courts to review the merits of tribal court decisions interpreting tribal law.
None of these attempts were successful as federal courts are not tribal
appellate courts. In Eagleman v. Rocky Boy Chippewa-Cree Tribal
Business Committee or Council three tribal members originally filed
common law claims in tribal court against the tribal housing authority.1017
The tribal court dismissed the claims on the basis of sovereign
immunity.1018 The plaintiffs then filed suit in federal court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the tribal court erred in dismissing their
claims.1019 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s
petition.1020 The Ninth Circuit went on to discuss the relationship between
tribal and federal courts.
The Eaglemans essentially ask the district court to sit as a general
appellate body to review the decision of the tribal court. This
miscomprehends the relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes. Tribal courts are not vertically aligned under the
federal judicial hierarchy. They are institutions within coordinate
sovereign entities vested with the power to regulate internal tribal
affairs. Asserting jurisdiction here would effectively expand this
court’s authority to superintend matters of tribal self-governance.
1014. Id. at 604–05.
1015. Id. at 605–06.
1016. Id. at 606.
1017. Eagleman v. Rocky Boy Chippewa-Cree Tribal Bus. Comm. or Council, 699 Fed. Appx.
599 (9th Cir. 2017).
1018. Id. at 600.
1019. Id.
1020. Id. at 601 (The Court used the well-pled complaint rule to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.
“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a claim must actually arise under federal law to trigger
jurisdiction under § 1331. A litigant may not plead his way into federal court by asserting an opposing
party’s federal defense. Here, tribal sovereign immunity arose as a defense in tribal court, and the
allegation that the tribal court erred in applying the defense is not a question ‘arising under’ federal
law for purposes of § 1331.”) (internal citations omitted).
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And because we lack general appellate power over the tribal court,
we would be unable to afford effective relief to the Eaglemans even
if we determined that the tribal court erred.1021

The Ninth Circuit’s summary is a concise description of the
interaction between federal and tribal courts. Two other federal district
courts also had to dismiss appeals from tribal courts, clarifying that the
same principle articulated in Eagleman that federal courts cannot
reinterpret tribal law.1022
Indian Health Service: While 2017 brought with it many claims that
involved the Indian Health Service (IHS), one case stood out for its
importance in discussing the interaction between the Affordable Care Act
and the provision of health care in Indian Country. In Redding Rancheria
v. Hargan plaintiff Redding Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe,
brought a claim against the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) seeking reimbursement for health services provided under a
compact with HHS under the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (ISDEAA). 1023 The defendants have consistently refused
reimbursement because they dispute the legitimacy of the tribe’s
coordination of a tribal insurance scheme with IHS benefits and the federal
agency is prohibited from making the reimbursements under the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act as amended by the Affordable Care Act.1024
The federal district court concluded that HHS’s interpretation of the
IHCIA was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute and
remanded back to IHS administrative courts for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.1025
Labor & Employment: Indian employment law cases often involve
whether the tribe is bound by state or federal labor rules. In County of
Riverside v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board the county appealed
1021. Id. (internal citations omitted).
1022. Lesperance v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 259 F. Supp. 3d 713, 719 (W.D.
Mich., 2017) (“When a tribe enacts a waiver of sovereign immunity, does the federal court have
jurisdiction to interpret it, either in an original action, or on review from a tribal court decision? The
Court believes the answer is ‘no,’ at least in this case. There is no diversity of citizenship. Neither is
there a general federal question presented by the scope and application of a tribal sovereign immunity
ordinance . . . . Finally, even if some basis for original subject matter jurisdiction existed, there would
still be no basis for this Court to exercise what would amount to appellate review of a tribal court
decision.”); Wilson v. Umpqua Indian Dev. Corp., No. 6:17-cv-00123-AA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
101808, at *8 (D. Or. June 29, 2017) (“But ‘jurisdiction’ is not a magic word that automatically creates
a federal question in the Indian law context. Rather, whether a dispute about the extent of a tribal
court’s jurisdiction raises a federal question depends on the source of the limitation on jurisdiction.
Here, the Tribal Court dismissed based on a jurisdictional limitation imposed by tribal law.”).
1023. Redding Rancheria v. Hargan, No. 14-2035 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184061 at *2
(D.D.C., Nov. 7, 2017).
1024. Id. at *2–3.
1025. Id. at *36–37.
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from a determination that it was liable for a former employee’s injury.1026
The state appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the county was liable
because the employee’s last employer was the Pauma Band of Luiseno
Indians.1027 Therefore, under state law, the last employer with workers’
compensation coverage becomes liable and since the tribe was not
obligated to carry coverage, the county was left with the obligation.1028
In Unite Here International Union v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok
Indians, the Union brought suit to compel arbitration with the tribe over a
claim that the tribe interfered with labor organization activity at the
casino.1029 The court determined that it was appropriate for the parties to
arbitrate about whether their dispute was subject to arbitration.1030 At the
same time the federal court declined to proceed with a separate claim
brought by the Tribe under the Declaratory Judgment Act, deferring
instead to arbitration.1031
Lay Advocates: Many tribes permit persons without a law degree,
but trained as lay advocates, to appear before them to represent clients.
This can cause confusion in the state and federal court systems. The issue
of tribal lay-advocates was at the center of United States v. Sanchez.1032 In
Sanchez, the defendant was charged with a first degree murder that
occurred on the Crow reservation.1033 After being arrested, the defendant
asked for an attorney and then specifically asked by name for a tribal
advocate.1034 The BIA Agents clarified that the advocate was not an
attorney and confirmed that the advocate was who the defendant wanted
to represent him.1035 The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the

1026. County of Riverside v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 119, 122 (Cal.
App. 2017).
1027. Id. at 128 (“[T]he fact that the Pauma Police Department is not subject to the WCAB’s
jurisdiction means the department was not ‘insured for workers’ compensation coverage or an
approved alternative thereof.’”).
1028. Id.
1029. Unite Here Int’l Union v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, No. 2:16-cv-00384TLN-EFB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108179 at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2017).
1030. Id. at *5–6 (“At bottom, ‘a broad arbitration clause—even one that does not specifically
mention who decides arbitrability—is sufficient to grant the arbitrator authority to decide his or her
own jurisdiction.’ . . . Thus, the parties have reserved for the arbitrator the question of arbitrability.
The Court is ‘divested of [its] authority and [the] arbitrator will decide in the first instance whether
[this] dispute is arbitrable.’”).
1031. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians v. Unite Here Int’l Union, No. 2:16-cv-01057TLN-EFB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108152 at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2017).
1032. United States v. Sanchez, CR 16-82-BLG-SPW-1, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1553 (D. Mont.
Jan. 5, 2017).
1033. Id. at *1.
1034. Id. at *2–5.
1035. Id. at *3.
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statements he made to law enforcement as a violation of his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.1036
The court concluded that the statements were admissible.1037
Specifically the court held that the defendant’s request for the advocate
was not “an unambiguous request for an attorney because [the defendant]
maintained he wanted to speak with [the tribal advocate] after the agents
clarified that [the tribal advocate was] not an attorney.”1038 Accordingly,
the court reasoned, a reasonable agent would not have understood the
defendant’s request to be for a lawyer because the defendant clarified that
he wanted the advocate after being informed that the advocate was not an
attorney.1039
Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act: In 2017, federal courts decided four
challenges to the denial of relocation benefits by the Office of Navajo &
Hopi Indian Relocation. In Laughter v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian
Relocation and Bahe v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, the
court affirmed the denial because there was documented evidence which
contradicted family testimony about the dates and times of settlement.1040
In Burnside v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, the court
affirmed the denial of benefits to three separate claimants who had waited
between five and ten years to appeal even after the Office had issued
Policy Memorandum 9 permitting appeals from previous denials.1041 In
Begay v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, the court reversed
the denial of benefits and remanded.1042 It reasoned that the evidence
suggested that the claimant may have been a resident on the partitioned
lands on December 22, 1974, as required by law1043 and may have earned
enough money to qualify as head of household.1044 It remanded with
instructions to verify the claimant’s income in 1984 and ensure it was at
least $1,300 in order to qualify under the law.1045
Rights-of-Way: Courts decided many cases dealing with access to
and across tribal lands in 2017, from oil and gas companies to utilities. The
1036. Id. at *1.
1037. Id. at *6–10.
1038. Id. at *6.
1039. Id. at *7–8.
1040. Laughter v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, No. CV-16-08196-PCT-DLR,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101116 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2017); Bahe v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian
Relocation, No. CV-17-08016-PCT-DLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212562 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2017).
1041. Burnside v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, No. CV-15-08233-PCT-PGR,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158804 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2017).
1042. Begay v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, No. CV-16-08221-PCT-DGC, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159648 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2017).
1043. Id. at *11–12.
1044. Id. at *7–9.
1045. See id. at *11.
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most notable case came from the Tenth Circuit. In Public Service Co. of
New Mexico v. Barboan, the public utility sought to condemn a right-ofway for electrical lines against five parcels owned by the Navajo Nation
and its members after they withheld consent.1046 The district court held that
on two of the parcels the Navajo Nation itself now holds an interest and
that 25 U.S.C. § 357 does not permit condemnation of an interest held by
the tribal sovereign.1047 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.1048 The Tenth Circuit
pointed to the difference between 25 U.S.C. § 357 which allows for
condemnation against Indian allotments and 25 U.S.C. § 319 which allows
the Secretary to grant rights-of-way across reservations for the limited
purpose of telephone and telegraph lines.1049 The utility argued that once
land was allotted it remained always allotted even if the tribe were to
obtain the entirety of the interest.1050 The Tenth Circuit disagreed:
“Congress has neither enacted nor amended § 357 to establish that everallotted status would permanently trump any later tribal acquisitions.”1051
The Court reasoned that the amount of interest owned by the tribe does not
matter, any tribal interest is enough to prevent condemnation
proceedings.1052
Tobacco: In Ho-Chunk Inc. v. Sessions, the plaintiff, a corporation
organized by the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, challenged the
application of the recordkeeping requirements of the Contraband Cigarette
Trafficking Act (CCTA) to tribal businesses.1053 It filed a claim in federal
court seeking a declaratory judgment that the recordkeeping requirements
of CCTA do not apply in ‘Indian country’ and alternatively that tribal
businesses, as instrumentalities of tribal government, are not ‘persons’
covered by the Act.1054 The court rejected both arguments.1055 It concluded
that 2006 amendments to CCTA that specifically exclude imposing new
reporting requirements on tribes were not retroactive and that the original

1046. Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Barboan, 857 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017).
1047. Id. at 1107.
1048. Id. at 1104.
1049. Id. at 1105–07 (The Tenth Circuit made clear “‘a plain and clear distinction’ exists
‘between the granting of rights-of-way over and across reservations or tribal lands and those allotted
in severalty to restricted Indians.’”).
1050. Id. at 1109.
1051. Id.
1052. Id. at 1110–11 (“When all or part of a parcel of allotted land owned by one or more
individuals is transferred to the United States in trust for a tribe; that land becomes ‘tribal land’ not
subject to condemnation under § 357.”).
1053. Ho-Chunk Inc. v. Sessions, 253 F. Supp. 3d 303, 304 (D.D.C., 2017).
1054. Id. at 306–07.
1055. Id. at 307–10.
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recordkeeping requirements under CCTA do still apply in Indian
country.1056
Treaty Abrogation: In Swinomish Indian Tribe Cmty. v. BNSF
Railway. Co., the Court was asked to determine whether the Swinomish
Tribe’s right to exclusive use of its reservation guaranteed in the Treaty of
Point Elliott of 1855 (and thus the right to exclude a railroad from
operating a rail line crossing the reservation without its consent) had been
abrogated by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995 (ICCTA).1057 The federal court reiterated the Supreme Court’s
requirement for preemption that abrogation can only be found if there is
clear evidence of Congress’ intent to abrogate.1058 The court concluded
that “[t]here is no such evidence in this case.”1059 The court reasoned that
Congress had acted to specifically protect Indian authority over railroads
in the Indian Right of Way Act (IRWA) and that ICCTA and IRWA act in
different spheres and are not mutually exclusive.1060 The Court recognized
that it is unclear whether Congress considered the conflict between the
statutes, but that even if it did “[i]t most certainly did not make clear an
intention to resolve potential conflicts by abrogating the treaty right of
‘exclusive use’ or repealing the IRWA.”1061 The Court reaffirmed this
conclusion in relation to the Treaty of Point Elliott explicitly in a
subsequent order from June 2017.1062

1056. Id. at 308–09 (The CCTA amendments “clarif[y] that ‘[n]othing in this chapter shall be
deemed to abrogate or constitute a waiver of any sovereign immunity of a State or local government,
or an Indian tribe against any unconsented lawsuit under this chapter.’ Plaintiffs argue that reading
‘State’ to include Indian country under the recordkeeping regulations somehow violates this latter
provision, because it encroaches on ‘tribal sovereignty.’ But ‘sovereign immunity’ is a term of art, and
in this context it is clearly a reference to tribes’ general immunity from suit, not a broader policy
statement regarding the autonomy of Indian government and lands.”) (internal citations omitted).
1057. Swinomish Indian Tribe Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 228 F. Supp.3d 1171 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
13, 2017). Additional discussion of this case is available under the “Trespass” section of this annual
update.
1058. Id. at 1181 (“What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose
to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”) (internal citations omitted).
1059. Id.
1060. Id. at 1181–82.
1061. Id. at 1181.
1062. Swinomish Indian Tribe Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-0543RSL, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88449 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2017) (“The Treaty of Point Elliott is not mentioned in the ICCTA,
nor is any treaty or agreement with Indian nations. The fact that rail lines cross tribal lands throughout
the United States was known at the time the ICCTA was passed, as were the tribe’s treaty rights to
exclusive use of those lands. Yet Congress expressly addressed the intersection of railroad rights of
way and tribal lands only through the IRWA, a statute which pre-dated the ICCTA by almost half a
century. Under the IRWA, if an individual or entity uses tribal lands without obtaining the necessary
permissions, the unauthorized use is a trespass and the Tribe ‘may pursue any available remedies under
applicable law. . . .’ 25 C.F.R. § 169.413. Thus, the congressional pronouncement that specifically
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Trespass: In Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, plaintiffs were
38 individual Indians and the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma who own
undivided interests in an allotment under which the defendant has a gas
pipeline.1063 The easement agreement expired in 2000 and the defendant
has been unable to obtain consent for a renewal but has continued to use
the pipeline.1064 Plaintiffs brought an action for trespass, seeking damages
and an injunction preventing its future use. The court, relying in part on
25 U.S.C. § 324 held that although the defendant was able to obtain
consent from five of the individual Indian landowners, their collective
interest was less than 10% of the whole and so there was no consent to the
trespass.1065 The court granted the tribe’s motion for partial summary
judgment as to liability for the trespass, issued an injunction immediately
enjoining the defendant from using the pipeline, and ordered its removal
within six months.1066
CONCLUSION
The year 2017 was an interesting one for Indian law. As the year
ends, we have three cases pending this term in front of the Supreme Court
and several others awaiting a decision on certiorari.1067 The Court
delivered its newest pronouncement on sovereign immunity, encouraging
the development of a canon of Indian law which will now look more
closely to determine the real party in interest in a lot of litigation involving
tribal officials.1068 Justice Thomas issued a lone dissent on the scope of the
Indian Commerce Clause.1069
It is my hope that the reader takes something away from this
summary of the year in Indian law. Whether you have stumbled across this
article in 2018 or 2028 there is certainly something important about trying
to collect and synthesize the year’s developments. I note that while this
piece contains a discussion of, and citation to, many of the cases decided
this year – many others have been omitted at the author’s discretion and
for the sake of space. I welcome any comments on how this project could
be improved or be made more useful for future iterations.

addresses tribal rights vis-a-vis a railroad right of way leaves intact the Tribe’s right to pursue a treatybased trespass action under federal law.”).
1063. Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, 247 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1235 (W.D. Okla., 2017).
1064. Id.
1065. Davilla, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 1237–38.
1066. Id. at 1238–39.
1067. See supra Section III.
1068. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017).
1069. See Upstate Citizens for Equality v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2017).

